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The Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedanta Prize.

Essay for 1915.

*Discuss how far Sankaracharya truly
represents the view of the author
of the Brahmasutras.*


BY

M. T. TELIVALA, B. A., LL. B.,
VAKIL, HIGH COURT.

WITH A SHORT SKETCH OF HIS LIFE.

Motto: “धात्रा स्वेन सदा सत्यं परं धीमहि.”

SECOND EDITION.



UNDER THE DISTINGUISHED PATRONAGE OF GOSWAMI
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श्रीमद्रोस्वामिकुलचुडामणि तीलकायत श्रीगोवर्धनलालजी ।



प्राकटयं संवत् १९१७ श्रावण कृष्ण १.

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PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

This is one of the two essays selected by the Bombay University for the Sâjnas Gokulji Zala Vedant Prize 1915. The essay was submitted in June 1915; and the result was declared in December 1917. Except Appendix A and a footnote on page 90, no new matter has been added to the original, and no material change made. I have to thank Mr. Tribhuvandas Pitambardas Shah of Nadiad, for defraying the expenses of printing this essay from the Nadiad Pushti-margiya Library Funds, and Mr. D. V. Sankalia, B. A., LL. B., for revising it and reading the proofs.

Bombay. }
15-4-18. }

M. T. TELIVALA.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

This is a reprint of the first Edition. A short sketch of the life of the departed scholar has been added and proofs corrected by his colleagues and friends Messrs. Dhirajlal Sankalia, Vadilal Shah, Jamnadas Morporia, Gordhandas Pragji, Hiralal Mulji and Purushottam Morporia.

Bombay, }
20-7-1928. }

RANCHHODDAS VARJIWANDAS.

“ धाम्ना स्वेन सदा सत्यं परं धीमहि ”.

“Discuss how far Śaṅkarâchârya truly represents the view of the author of Brahmasutras.”

The Sujna Gokulji Zala Vedanta Prize

Essay for the Year 1915.

Before taking up the main subject, let us advert to some preliminary points, which are worked out by commentators of the Brahma-sûtras. The first of these is:-who is the Adhikârin of this S'âstra? In the S'ugâdhikaraṇa (1-3-34-38, B. S.), the Sûtrakâra declares that, among mortals, S'ûdras have no Adhikâra in this Vedic S'âstra, though a god has. Among the members of the first three castes who is the Adhikârin? Of course the Traivarnika must be learned in the Vedas, he must be capable of undertaking *Sravaṇa*, *manana* etc., he must be possessed of some desire for elevation. These requirements are necessary, they are suggested, *arthâ-* but beyond this, in the whole of the Brahma-mīmāṃsâ, the Sûtrakâra does not consider the question of Adhikâra. Śaṅkara maintains that before one undertakes Brahma-Jijnâsâ, he ought to be possessed of the four viz. (1) नित्याभ्यासवन्तुष्विदं, (2) इहामुन्नाय-भोगविराग, (3) शमदमादिभावतत्त्वज्ञ, and (4) मुमुक्षुत्व. These four are, according to Śaṅkara, *sine qua non* to the of Brahman, and these are, he thinks, by the Sûtrakâra by the word 'अथ' in the 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा'. This 'अथ' is used in the sense of अनन्तरं, and

presupposes the existence of the four requirements mentioned above, and not a कर्मविबोधः. A knowledge of the Karma-mîmânsâ is no condition precedent to the study of Brahma-mîmânsâ. This is the view of S'āṅkarâchârya as regards अविवेकः.

Bhâskara¹ and Râmânujâ² both maintain अनन्तर्यं, and reject the आन्तर्य of the above-mentioned four requirements.

It appears that the Sûtrakâra has in his mind neither of the two views. The 'अथ' suggests neither this nor that. 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' is the first Sûtra of the Brahmamîmânsâ introducing the reader to the S'âstra. S'āṅkarâchârya rejects धर्मनान्तर्यं on the grounds that ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा may precede धर्मजिज्ञासा of one who has studied Vedânta, and that there is nothing to establish the custom that धर्ममीमांसा must be studied before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. By similar arguments Vallabha³ also comes to the same conclusion. To add to this, Bâdarâyana and Jaimini are opposed in their views on this point, and as Prof. A. B. Dhruva remarked in his recent University lectures, a reader cannot be expected to study the works of the opponent before he studies his own, so a student of ब्रह्ममीमांसा does not necessarily need study धर्ममीमांसा before ब्रह्ममीमांसा. It is not disputed that some of the पूर्वमीमांसान्यायस are referred to here, but that does not compel us to come to the conclusion that a knowledge of धर्ममीमांसा is a condition precedent. Bhâskara accepts ज्ञानकर्मनमुचयः, and says that this is the view of Bâdarâyana expressed in 'सर्वपिष्ठा च यज्ञादि

1. 'नित्यानित्यविवेकादयः अन्तःकरणधर्माः पूर्वव्याख्यातः स्वशब्देन चानिर्दिष्टाः कथमिव सूत्रकारस्य विवक्षिता इति प्रतिपत्तुं शक्यते' भा. भा. p. 4.

2. 'अपि च नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकादयः मीमांसाश्रवणमन्तरेण न संपत्स्यन्ते, फलप्रकरणेति धर्मप्रतिपत्तिरिति धर्मनान्तर्यं कर्मस्वरूपतत्कल्यतस्थित्वास्थित्वात्मनित्यत्वादीनां दुरुवबोधात्' श्रीभाष्य. p. 13.

3. 'न तावद्धर्मनान्तर्यम्, विपर्ययसंभवात्, न च पाठतो नियमः, तत्रापि तथा, न च आचाराद् व्यवस्था, अत्रापि अनियमसंभवात्, प्रत्यवायाश्रवणात्' A. B. pp, 26-27.

श्रुतेरश्वद्' (3-4-26.) Even accepting for a moment Bhâskara's suggestion of ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चय, it does not in the least invalidate S'ankara's argument—*प्रागपि ब्रह्म-जिज्ञासोपपत्तेः*. The Sûtra (3-4-26.) only says that a knowledge of *ब्रह्ममीमांसा* is also recommended but does not say it should necessarily precede the study of *ब्रह्ममीमांसा*. One may as well study *ब्रह्ममीमांसा* first, and then *कर्ममीमांसा*, or *vice versa*. There is no प्रत्यवाय prescribed whichever one begins first. Hence S'ankarâchârya, on this very argument alone, is right in rejecting धर्मानन्तर्य. But is he then right in prescribing the *ब्रह्ममीमांसा*? It is undoubted that this view does not suggest itself from the words of the Sûtrakâra. S'ankara's शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्ति is based on the passage of the Bṛihadâraṇyaka 4-4-23, but that passage refers to the stage of a person who has¹ known Brahman. Before one knows Brahman it is impossible for him to be possessed of शमदमादि, while according to S'ankara's view शमदमादि must precede ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा. This is rather placing the cart before the horse. One may never have शमदमादि, and then he will always be debarred from studying this ब्रह्ममीमांसा. The result would be शास्त्रोच्छेद. Vallabha² says that this view is opposed to our daily experience. The Sûtra³ (1-1-1) only introduces the reader to the study of Brahmanîmânasâ, and there neither any suggestion of धर्मानन्तर्य nor साधनननुष्ठानान्तर्य. Both the views are not countenanced by the Sûtrakâra. Of course a knowledge of the Upanishads seems to be necessary for the right understanding of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. This knowledge of the Veda and a sort of earnest desire for ' ' ' of

1. 'अथ नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य × × × य एवं वेद' 4-4-23. Br. Upa.

2. 'इदानीन्तनानामपि शमदमादिर्हितानां निर्विनिर्वातस्तत्त्वैर्यज्ञानोपलब्धैः' A. B. B. S. S. p. 32.

3. अथाथो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा.

Brahman seem to be *sine qua non* to the study of ब्रह्ममीमांसा. A Nimbârka writer comes very near this view when he says:—‘किं तद्वस्तु यदनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा विधीयते इत्यपेक्षायां सुमुक्षेति तत्सहकारीणि च श्रद्धोपपत्तिर्गुरुतत्त्वज्ञानादिति’ (परपक्षगिरिवज्र p. 18). Hence if the आनन्तर्यार्थि is insisted upon, we cannot go further than the suggestion made above. Vallabha seems to be driving at the truth when he accepts अधिकारार्थ after examining and rejecting the आनन्तर्यार्थ, saying that it is full of objections ‘अनेकेष्वपि तदुक्तं तदधिकारार्थ एव श्रेयान्’ (अ. भा. B. S. S. p. 33.).

The Veda.

The method of composition adopted by Bâdarâyana leads one to suppose that the Sûtrakâra had a double object in view, viz to remove doubts, and at the same time to summarise the teachings of the Upanishads. It is therefore necessary to consider in what light he views the Vedas. After undertaking an inquiry of Brahman in ‘अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा’ 1-1-1, and giving the definition of Brahman in ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’, he goes on to say that Brahman is revealed from the S’âstra *i. e.* Veda. He means thereby to say that his conception of Brahman is based on Veda alone. Śaṅkara says in शास्त्रयोनित्वात् 1-1-3, that this Sûtra has been written with a view to emphasize the omniscience of Brahman, which has been suggested in the definition of Brahman in ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’. This may be as Śaṅkara says, or may not be as Jayatîrtha says. It is clear that when once Brahman is defined to be one from which origination, existence and absorption take place, when it is said to be कर्तृ the creator of the universe, its omniscience is established, and no further Sûtra is needed to repeat it. Whatever it may be, this Sûtra ‘शास्त्रयोनित्वात्’ gives us an opportunity

to consider the attitude of the Sūtrakāra and S'āṅkara towards the Veda. By declaring the शास्त्रयोनित्व of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra declares that his conception of Brahman is entirely based on Veda. He further on declares that तर्क is अप्रतिष्ठ. Independent reasoning has nothing to do with his conception of Brahman. All contradictions are removed by taking shelter in the word of the श्रुति. S'āṅkara's attitude on the whole is undetermined. Once he says *असंगतः प्रसंगविगम्य एव त्वयमर्थः, धर्मवत्* 2. 1. 6. B. S. but on good many occasions he departs from this rule. In 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27, we have a very clear instance. Bādarāyaṇa removes the difficulty raised by S'āṅkara in his usual way, viz. taking shelter in the text of the श्रुति, but S'āṅkara goes further and says 'ननु शब्देनापि न शक्यते विरुद्धः अर्थः प्रतिपत्तुम्'. S'āṅkara's shelter is अविद्या, (अविद्याकल्पितभेदाभ्यासमात्). Throughout the whole of the *Brahma-mīmāṃsā* the Sūtrakāra never resorts to any other authority except प्रत्यक्ष and अनुमान which respectively mean श्रुति and स्मृति which is श्रुत्यनुसारिणी. Independent ratiocination has no place in his

S'āṅkara fails very badly in representing the view of the Sūtrakāra in not submitting himself to the ideal of the Sūtrakāra. Even if S'āṅkara's attitude may be justified on philosophical grounds independent of श्रुति, the fact remains that, that is not the way in which the Sūtrakāra would look at it, and so long as he would not, it is useless to discuss that question here. To the Sūtrakāra, any reasoning, not in strict harmony with the letter of the Veda, is useless (अत एव न नित्यत्वम् 1-3-29). To the Sūtrakāra, Veda is eternal (अत एव न नित्यत्वम् 1-3-29). From the words of the Sūtra we do not learn much further than this, but it is quite clear that the attitude of the Sūtrakāra is very devout. Like S'āṅkara he has no courage to say:—'अविषयत्वे ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रयोनित्वानुपपत्तिरिति चेत्, न,

अविद्याकल्पितमेदमित्यतिपरत्वात् शास्त्रस्य, न हि शास्त्रं इदंतया विषयभूतं किं तर्हि, प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन अविषयतया प्रतिपादयदविद्याकल्पितं भेदेऽविद्याकल्पितेऽविद्याकल्पितं नयति' 1-1-4. V. S. From the very undertaking of investigation and definition of Brahman by the Sûtrakâra, it is quite clear that S'ankara is not justified in making the above remark. Bâdarâyana's whole system is entirely based on the words of श्रुति, so the duty of his commentator is not to modify or correct his statements, but simply to put them in their true light. The aim of the S'âstra is not merely the removal of अविद्याकल्पितमेदं but the realisation of Brahman. Except श्रुति, and तदनुसारिस्मृति, the Sûtrakâra does not take the aid of any other प्रमाण in support of his statements. S'ankara also does not say that he accept any more प्रमाण. The later S'ankara writers accept six Pramânas, but with that we are not concerned. If S'ankara had maintained the position as declared¹ by him in दृश्यते तु। (2-1-6) throughout, we should have seen him entirely at one with the Sûtrakâra. Looking at S'ankara's Bhâshya as a whole, one sees a sort of contradiction running throughout, so far as his attitude to the S'âstra is concerned. While meeting the Mîmâṃsikas, he draws a distinction² between पुरुषतत्त्व and वस्तुतत्त्व. धर्म is पुरुषतत्त्व, and as such does not admit of any reasoning independent of Veda, while Brahman is वस्तुतत्त्व, and as such, admits the claims of reasoning. But when the Sāṅkhya opposes him, he declares, as is said above, that the conception of Brahman like धर्म is based on Scripture alone, and does not admit of any प्रमाण independent of Veda (2-1-6). If S'ankara had

1. 'यत्तुक्तं परिनिष्पन्नत्वाद् ब्रह्मणि प्रमाणान्तराणि सभवेयुरिति, तदपि मनोरथमात्रम्, रूपाद्यभावाद् हि नायं अर्थः प्रत्यक्षस्य गोचरः, लिङ्गाद्यभावाच्च नानुमानादीनाम्, आगममात्र-समाधिगम्य एव तु अयमर्थो धर्मवत् × × × दृश्यते तु। एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवांगत्वेन श्रीयते।' 2—1. 6.

2. अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या, किं तर्हि, प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवत् वस्तुतन्त्रा अ। 1-1-4-S. B.

avoided this contradiction, and adhered to the view expressed in 2-1-6, his faithfulness to the Sâtrakâra would have been greatly enhanced.

Bâdarâyana's attitude towards his opponents, though queer, is justified on the ground that it is consistent. When difficulties are raised against his system by a Sâṅkhya or a Vaiśeṣhika, he says his system is based on *श्रुति* alone, and as such has nothing to do with reasoning, 2-1-29. But his opponents, as they accept *तर्क*, cannot take advantage of this position. As they resort to *तर्क*, he challenges their position by *तर्क*. S'āṅkara fitly remarks on this point thus:—‘अपि च आगमवलेन *कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतीति* नावश्यं तस्य यथादृष्टमेव *नियमोऽस्ति*, परस्य तु दृष्टान्तवलेन *कारणादिस्वरूपं निरूपयतो यथादृष्टमेव*’— 2-2-38. This is a very faithful way of expressing the Sâtrakâra's view, and had S'āṅkara followed the same, he would not have embodied two contradictory interpretations as in 1-1-11-18, 2-1-27, 2-1-29, etc. etc.

Brahman.

Brahman is the centre round which the whole philosophy and theology of the Upanishads turn. In the first Sâtra, ‘अथातो ब्रह्मविज्ञासा’, the Sâtrakâra undertakes an investigation of Brahman, and then immediately in the next Sâtra gives the definition of Brahman, ‘जन्माद्यस्य यतः’, as that in which the world has origination, existence and absorption. It is worthy of note that the Sâtrakâra, instead of defining Brahman as ‘सत्यं ज्ञानं अनन्तं ब्रह्म’ ‘सत्यं ज्ञानं आनन्दं ब्रह्म,’ instead of giving *स्वरूपलक्षण*, gives *कार्यलक्षण*, by declaring that the Brahman of which he has undertaken investigation, is the creator of the Universe. In ‘शास्त्रयोगित्वात्’, he declares further that his definition of Brahman is

entirely based on Scripture. Brahman is शास्त्रैकसमधिगम्य. The Sûtra 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is very important. S'ankara also says that it gives the definition of Brahman. This लक्षण must be referred to the Brahman whose जिज्ञासा has been undertaken in the first Sûtra. Instead of defining Brahman as 'सच्चिदानन्द', Bâdarâyana declares Brahman as that which creates, sustains and absorbs the universe, the reason for this being that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind only the summary of the leading tenets of the Upanishads, but a desire to clear every Vedic passage of importance of any doubt or difficulty by giving its interpretation. To the mind of the Sûtrakâra, the tenets of the Sâṅkhyas' were most prominent. This fact can be inferred from the boundless zeal with which he refutes the principal dogmas of the Sâṅkhyas. On every occasion, he makes a polemic remark against the Sâṅkhya. Now these Sâṅkhyas attributed activity not to Brahman - or more correctly to Purusha, but to *jada* प्रकृति, while the पुरुष was *chetana* but निष्क्रिय etc., Many of the Vedic thinkers themselves were under the spell of the Sâṅkhyas. Thus, this was the crucial point, on which it was essential for the Sûtrakâra, interpreter as he was of the Upanishads, to pronounce a very definite opinion, and this the Sûtrakâra has done by declaring that Brahman is that which creates, sustains, and resolves the world in itself, thereby tacitly rejecting the Sâṅkhya doctrines of पुरुष's being निष्क्रिय and प्रकृति's being कर्त्री. Similarly, by writing the Sûtra 'शास्त्रयोनित्वात्', he boldly declares that his definition of Brahman is entirely based on scripture, meaning thereby that the S'âstra teaches the कर्तृत्व of Brahman and not of प्रकृति. Thus it appears that the learned Sûtrakâra at one stroke achieves two objects, viz. he sets aside the doubts of the Vedic passages, and then with it pronounces a definite view that, Brahman, the

highest entity of the Upanishads, is possessed of activity, and therefore of knowledge also. Thus in “जन्मायस्य यतः,” Brahman as *sad* is shown to be the cause. In ईक्षत्यधिकरण, Brahman, as *chetana*, is shown to be the cause of the universe. In अनन्दमयविशेष, the same Brahman, as *Ānanda-maya*, is declared to be the cause. In Brahman as *sad*, in ईक्षत्यधिकरण as *chetana*, and in *ānanda*, is declared to be the cause of the universe. *Īkshati* and *kāma* being the attributes of *chetana* something, the causality of the non-intelligent *prakṛity* etc., is out of question. Similarly ‘नेतरोनुपपत्तेः’ sets aside the causality of the human soul, though he is *chetana*. Thus, the learned Sūtrakāra, while setting aside the doubt as to कर्तृत्व and कारणत्व of the universe, suggests and establishes that the same *Kartṛi* and *Kāraṇa* Brahman is सगिदानन्द. In other words, सगिदानन्द Brahman as सत्, चित् and आनन्द is the material and efficient cause of the universe, and not *jada Prakṛity* nor *chetana jīva*. Thus by showing the causality of Brahman alone, and suggesting thereby Brahman’s unfettered activity, the Sūtrakāra has established that the same Brahman is After once in brief his conception of Brahman, the Sūtrakāra proceeds to show that, words bearing other senses elsewhere, refer to Brahman alone in the Upanishads, and even while doing so, he does bring out some essential characteristics of Brahman. With this double end in view, he seems to arrange his latter portion of the first chapter. Hence, आनन्दमय, अन्तर आदित्य, आकाश, प्राण, परो दिव्यो ज्योतिः, प्राण, मनोमय प्राणशरीर, अत्ता, अन्तर, अदृश्य, वैश्वानर, भूमान्, अक्षर, दहर्, अंगुष्ठमात्र, प्राण, ज्योतिः, आकाश and विज्ञान-मय are all Brahman. ‘गुहां प्रविष्टो’ refers to Brahman and *jīvātman*, *Samprasāda* refers to Brahman. One clearly sees here that the aim of the Sūtrakāra is not only to say that these words refer to but that they do

bring out a certain attribute of Brahman. The Sûtrakâra, by following this method, develops, and perfects his conception of Brahman, the investigation of which he has proposed to undertake in 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः'.

S'ankara in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' 1-1-2. observes as follows:—
 'यत इति कारणनिर्देशः, अस्य जगतो नामरूपाभ्यां व्याकृतस्य अनेककर्तृत्वोपपत्तिः । सत्तात्त्विकवित्त्वयवनास्य जन्मस्थितिमङ्गलं यतः सर्वज्ञात् सर्वशक्तेः कारणाद् भवति तद् ब्रह्मेति वाक्यशेषः'. From this it can be seen that Brahman which is being investigated by the Sûtrakâra is *sarvajña*, *sarvashaktimat*, and, therefore, *kartri* also according to his view as interpreted by S'ankara here. The Sûtrakâra's *jñnâsâ* thus refers to Brahman which is सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, कर्तृ etc., and शास्त्रसमन्वय, established in the following Sûtras, refers to the same Brahman; while according to S'ankara, the जिज्ञासा and the समन्वय both refer to निर्विशेष Brahman. In 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' (1-1-4), S'ankara observes:—'इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कूटस्थं नित्यं व्योमवत् सर्वव्यापि सर्वविक्रियारहितं नित्यवृत्तं निरवयवं — × × × अतस्तद् ब्रह्म यस्य जिज्ञासा प्रस्तुता.' In 'ब्रह्मसंज्ञायाः प्रमाणम्' (2-1-14), S'ankara labours to show that, in adopting the ideal of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman, he does not violate the *pratijña* of the Sûtrakâra expressed in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' 1-1-2. The fact that throughout the latter portion of the Brahmamimânsâ, Brahman is described as possessed of some attributes, confirms the view that the Sûtrakâra has not in his mind the जिज्ञासा and शास्त्रसमन्वय that S'ankara wants to impose upon him in the समन्वयसूत्र, 1-1-4. Vallabha also says, 'न च येन रूपेण समन्वयो मतान्तरस्थैः विचारितः तत्राग्रे सूत्रेषु निर्णयोऽस्ति,' 1-1-4. p. 115. Kes'ava Bhatta Kâs'imirin, after showing the contradiction between the views of the Sûtrakâra and S'ankara, observes that, according to the reasoning of S'ankara, there can neither be anything like जिज्ञास्यब्रह्मन्, nor even शास्त्रारंभ. 'परमते तु जिज्ञास्यो दुरुपपादः × × × परमते तु

concluding Sûtra, 'अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात्,' teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, would, by a parity of reasoning, refer to the lower or *saguṇa* Brahman, a creature of *avidyā*. We fail to trace this view to any Sûtra, neither does Śaṅkara support it by any Sûtra, hence, in the absence of any convincing proof, we cannot take this to be the view of the Sûtrakâra. Looking at the Vedânta Mīmāṃsâ as a whole, one sees that, in 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', the Sûtrakâra undertakes the investigation of the Brahman, in जन्माद्यस्य यतः, etc., declares that जगत्कारणत्व is Brahman's असाधारणलक्षण, in Sûtras like 'ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम्', 'कामाच्च नानुमानापेक्षा,' he removes the प्रकृतिकारणता of जगत्, and in Sûtras like 'नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः,' he removes the कर्तृत्व of jīvâtman; in the second chapter, the Sûtrakâra declares that even though Brahman Jīvâtman are *ananya*, still Brahman is *adhika*, this being the reason why unlike Brahman he does sometimes *ahita* to himself; that Jīvâtman is the *aṅśa* of Brahman, that his Brahmanhood, omnipresence, etc., are through his relation with Brahman, that the Jīvâtman is a *kartṛi* under the control and guidance of *para* Brahman; in the third chapter, the Sûtrakâra teaches how निष्कामकर्म secure a body fit for the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान, and in the fourth chapter, this Jīvâtman, by the aid of ससाधन ब्रह्मज्ञान, reaches Brahman by अचिरादिमार्ग from where he does not return; vide Anubhāshya 2-3-29. Dr. Deussen, in his 'System of the Vedānta', on pp. 98-99, thus summarises the teachings of the Brahmasûtras:—The first part contains, in Adhyāya I, the theology, which, on the basis of seven times four passages of the Upanishads, discusses the essence of the Brahman, its relation to the world as creator, ruler, destroyer, its relation to the soul, and its various names and attributes. This is followed, in Adhyāya II, by cosmology which is concerned with the relation of the

world to the Brahman as cause, its gradual evolution from and reabsorption in it, and, from II-3-15 on, the psychology, in which are thoroughly discussed the nature of the soul and its organs, its relation to God, to the body, and to its own deeds. In Adhyaya III, comes first the doctrine of transmigration, then a supplement to psychology (III, 2, 1-10), another to the theology (III, 2, 11-41); the rest of the Adhyāya contains a miscellaneous assemblage of discussions, for the most part exegetic in character, as the chief content of which we can, in any case, with Śaṅkara, consider the teaching of the means (साधन) to attain the higher and lower doctrine, that is the knowledge and worship of the Brahman. For the most part these discussions deal with the strange question whether certain passages of the Veda are to be comprehended in one Vidyā or to be separated, a question which has a meaning only for the lower doctrine, with its aim of worship. Finally, the conclusion of the work, Adhyāya IV contains eschatology; it sketches in detail the departure of the soul after death, and how some souls follow the way of the Fathers (पितृयान) to a new incarnation, while, on the contrary, others, the worshippers of the Brahman, are led along the way of gods (देवयान) higher and higher upwards to the Brahman, 'whence there is no return' according to the Upanishads.

After thus summarising the system, he goes on to say 'but not without further conditions, according to the reasoning of our (Śaṅkara's) system, for this Brahman is only the 'lower' Brahman, that is, as considered as possessing attributes 'guṇa', it is the object of worship, and not of 'perfect knowledge' 'सम्यग्दर्शनम्'; only after this latter, that is, the esoteric doctrine is imparted to the pious in the world of Brahman, is he also liberated; until then, although he is in the world of Brahman, and a partaker of

Lordship 'ऐश्वर्यम्' 'his darkness is not yet driven away', 'his ignorance not yet destroyed', that is, he possesses only the lower doctrine 'अपरा विद्या', whose content consists of all that has hitherto been mentioned, not the opposed higher doctrine, the परा विद्या or सम्यग्दर्शनम्, that is, the pure philosophic, esoteric doctrine, which, in every part of this picture of the world with its empiric colouring, crops up in contradiction with it, and whose results, according to the metaphysical standpoint which we occupy, we may find strange, or admirable.' Thus Dr. Deussen says that there is a contradiction between the system which is deduced from the express Sûtras of Bâdarâyana, and the esoteric doctrine of Śaṅkara, and then proceeds thus to explain Śaṅkara's esoteric doctrine:—'In the department of Theology it teaches that the Brahman is not thus or thus, but altogether without attributes 'गुण,' distinctions 'विशेष' and limitations 'उपाधि,' and therefore in no way capable of being defined or conceived. And this Brahman, devoid of all limitations, is only being, outside which nothing is; therefore in the department of cosmology, there can be as little question of the origin of the world as of its existence, but only of there being neither anything different 'नाना' from the Brahman, nor any plurality of things 'प्रपञ्च', and that the world extended in names and forms is non-existent 'अवस्तु', is only a glamour 'माया' which Brahman of course 'सृणु', as master-magician 'मायाविन्, projects 'प्रसारयति,' as the dreamer projects dream-forms. In the same way all further Psychology falls away after the saying 'तत् त्वम् असि', 'that thou art' is comprehended, according to which the soul of each human being is not an emanation, not a part of the Brahman, but fully and completely the Brahman. For him who knows this, there is no more migration for the soul, nor even liberation; for he is already liberated; the con-

tinued existence of the world and of his own body appears to him only as an illusion, the appearance of which he cannot remove, but which cannot further deceive him, till the time when, after the decease of the body, he wanders not forth, as the others, but remains where he is and what he is and eternally was, the first principle of all things, 'the originally eternal, pure, free, Brahman.'

This is a very fairly accurate view of Śaṅkara as laid down by Dr. Deussen. Śaṅkara's views about cosmology, psychology and eschatology are examined in the sections of Jagat, Jivātman and Moksha respectively, and have been shown not to flow naturally from the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa as they stand at present. Here we are concerned with the consideration of Brahman, so we shall examine here his view as to whether Śaṅkara's distinction of higher and lower Brahman can be worked out from the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. It has been suggested above that so far as our casual survey of the Brahmasūtras is concerned, Śaṅkara's distinction, between the higher निर्दिश्य, निर्गुण, निष्वाचि, and the lower, सविशेष, सगुण, संपादिक Brahman, is not found to be countenanced by the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.

The most important Sūtras, on this point, are to be found in the second pāda of the third *Adhyāya*. The adhi-karaṇa, beginning with 'न परस्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि,' and ending with the sūtra 'दर्शनान' (3-2-11-21), deals with the question, whether Brahman is सविशेष or निर्दिश्य or both. The beginning with 'प्रकृतेतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च श्रूयः', and ending with the Sūtra 'प्रतिषेधान' (3-2-23-30), deals with the question of निषेध which refers to the रूपद्वय of Brahman, and not to Brahman itself, or in the words of Deussen, deals with the question of the possibility of the निर्दिश्य Brahman or esoteric Brahman. This is the scope of these sūtras as stated by Śaṅkara.

At the outset, it may be remarked that it is rather somewhat strange to find these Sûtras (3-2, 11-30) in the third chapter, which, as its very name suggests, purports to deal with the question of sâdhanas. But as none of the Vedanta doctors have questioned their legitimacy, we shall deal with them as they are to be seen at present. These Sûtras seem to be rather obscure, and this seems to account for the vast divergence to be noticed in the existing Bhâshyas regarding the sense of these Sûtras, as well as the arrangement of them into the adhikaraṇas.

From the first adhikaraṇa (3-2-11-21), Śaṅkara thus works out the निर्विशेषत्व of his Brahman. According to Śaṅkara, the human soul, when freed from all उपाधिस, becomes identical with Brahman in stages like dreamless sleep. In his Bhâshya on the Chhândogya also, Śaṅkara says that by the word 'एव' the श्रुति suggests the identity of the jīvâtman and Brahman. The Swarûpa of this Brahman is being investigated in this section by the aid of the Vedic passages. Concerning Brahman, says S'ankara, there are Vedic passages of two kinds. One set of Vedic passages like 'सर्वकर्मा, सर्वकामः, सर्वगन्धः, सर्वरसः' teaches that Brahman is सविशेष, while another set of Vedic passages like 'अस्यूलमनण्वहस्त्वमदीर्घम्' teaches the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman. Now the Brahman in itself, continues S'ankara, cannot be both, for it is not possible that one and the same thing in itself should be सविशेष and निर्विशेष. It is true that we might think that Brahman in itself is निर्विशेष, and becomes सविशेष by उपाधिस. But one thing cannot become another by the fact that it appears to be connected with limitations (उपाधिस); the crystal remains clear even when it has अलक्तानुपाधियोग; as it is an error to take it red in itself, so in case of Brahman also, the सविशेषत्व is due to limitations etc., and rests only on Ignorance (अज्ञानम्). Therefore S'ankara concludes that Brahman is free from

all differences and perfectly unchangeable, and not the contrary, 'निर्विकल्पकमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम्,' the reason being that in all the passages like 'अशब्दम्' etc., where the swarûpa of Brahman is taught, it is declared to be devoid of all limitations etc., 'निर्विशेषत्वम्.' Having worked out the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman thus, in the next Sûtra, 'न भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्वचनात्' 3-2-12, S'ankara further elaborates the same by declaring that Brahman is निराकार. How does it then that in many passages of scripture, manifold forms are attributed to Brahman? Should we not admit that by such passages a difference of form is actually brought out? 'तस्मात् सविशेषत्वमपि ब्रह्मणोऽन्वयमन्तव्यम्.' For otherwise what is the purpose of the passages of scripture which attribute 'भेद' differentiation to Brahman? To this it is replied that in every passage where limitations appear, it is further said that Brahman is not affected by them, 'प्रत्युपाधिभेदं ह्यभेदमेव ब्रह्मणः बोधयति शास्त्रम्.' Having thus emphasised the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman, S'ankara remarks, 'अतश्च न भिन्नाकारयोगो ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रीय इति शक्यते वक्तुम्, भेदस्योपागमार्थत्वादभेदः' The next Sûtra, 'अपि चैवमेके,' has been written to teach the cognition of *abheda* which is preceded by a censure of the perception of *bheda*. How is it that only the अनाकार Brahman is insisted upon when the Vedic passages describe Brahman as both? To this question, an answer is given by 'अरूपवदिव हि' 3-2-14. Brahman is not रूपादिमत्, because Vedic passages like अक्षयम् etc., expressly declare that निर्विशेष Brahman is प्रधान. Then what about the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as आकारवद्? To this an answer is given in 2-3-15. As the light of the sun and the moon, when it falls on the finger, shares in the finger's limitations, and in conformity with it, seems crooked, when it is crooked, 'वक्रं वक्रं' when it is straight, so also Brahman, when it is united with

assumes its forms. Such an 'अकारविशेषोपदेश' is not विरुद्ध, for it is taught for the purpose of उपासना. It is therefore by no means purposeless. All the words of the Upanishads have a purpose, and are authoritative, but this does not prevent this view of Brahman's सविशेषत्व etc., from resting on Ignorance all the same, for on inborn Ignorance depends worldly action as well as those prescribed by the Veda. The Sûtra, 'आह च तन्मात्रम्' 3-2-16, also teaches the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman. The Sûtra 'दर्शयति चायोऽपि स्मर्यते' 3-2-17, emphasises the निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman by quotations from श्रुति and स्मृति. After explaining the Sûtras, 'अत एव चोपमा पूर्णवद्विना' and 'अम्बुवद्वहणात् न तथात्वम्' 3-2-18-19, in the same strain, Śaṅkara remarks in 'जलगत्तसूर्यप्रतिबिम्ब-वद्वहणात्' 3-2-20 :—Just as the जलगत्तसूर्यप्रतिबिम्ब increases with the increase of water, moves with its motion, is जलधनानुविवाचि, in the same way, the one अविद्वत्तत्त्वं Brahman assumes the धर्मे of उपाधि. In the last Sûtra, 'दर्शनाच्च' 3-2-21, Śaṅkara concludes again emphasising the same view on the authority of certain passages of the Veda. In the end, Śaṅkara gives it as his opinion that Brahman is निर्विकल्पक. 'तस्मात् निर्विकल्पकैकलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म न उभयलिङ्गं, न विपरीतलिङ्गं चेति सिद्धम्' 3-2-21.

The interpretation of these Sûtras by Śaṅkara cannot be taken to be convincing, because it is not consistent with what the Sûtrakâra has said before, and even if we do not mind this inconsistency with the previous Sûtras, the interpretation of the Sûtras and Vedic passages cannot be denied to be very forced. In 'न स्थानतोऽपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि,' Śaṅkara explains the words 'सर्वत्र हि' by 'ब्रह्मस्वरूप-प्रतिपादनपरेषु' निर्विशेषस्यैवोपदेशात्. The wording of the Sûtra does not in the least suggest this meaning, nor is it to be found in this third chapter, nor in the whole of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstra. The word *Sarvatra* is

once found before in 'सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्' 1-2-1, and there also, no suggestion is to be found in favour of S'ankara's interpretation. Hence that explanation owes its existence to S'ankara's zeal for the *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman. Even the latter halves of the sentences, quoted by S'ankara in support of *Nirviśeṣa* Brahman, do not support his view, but go against him. The first sentence quoted is this:— 'अशब्दमरूपक्षेमलपमव्ययं तथाऽसं नित्यमगन्धवत् यत् । अनाद्यनन्तं महत् : परं ध्रुवं निचाय्य तन्मत्स्यमुखात् प्रमुच्यते' कठ० 3-15. In this passage the same *Brahman* which is *Aśabdam* etc., is described to be *Anādyananta*, *mahatah para* and *dhrura*, which, in their turn, imply the *saviśeṣatva* of Brahman. Moreover, when it is established here, that Brahman is *Nirviśeṣa*, the following Sūtra, 'अस्त्वत् तत्प्रधानत्वात्,' becomes redundant. To consider that this doctrine, which is to be proved there, is proved here, is also rather incongruous. Again, the interpretation of the Sūtra, 'अस्त्वत् तत्प्रधानत्वात्' does not appear to be supported by the very texts, which S'ankara, quotes in his support. The first text, quoted by S'ankara, is 'अस्थूलान्' etc., बृह० 3-8-8. This sentence has been spoken by the sage Yājñavalkya to explain to Gārgi the nature of Brahman, so first he says *Asthūlam* etc., and then at once teaches the ' ' ' ' *ambarāntadhârakatva*, beginning with *drashtṛitva*, and ending with *ākâśopādânatva*. Hence to lay unnecessary stress on the negative words like *asthūlam* etc., and to say that the *nirviśeṣa* Brahman alone is taught, and to disregard completely the context teaching divine attributes of Brahman like *prāsādsitṛitva* etc., is not fair. *Asthūlam* etc., can be reconciled by saying that the *nishedha*, there referred to, is only the negation of what is to be found in the world of *prakṛiti*, it is only a *nishedha* of ' ' ' or *laukika* things, and not a wholesale negation of everything including even attributes divine like *prāsādsitṛitva* etc. The second *kāthaka*

sentence 'अशब्दमस्पर्शम्' etc., does not, as already shown above, support S'ankara's contention that Brahman is absolutely devoid of any attributes, 'केवलनिर्विशेषाग्रह'. The third quotation is from the Chhândogya, 'आकाशो वै नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म,' 8-14-1. This sentence is very clear. It distinctly teaches that the revelation of names and forms is an (नामरूपनिर्वहकत्व) attribute of Brahman. It teaches Brahman as possessed of attributes, *saviśeṣa*, and it is rather strange to find Śankara quoting it in his support. The fourth is quoted from Mundaka 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः (2-1-12). That also cannot be taken to teach the out and out *nirviśeṣatva* of Brahman. By calling the *puruṣa amūrta*, it does not deny *mūrti* absolutely, it may be *iyattā-parimāṇa*, for it, at the same time, says that *puruṣa* Brahman is *divine-divya*, अक्षरान्यन्तराक्षरहित्य or अक्षरान्यन्तराक्षर. But the passage quoted goes further, and declares that the *puruṣa* is greater than the great *akshara* Brahman, 'अक्षरात्परतः परः'. Thus this passage also goes against the *nirviśeṣatva* of Brahman. The last sentence quoted by S'ankara is from the Brihadâraṇyaka 'तदेतद्ब्रह्म अपूर्वमनपरमनन्तरमव्यक्तमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूः' 2-5-19. Even when we consider this sentence without any reference to the context, the very word *sarvānubhūh* suggests an inference against S'ankara's absolute negation of any attributes in Brahman. If there was no *sarva*, how was Brahman to be *sarvānubhūh*? 'सर्वसत्त्वे एव सर्वानुभूतिरुपपन्नमाह'. Taken with the context it further goes against S'ankara's view. This quotation is at the end of the *Madhu-Brahmana*. In the beginning of the *Madhu-cûṭya* 'अयमेव स योऽयमात्मेदममृतमिदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम्' is repeated fourteen times in order to teach the *sarvatva* of Brahman. Then there is further taught the 'सर्वं रूपं' then as an explanation to 'रूपं रूपं प्रतिकूलो बभूव' is added 'अयं हरयोऽयं वै दश च सहस्राणि च बहूनि च

अनन्तानि' which directly declares not the absolute negation in Śaṅkara's sense, but the *anantarāpatā* or *sarvatra* of Brahman. Hence the so-called prominence-*pradhānatā* of *nirviśeṣa* Brahman, according to Śaṅkara, cannot be fairly worked out here. Śaṅkara's very appropriate remark 'नहि विद्वान् कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, अन्तराविशेषता' loses much of its force, when he says that the आकारविशेषोपपत्ति of Brahman is due to उपाधि, because according to him, what is due to उपाधि, cannot be said to belong to the thing itself, and also because all the उपाधिस are आधिरूप, 'उपाधिनिमित्तस्य यत्पुनरीत्यागुपयतिः' 'उपाधीनानाविशेषत्वात्.' Even Vedic passages like 'यतो वाचो निर्वर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति कुतश्चन' at best teach the वाङ्मनसातीतत्व and Brahmadev's भयाभाव and not its अत्यन्तनिर्विशेषत्व. The quotation from *Geeta* 'ज्ञेयं यत् तत्प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ज्ञात्वाऽमृतमश्नुते, अनादिमत्परं ब्रह्म न सत्तन्नासदुच्यते' 13-12, refers to व्याकृत and अव्याकृत stages of Brahman on the authority of 2-1-17-B. S. Moreover this conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the *Geeta* further describes Brahman as सर्वतः पाणिपादान्तम् etc. Attributes like 'सर्वत्राविशेषता' etc., cannot be *prākṛita laukika*, *log.* The interpretation given in the 'बृहद्वास' Sūtra 3-2-20, can be explained by the fact that there is no difference in the प्रतिबिम्ब either in less or more water. भाष्यप्रकाश. pp. 945-946. B. S. S.

Thus it has been shown that so far as the Sūtras and the texts of the Upanishads are concerned, Śaṅkara's effort to work out the absolute निर्विशेषत्व of Brahman in this अधिकरण (3-2-11-21) cannot be justified. Now in the next अधिकरण (3-2-22-30) he works out his interpretation in the same strain, and concludes:—'तस्माद् ब्रह्मावसानोऽयं प्रतिषेधः, न अभाववसान इत्यध्यवस्यामः' (3-2-22). The Sūtra 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च मूयः' 3-2-22 is thus explained by Śaṅkara. The विषयवाक्य 'नेति नेति' etc., here chosen, is from the बृहदारण्यक.

In the passage in question, 'नेति नेति' follows a statement of the two rūpas of Brahman viz. मूर्त and अमूर्त. Both these forms, according to Śaṅkara, are denied of Brahman by 'नेति नेति.' It is by the aid of this Sūtra that Śaṅkara establishes his strict अद्वैतवाद. By denying everything except Brahman which is 'केवल चैतेन्य,' he distinguishes his system from the सून्यवाद of the B. 1.1.1. Everything except the Brahman is to be denied, and the Brahman itself is to be, if at all, described by all negations. This is the essence of the Vedānta according to him. Thus his system should be very aptly called, not the 'अद्वैतवाद,' the doctrine of non-duality, but 'एकवाद' or 'singularism' in the words of Sir Ramkrishṇa Bhandarkar.

Thus there are two sorts of passages to be found in the Upanishads, one teaching the Brahman as सविशेष, and the other teaching it as निर्विशेष. Śaṅkara subordinates, nay rejects, the Vedic passages teaching Brahman as सविशेष, as shown above, calling them useful only in उपसर्गास, which in their turn, are products of अविद्या, according to him. On what authority Śaṅkara bases this theory of his, we are unable to trace. No Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa can with certainty be taken as an authority for drawing this distinction. In doing so, he, it appears, departs from the lines of the Sūtrakāra. In (3-2-15), he remarks 'न हि

कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं ग्राह्यत्वादिशेषात्.' Thus according to the principle laid down by Śaṅkara himself (and this seems to be the view of the Sūtrakāra who, as a true Vaidika, has undertaken to set aside विशेष, and to work out harmony of the conflicting Vedic passages) the विशेष would not be set aside, if some passages are subordinated or deprived, as is done by him of their primary importance and significance. Being passages of the Veda, their authoritativeness is equal, and

they deserve to be equally respected. The difficulty of contradiction should have been set aside on the principle laid down by Bâdarâyana in 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्,' 2-1-27. This seems to be a very strong piece of argument to refute S'ankara's theory of अत्यन्त निर्विशेष Brahman. The argument that, because the 'एकवाक्यता' is to be worked out, S'ankara is justified in subordinating, or rather rejecting सर्वशेष Vedic passages to निर्विशेष ones, and thereby removing the विरोध between them, would not stand a moment's consideration; the hollowness of this argument is not difficult to be seen. The विरोध as such, can rightly be said to be reconciled, when both sorts of Vedic passages deserving of equal weight as they are, are given their due and equal weight and scope. S'ankara's way of looking at the श्रुतिस, one must admit, not only subordinates the सर्वशेष श्रुतिस, but renders them meaningless ultimately. What prevented S'ankara from an unqualified submission to the letter of the Veda, in complete disregard of the so-called युक्तिविरोध, as was done by the learned Sûtrakâra in 2-1-26-27, is a question, which cannot be satisfactorily solved. S'ankara ought to have accepted the principle, which he himself expresses so very tersely in 2-1-27. 'शब्दमूलं च ब्रह्म, नेन्द्रियप्रमाणं, तद् शब्दमूलं, शब्दश्च उभयमपि ब्रह्मणः प्रमाणमस्ति, अद्वैतप्रमाणं निरवयवत्वं च, लौकिकानामपि मणिसत्रोपधि-प्रवृत्तीनां शक्तयो निरुद्धानेककार्यविधा दृश्यन्ते, ता अपि वाक्योपपत्तयः केवलेन तर्केणावगन्तुं शक्यन्ते, अस्य वस्तुन एतावत्य एतत्सहाया एतद्विषया एतत्प्रयोजनाश्च शक्तय इति, तस्मात् ब्रह्मणो रूपं विना शब्देन न निरूप्येत, तथा चाहुः पौराणिकाः 'अचिन्त्याः सख्ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण शोजयेत्, प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यम' इति, तस्मात् शब्दमूल एव ब्रह्म' Thus Brahman's स्वरूप being there is no विरोध. What seems impossible to us becomes possible in the case of Brahman. Thus has the Sûtrakâra set aside the contradiction, so, follow-

ing the same reasoning he removes in 3-2-11-30, the विशेष, which appears to exist in the various attributes of Brahman. The Sûtra 'तदव्यक्तमाह हि' 3-2-23, declares that Brahman is अव्यक्त—that which cannot be comprehended. But this want of comprehension or दर्शन is not due to Brahman's being devoid of any विशेष; रूप etc., can be seen from the next Sutra 'अपि च संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम्' 3-2-24, where it is taught that Brahman is seen in संराधनकाल. Now if Brahman is absolutely निर्विशेष, what is to be seen or realised in the संराधन? Again, it would not be fair to say that what is seen in संराधन is a product of nescience, for as S'ankara remarks, this दर्शन is ज्ञानप्रसाद, and hence, it should be accepted as प्राणात्मिक. Thus the Sûtrakâra seems to accept that Brahman is 'अव्यक्त' without ज्ञानप्रसाद or भक्ति, while it is 'व्यक्त' when there is भक्ति and ज्ञानप्रसाद, and as such, the latter दर्शन would be प्राणात्मिक. S'ankara's absolute negation of विशेषs in Brahman is a view, which seems never to have occurred to the mind of the Sûtrakâra. This view is strengthened by the answers given by the Sûtrakâra to the objection raised by the Sāṅkhya, where the Sûtrakâra distinctly says that Brahman is सर्वशक्त्युपेता and सर्वधर्मयुक्त. 'सर्वोक्तिः च तदर्शनात्' 'सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च' 2-1-30 and 2-1-37 respectively.

Again, the Sûtra 'उभयव्यवस्थेऽपि अहिकुण्डलवत्' 3-2-27, seems to answer the view put forth above. It does not appear to be a मतान्तरीय Sûtra, but a सिद्धान्त Sûtra. Nimbarka and Vallabha take it to be such. In 'न स्थानतोपि परस्य उभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि' 3-2-11, it is declared that Brahman's उभयलिङ्गत्व cannot be due to उपाधिस, for it is described everywhere as such (उभयलिङ्गयुतः). (*Vide* Nimbarka's Bhâshya on this Sûtra). To this question, this Sûtra seems to furnish an answer by saying that just as it is natural in a serpent to assume शृङ्ग and कुण्डल forms, so Brahman at will assumes

forms of all sorts. This view is not singular. Vallabha also says the same thing when he observes 'यथा सर्पः क्रञ्च-
रनेकाकारः कुण्डलश्च भवति, तथा ब्रह्मस्वरूपं सर्वप्रकारं भक्तेच्छया तथा स्फुरति × ×
तस्मात् सकलविरुद्धधर्मा भगवत्येव वर्तन्त इति न कापि श्रुतिस्मरितार्थेति सिद्धम्'
3-2-27. The above view is again supported by the Upani-
shads which frequently describe Brahman by contraries¹.
Vallabha gives another explanation of the negative श्रुतिः,
'प्रतीतं च निषेध्यम्, न अप्रतीतं, न श्रुतिप्रतीतं, सत्यत्वादयश्च लौकिकाः, ततः सर्व-
निषेधे तदज्ञानमेव भवेत्.' Anubhâshya B. S. S. p. 57. The
निषेध should have reference to what one sees, and not to
the attributes of Brahman, which have been spoken of in
the Veda. The Sûtra 'प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि परिधिभिः ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः'
3-2-22, does not deny रूप, etc., in Brahman, but simply
'इयत्ता.' (Vide Nimbarka-Bhâshya and Anu-Bhâshya on
this Sûtra). Hence in the absence of any Sûtra directly
supporting S'ankara's view, it appears clear that his ac-
ceptance of the negative श्रुति alone is not sanctioned by the
Sûtrakâra. The Sûtrakâra seems to accept that Brahman
is possessed of all धर्म, (सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेः 2-1-37.), and also those
that appear to be contrary. It is possessed of all wonderful
powers, ('सर्वोपेता च तद्देशनात्' 2-1-30, 'आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि'
2-1-28). The negation of negative श्रुति refers not to the
divine attributes described of Brâhman in the Upanishad,
but to the लौकिक or प्राकृत or इयत्तावाचक ones. This seems to
be the युक्ति to explain to those who cannot see their way
to accept Brahman as possessed of even contrary attributes
on the authority of the Vedic texts and the अचिन्त्यैश्वर्ययोग
of Brahman, for in that case there is no विरोध, but a विरोधा-
भास, an अलंकार, resulting in suggesting the glory of the
great Brahman, and sowing the seed of devotion to it.

1 अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णैः । श्वेताश्वतरं 3-19.
अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयान् आत्मा गुह्यायां निहितोऽस्य जन्तोः । श्वे० 3-20 कठ० 2-10.
तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्दन्तिके । ईश० 5-1. आसीनो दूरं व्रजति, शयानो याति सर्वतः ।
कठ० 2-20.

This view, thus it appears, is in perfect harmony with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. Nimbârka and Râmânujā also favour this view. S'āṅkara's निर्विशेषग्रह does not seem to have any connection with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. This view is supported by the fact that none of the Vedānta writers accept S'āṅkara's view of निर्विशेष Brahman to be the view of the Sûtrakâra.

Thus, according to Bâdarâyana, the same Brahman is both निर्विशेष and सर्वधर्मयुक्त. S'āṅkara's theory of निर्गुण पर and सगुण अपर Brahman is further shaken off by Bâdarâyana in 3-2-21, and the Sûtras following. There the question is raised whether there is any पर greater Brahman than which has been described before. The answer given to this question in the following Sûtras is in the negative. Not only is this Brahman the highest, but another its equal is prohibited. Thus the same Brahman which is उभयलिङ्ग is the highest. 'परमतः सेतून्मानसम्बन्धमेदन्यपदेशेभ्यः' × × सामान्यात् × × 'उपपत्तेश्च' 'तथान्यप्रतिषेधात्' 3-2-31, 32, 33, 34 35, 36. Dr. Thibaut¹ agrees with the view that S'āṅkara's theory of Saguna and Nirguna Brahman is not recognized by the Sûtrakâra, but he thinks that S'āṅkara by recognizing Saguna and Nirguna Brahman gives scope to all sorts of divergently conflicting श्रुति texts. But this sounds rather strange. To say that S'āṅkara understood or harmonised the Upanishads better than Bâdarâyana is placing the cart before the horse. S'āṅkara's lower Brahman being a creature of nescience, a non-entity in the highest sense, the scope given to सविशेष श्रुति is also illusive. Bâdarâyana does not even dream of such a method, a fact evidenced by the absence of any Sûtra quoted by S'āṅkara in support of this theory. If in

1. *Vide* Vedānta Sûtra I. Introduction. p. 128. Sacred Books of the East.

numerous places the Upanishads describe Brahman by contrary attributes, Bâdarâyana like a true Vaidic, with the great regard that he had for the letter of the Veda, without subjecting one set to another, or accepting one set and rejecting another, refers both the sets to the same Brahman, and says that it is the highest. When the विरोध is pressed against him, he falls back on the letter of the Veda as in 2-1-27, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलकात्,' saying that Brahman is to be learnt only from scriptures, and that independent reasoning as such has nothing to do with it. Thus it will be seen that Dr. Thibaut's claim for S'ankara that he gives scope to all the श्रुति is very weak. Bâdarâyana decidedly has done better justice to all the श्रुति by referring them to one and the same Brahman, while S'ankara's insistence on the निर्विशेष श्रुति alone has rendered his conception of Brahman open to the charge that it owes its origin not to Veda or Sûtras of Bâdarâyana but to Buddhism. (*Vide* Bhaskara's भाष्य p. 124.).

Thus it will be seen that the investigation of the Sâtrakâra refers to Brahman which is सर्ववर्मेयुक्त and सर्वशक्त्युपेत and therefore कर्तृ, but not to निर्विशेष Brahman as S'ankara repeatedly says. Except Bhâskara, all the Bhâshyakâras are almost agreed with the view expressed above, and even Bhâskara's निर्विकल्पकप्रज्ञ is very mild as compared to that of S'ankara. Vallabha's commentator truly remarks:—“अतोऽन्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स सर्वं ब्रह्मणोऽन्तर्निवेद्येतरं निषेधति, न तु सर्वं निर्विकल्पकं सुधीभिरवधेयम्,” p. 953. Anu-Bhâshya Prakâsa B. S. S.

Bâdarâyana has established that Brahman whose investigation he has undertaken, and whose definition he has given in 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' is possessed of wonderful powers, creates the universe etc., for its sport, is कर्तृ. S'ankara wants to refer the कर्तृत्व not to Brahman but to अविद्या, the

reasons for this being विषमता and निर्धृणता. Here also he departs from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. The Sûtrakâra considers this question in 'वैषम्यनैर्धृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात् तथाहि दर्शयति' 3-2-27. Bâdarâyana says that Brahman is not to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for it allots fruits according to धर्माधर्म; Brahman is कर्मासापेक्ष, Veda teaches so. Though here the Sûtrakâra gives धर्माधर्मासापेक्षत्वं as the reason why Brahman is neither विषम nor निर्धृण, he feels conscious of the difficulty that if Brahman were to allot fruits according to धर्माधर्म, its स्वातन्त्र्य would to that extent be controlled by it, and so far its ईश्वरत्वं, 'सर्वस्य वशी, सर्वस्येशानः,' etc., would be limited. Hence, to avoid this objection he says in 'फलमत उपपत्तेः' that Brahman alone allots fruits and not धर्माधर्म. Giving fruits according to धर्माधर्म, Brahman is not controlled by them. This seems to be the reasoning of Bâdarâyana. Of course he says जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, and hence it is possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्माधर्म, but then the difficulty arises— if the जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, how is Brahman to create it? To this his reply is that श्रुति and स्मृति teach both. After removing this doubt, he cuts short the argument by the Sûtra सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च' meaning thereby that Brahman is possessed of all धर्म, and that is in fitness of things. श्रुति word is Bâdarâyana's shelter in case of difficulty, while S'āṅkara's is अविद्या. S'āṅkara's interpretation of these Sûtras is correct, though according to the reasoning of S'āṅkara's system the answer would be different. According to S'āṅkara's reasoning there is no question of वैषम्य and नैर्धृण्य. Brahman's कर्तृत्वं is आविद्यक, hence its फलदान much more so, happiness and misery are आविद्यक, and the human soul is also a creature of nescience. How does Brahman become joined with अविद्या? Of this the Sûtrâs give no trace. Even S'āṅkara does not give any reason for this, as is remarked by Dr. Deussen:—"In reality (परमार्थतः,) there is

nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (विकार) of Him into the world, a division (भेद) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on अविद्या. But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahman alone is? On this question our authors give us no information." System of Vedānta p. 302. Bādarāyaṇa does not give any information on this point, because as shown above, he does not hold this view, and S'āṅkara does not give any reason because it is not possible to do so. Hence Dr. Deussen's remark: 'But the system gives no real ground for this assumption' (S. V. p. 303) can be applicable only to S'āṅkara's reasoning. When Jīva's कर्तृत्व is due to Brahman (परात्तु तत्प्राप्तः), when Brahman is itself the source from which all activities flow, how can Brahman be अकर्तृ? Since Brahman is unfettered by anything like अविद्या, माया, प्रकृति etc., at will it becomes कर्तृ or अकर्तृ. Hence Bādarāyaṇa's system is not to be charged with 'neither his Brahman is to be charged with partiality or cruelty, for Brahman's creation is आत्मसृष्टि, आत्मप्रकृति or लीलासृष्टि. One cannot be unjust to one's self, one cannot be said to be unjust or cruel, if one were to do anything for the sake of fun, लीला, similarly Brahman cannot be said to be unjust or cruel towards its own creation created for the sake of लीला only.

Thus the Brahman whose investigation Bādarāyaṇa has undertaken is—possessed of all वर्यस्य,¹ all wonderful powers,² it is independent doer,³ attā,⁴ it is untouched⁵ by the short-comings of the Jivātman; it resides in the heart;⁶

1. सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च 2-1-37. 2. सर्वोपता च तद्दर्शनात् 2-1-30. 3. जन्मा-
यस्य यतः 1-1-2. 4. अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात् 1-2-9. 5. संयोगप्राप्तिमिति चेन्न नैशेष्यात्
1-2-21. 6. गुहां प्रतिष्ठौ आत्मानौ हि तद्दर्शनात् 1-2-11.

it is रूपवत्;² it is अन्तर्यामिन्;³ it is भूमन्;⁴ it is अंगुष्ठमात्र;⁵ it is वैश्वानर;⁶ it is प्रादेशमात्र⁷ and व्यापक; it is दहर्;⁸ it is सत्⁹ चिद्,¹⁰ आनन्द¹¹ It is everything.¹² It is¹³ beyond प्रकृति, माया, अविद्या, शरीर, शक्ति, etc.. Guṇas of प्रकृति,¹⁴ etc., have no सम्बन्ध with it, hence it is निर्गुण. It is जगत्कल्पनकर्तृ;¹⁵ it is आनन्दमय,¹⁶ it is the support¹⁶ of heaven and earth; these attributes are divine. The subject¹⁴ of negative श्रुति has reference to attributes of प्रकृति etc. The negative श्रुति do not deny the divine attributes of Brahman spoken of in other Vedic passages.

This Brahman whose investigation Bâdarâyana has undertaken, and in whom harmony of all the Vedic passages (समन्वय¹⁷) has been worked out by him, for its own sport,¹⁸ develops¹⁹ itself into Jadajivâtmake universe, without undergoing the least change,²⁰ and without ceasing to be निरवयव. It alone shapes,²¹ and names the Jadajivâtmake universe making it Nâmarupâtmake also. Just as Brahman, by its mysterious powers, makes सद्दश and चिद्दश perceptible, while आनन्ददश imperceptible, thus developing itself into जडजीवित्जगत्, similarly by making

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1. अवृद्धशक्तिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः 1-2-21. 2. रूपोपन्यासाच्च 1-2-23. 3. अन्तर्यामिन्स्य धिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदेशात् 1-2-18. 4. भूमा संप्रत्ययव्युत्पत्तिरेव 1-3-8. 5. शब्दादेव प्रमितः 1-3-24. 6. वैश्वानरः संप्रत्ययव्युत्पत्तिरेव 1-2-24. 7. आमनन्ति चैनमस्मिन् 1-2-32. 8. दहर् उत्तरेभ्यः 1-3-14. 9. जन्माद्यस्य यतः 1-1-2. 10. ईक्षतेनांशब्दम् 1-1-5. 11. आनन्दमयोऽस्यामात् 1-1-11. 12. सर्वत्र प्राप्तद्वोपदेशात् 1-2-1. 13. गौणशब्दात्प्रत्ययव्युत्पत्तिरेव 1-1-7. 14. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः 3-2-22. 15. कल्पनात् 1-3-39. 16. बुभुक्षायायतनं स्वशब्दात् 1-3-1. In वैश्वानराधिकरण, वैश्वानर is described as प्रादेशमात्र and अभिविमान according to scripture 1-2-32. This also goes to show that there is no विरोध in Brahman if the contradictions are sanctioned by Veda, because the स्वरूप of Brahman is शालोकसमधिगम्य. Śaṅkara's interpretation of these two words is forced, and consequently is rejected by Ramanuja, Bhaskara, Vallabha, Madhva, Deussen and others. 17. तत्तु समन्वयात् 1-1-4. 18. लोकास्तु लीला कवेत्यम् 2-1-33. 19. अस्मकृतेः परिणामात् 1-4-26. 20. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् 2-1-27. 21. संसृजतिरिति विवृत्तुर्देव उपदेशात् 2-4-20.

imperceptible the सर्वरूपत्व and सर्वरामत्व, develops एकरूपत्व and एकनामत्व producing thus an infinite beautiful variety. Giving fruits to Jīvas according to their कर्म's, Brahman is not controlled by them. In becoming ईश्वर, it does not become partial or cruel. Brahman is शब्दमूल. Ratiocination has nothing to do with it. On the strength of the letter of the Veda, this Brahman, all-pervading¹ as it is, is to be reached from whence there is no return. It is one and infinite. It is everything. S'āṅkara's theory negating everything in Brahman cannot be supported by any of the Sūtras of Bâdarâyana. Bâdarâyana's view seems to be to affirm that Brahman is everything, rather than to deny everything of Brahman.

HUMAN SOUL.

It has been shown that so far as the Sūtras of Bâdarâyana are concerned, one fails to find any trace of the theory of 'निर्विशेष' higher Brahman and सविशेष lower सगुण Brahman, that all the passages of the Upaniṣads describing Brahman as 'नेति नेति' or 'सर्वकर्मा,' etc., refer to the same Brahman, and the विरोध between these two sets of Vedic passages, transforms itself into a विरोधाभास the moment तर्क as such is dismissed from our consideration, and the letter of the Veda is with implicit faith (श्रद्धा) followed, without the least attempt to better or modify its natural significance, and thereby accepting Brahman to be possessed of wonderful powers विचित्र शक्तis and all attributes 'सर्वधर्म's; or if one fails to see his way to अचिन्त्यै-श्वर्ययुक्त ब्रह्मन्, then he may set aside the विरोध by referring the negative Vedic passages to 'प्राकृत' or 'लौकिक' पदार्थ's and the affirmative to 'दिव्य' divine ones, as is suggested by Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, or even by Vallabha in 'प्रकृतैनावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः' 3-2-22. V. S., thus giving equal

1. अनादितः शब्दात् अनादितः शब्दात् 4-1-22.

scope to both sets of Vedic passages without following Śaṅkara's method of subordinating the affirmative to the negative ones, a method which on its face is not justified by the fact that the Vaidikas like Bâdarâyaṇa are always anxious to revere all the Vedic passages whether like 'नेति नेति' or like 'सर्वज्ञः' with the same reverence.

Now let us take up the consideration of the human soul-Jīvâtman. The whole body of the Vedânta Sûtras dealing with the nature of the Jīvâtman, is to be found in the third pâda of the second chapter of the Brahmanî-mânsâ (2-3-16-53). Bâdarâyaṇa begins thus:—In 'चराचर-व्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात् तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तः तद्भावमावित्वात्' 2-3-16, it is said that birth, death, etc., refer to the body of the human soul. In 'नात्माऽश्रुतेः नित्यत्वाच्च ताम्यः,' it is taught that Jīvâtman has no उत्पत्ति. Vedic passages deny the 'उत्पत्ति' of Jīvâtman, they on the contrary teach the निरुत्पत्ति of Jîva. In 'ज्ञोस्त एव' 2-3-18, it is taught that Jîva, though by nature चेतन, is a 'ज्ञातः,' on the authority of the Veda. S'āṅkara's insistence that Jîva is only 'चैतन्यस्वरूप' and not a knower goes directly against the wording of the Sûtra. In Sûtras 2-3-19-28, it is taught that Jīvâtman is of the size of an atom, because 'उत्क्रान्ति, गति and आगति' are spoken of him in the Veda; even if उत्क्रान्ति be otherwise explained, the गति and आगति do refer to Jīvâtman as such; that श्रुति passages describing Jīvâtman as non-Āṇu describe him as such in his capacity of Brahman; where Jīvâtman's Brahmanhood is to be emphasized, there only he is described as non-āṇu-विभु; Vedic passages do teach Āṇutva of Jīvâtman as well as suggest it; the objection that the चैतन्य of Jīvâtman as he is atomic cannot be 'सर्वशरीरव्यापि' pervading the whole body, does not stand. Just as चन्दन though applied to one part produces coolness in the whole body, similarly the चैतन्य of Jīvâtman, atomic as he is, spreads over the whole body; like chandana, Jīvâtman has his abode—in the heart, the Vedic passages

teach the same thing. On the analogy of the diamond or the lamp, also the Jivâtman's चैतन्य spreads over the whole body. These latter instances seem to be given because some onemight urge that minute particles produce coolness in the case of chandana, and that the Jivâtman has no particles, hence just as the light of a diamond spreads over a wider space than is occupied by the diamond, in the same way even though the Jivâtman resides in the heart, his chaitanya spreads over the whole body. 'गुण' cannot exist without द्रव्य, hence, if the Jivâtman resides in the heart, and is of the size of an atom, his chaitanya would not be सर्वशरीरव्यापि; this objection is set aside by Bâdarâyana on the analogy of गन्ध.¹ Vedic passages also teach the aputva of the Jivâtman. The श्रुति passage, 'प्रज्ञा शरीरं समाख्य,' teaches that by चैतन्यगुण the Jivâtman pervades the whole body. Hence the conclusion is that the Jivâtman is of the size of an atom. Why is the Jivâtman then said to be विमु, etc., if it is really aणु? If the Jivâtman is really different from Brahman, why is 'तत् त्वमसि' etc., taught by the Vedic passages? These questions the author of the Sûtras answers in 'तद्गुणसारत्वात् तु तद्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् 2-3-29. The Jivâtman is described as विमु, Brahman, etc., because he derives these attributes from Brahman on the analogy of the प्राज्ञ. Just as the प्राज्ञ, though a अणु, is, in Bṛihadâraṇyaka, described as ब्रह्म, the attributes like अपहृतपाप्मत्वं, etc., which are Brahman's, are also his; similarly when the ब्रह्मत्व of the Jivâtman is to be emphasised, he is described as विमु etc. This is the interpretation favoured by Nimbârka and Vallabha, and it is strengthened by the preceding Sûtra 'चाणुस्तच्छ्रुतेरिति' 2-3-23, where विमुत्वं, etc., are said

1. Modern science may detect a flaw in this reasoning but Bâdarâyana's view is clear. He wants to say that the Jivâtman's residence in the heart, his aputva, and his 'सर्वशरीरव्यापि चैतन्य' are all possible.

to be attributed to the Jivâtman to declare his Brahmanhood. Hence, according to Bâdarâyana, the Jivâtman is *anu*, when in Brahmanbhâva he experiences विमुक्त, etc., on account of his Brahmanhood. Râmânujâ, Madhva, Nimbârka and S'reekantha all accept the Jivâtman to be *anu*.

S'ankara interprets the Sûtras 2-3-19-28 as belonging to पूर्वज्ञ, and 2-3-20 'तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्' as a सिद्धान्त-मूत्र refuting and rejecting the Jivâtman's *anutva* and accepting his विमुक्त. With some reservation, Bhâskara follows S'ankara and Vijnana Bhikshu, though breaking the adhikarâṇa from पृथगुपदेशात्, says that Jiva's *anutva* is due to उपाधि. S'ankara explains the Sûtra thus:—the first 'तद्' of the Sûtra 2-3-20 refers to 'बुद्धि उपाधि,' etc., and the second 'तद्' to अनुत्व, etc., that the Jivâtman through the adjuncts of बुद्धि उपाधि, etc., is described as *anu*, just as the 'प्राज्ञ', the *brahman* soul, though devoid of any विशेषः, is described as possessed of all धर्मः, and called सर्वज्ञ, सर्वशक्तिमत्, etc., which are ब्रह्मलिंगः. S'ankara's interpretation has one advantage over that of Râmânujâ, Madhva, and S'reekantha in the fact that he explains the instance of 'प्राज्ञ' somehow, while the other writers fail to make out much of it. In fact, they seem to have lost sight of its importance. Dr. Thibaut has also neglected to consider its importance. But Vallabha manages to interpret it, in an exactly opposite way, by showing the appropriateness of the instance. He says, just as प्राज्ञ who is merely a सुबुद्धिसाक्षिन्, who is not Brahman, is attributed ब्रह्मधर्मः on account of his Brahmanhood, so the Jivâtman on account of his Brahmanhood is described as विमुक्त, etc., though he is अनु. Vallabha's explanation has this advantage that he has not to add words like बुद्धि or उपाधि which are never suggested in any of the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana either preceding or following this Sûtra. Bhâskara's reference to 'विज्ञानमनसी'

2-3-15, in support of his reference of first 'तद्' to उपाधि, does not improve the case by the absence of any reason for translating 'विज्ञानमनसी' not as इन्द्रिय but बुद्धि and उपाधि. The distance between the two Sûtras suggests an inference against Bhâskara.

But S'ankara's arguments in favour of विमुत्त्व deserve to be considered independently. He observes in 2-3-29, 'नैतदस्ति अणुराभेनि. उत्पत्त्यश्रवणात्, परस्यैव तु ब्रह्मणः प्रवेशश्रवणात्, तादात्म्योपदेशाच्च परमेव ब्रह्म जीव इत्युक्तम्, परमेव चेद् ब्रह्म जीवस्तस्माद् यावत्परं ब्रह्म, तावन्नेव जीवो भवितुमर्हति, परस्य च ब्रह्मणः विमुत्त्वमान्नातम्, तस्माद् विमुः जीवः'. S'ankara thus advances three arguments in favour of the Jîvâtman's विमुत्त्व, viz., (1) उत्पत्त्यश्रवण, (2) परस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रवेश, (3) तादात्म्योपदेश. It is worthy of note that none of these arguments find any support from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. The first argument, which S'ankara gives, in favour of the विमुत्त्व of the Jîvâtman, has been used by Pâlatâyana to establish the eternity of the human soul, hence it cannot be taken to be conclusive. The denial of उत्पत्ति does not conclusively prove that the Jîvâtman is विमु. It cannot be said because Jîva's उत्पत्ति has been denied, it is Brahman, and hence विमु. The very argument goes against S'ankara's view of अविद्या which he accepts to be without उत्पत्ति—अनादि. It cannot be said because अविद्या has no उत्पत्ति it is ब्रह्मन्. To this, it may be urged on behalf of S'ankara that the acceptance of any duality being opposed to the प्रतिज्ञा of 'एकविज्ञानेन सर्वं, विज्ञानम्', the नित्यत्व suggested by the denial of उत्पत्ति, results in अभेद-ब्रह्मन्, while अनादित्व alone suggests मिथ्यात्व as in the case of अविद्या, that is, there cannot be two things eternal. hence the नित्यत्व of Jîva, taught by the Sûtrakâra, teaches that Jîva is Brahman, and hence विमु, while अविद्या though अनादि has an end, hence it is मिथ्या.

To this argument, an answer is furnished from the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. Even accepting the J^A ^ ^ to

be नित्य and अणु, there is no विरोध of the प्रतिज्ञा of 'अविद्या-
सर्वविज्ञानम्.' This प्रतिज्ञा can be fulfilled by accepting
the Jivâtman to be an अंश of Brahman, as taught by
Bâdarâyana later on in 'अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्', etc., or by
taking the human soul to be a शक्ति of Brahman as done
by Nimbârka, or प्रकार or विशेषण by Râmânuja, and by
taking the अंश jîva to be अनन्य with Brahman on the
principle laid down by the Sûtrakâra in 'अनन्यत्वात्तद्विद्यु-
दिम्यः' 2-1-14. The अंश according to Bâdarâyana, is अनन्य
with अंशिन् Brahman, the शक्ति is अनन्य with शक्तिम् Brah-
man, the विशेषण is अनन्य with विशेष्य Brahman; hence the
knowledge of अंशिन् Brahman includes the knowledge of अंश
Jivâtman. The प्रतिज्ञा on the other hand goes radically
against S'ankara's views, because it can be possible of fulfil-
ment only when there is 'one' and 'all', and that 'one' is
'all'. The difficulty arising from the Vedic passages teach-
ing the निख्यवत्त्वं of Brahman can well be answered on the
principle laid down by Bâdarâyana in 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्'
2-1-27. Thus the denial of the उत्पत्ति of the human soul
cannot be worked out to prove that jîva is Brahman
विमु. It cannot be taken to be the view of the author
of the Sûtras.

The second argument of S'ankara is based on a
passage from the छान्दोग्य (VI), 'अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य
नामरूपे व्याकृत्वाणि'. Para Brahman's entrance is taught in this
श्रुति, hence says S'ankara, that the Jivâtman is the same
as Para Brahman—विमु. According to the reasoning of
S'ankara, in the first place, there can be no प्रवेश, the परब्रह्मन्
being व्यापक. Nor can we interpret प्रवेश in the sense of सयोग,
for Brahman being व्यापक inside and outside the सृष्टि, even
without the declaration of प्रवेश Brahman could have develop-
ed names and forms. With this श्रुति if we read 'द्वा सुपर्णा'
श्रुति teaching co-existence of Brahman and Jîva, the sense

that can be made out is this, that the Supreme enters with the Jivâtman, and then develops names and forms. The difficulties, presented by the अद्वैतश्रुति and व्यापकत्वश्रुति, can be answered by Bâdarâyana on the authority of 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. Hence the argument of Para Brahman's प्रवेशाश्रयण is not conclusive on the point of Jiva's विभुत्व.

The third argument of S'ankara is तादात्म्योपदेश. This argument is based on the passage of the छान्दोग्य which runs thus:—'स एष अणिमा, ऐतदात्म्यं इदं सर्वं, तत् सत्यं, स आत्मा, तत् त्वम् असि.' It is taught by Uddâlaka to his son S'vetaketu. This argument is on the whole stronger than the two preceding ones. But even here one cannot say that this तादात्म्योपदेश is in the sense of S'ankara. The 'तत्' of 'तत् त्वमसि,' as¹ Ranga Râmânûja remarks, refers to ऐतदात्म्य. The Vedic passage has been spoken with a view to teach श्वेतकेतु 'the knowledge of everything by the knowledge of one'. With this end in view Uddâlaka teaches his son that 'इदं सर्वं'—this whole visible universe is ऐतदात्म्य—a प्रकार of सद्, it is सत्य because सद् is its आत्मा, श्वेतकेतु, thou art that—ऐतदात्म्य—, a प्रकार of सद्, तत् being a pronoun refers to the noun ऐतदात्म्य. But apart from this, the fact remains that Jîva as such is not Brahman; then why does श्रुति say so? To the Vaidika the letter of the Veda is all in all. Its authoritativeness cannot be questioned by him.

As to S'ankara, 'तत् त्वम् असि' is possible thus. तत् refers to Brahman, freed from अविद्या and its products, *viz.* omniscience, omnipotence, etc., while त्वम् refers to the human soul, freed from अविद्या and its adjuncts अल्पज्ञत्व, अणुत्व, अंशत्व, कर्तृत्व, etc. Thus in both तत् and त्वम् a लाक्षणिक secondary sense is to be preferred in perfect disregard of the primary sense. S'ankara's preference for secondary

sense cannot be supported by any Sûtra of Bâdarâyana. In addition to this, the result is that all उपासनारूपस्य of Brahman become the products of अविद्या, the कार्ये and अंश of Brahman become मिथ्या, and श्रुति passages and Sûtras, teaching कारणत्व and अंशित्व of Brahman, become असद् अर्थवादः. The result is that one arrives at a point where the demarcation line between S'ankara's निर्विशेषवाद—absolutely negative system, singularism, and शून्यवाद of Mâdhyamika becomes a problem of doubt and difficulty. One cannot seriously dispute that there is Buddhistic influence working here somewhere in one form or another.

But if we take Jîva as अंश of Brahman following the letter of Bâdarâyana, then there is लक्षणा only of 'तत्', and this too is not असत्पर्यवसायिनी, but as Vallabha says, just as the crown-prince becomes king, so Jîva becomes Brahman and he experiences ब्रह्मभाव, he experiences विमुक्त्य, etc., the धर्मस्य of ब्रह्मन्, side by side with his अणुत्व. The result here is सत्पर्यवसान. The Vedic passage, 'स आनन्त्याय कल्पते,' also favours this view; besides the theories of Saguṇa Nirguṇa Brahman, जगन्मिथ्यात्व, etc., resulting from S'ankara's reasoning have not to be resorted to. On the acceptance of 'अंशित्व' of 'अंशित्व' Brahman and अंश Jîva on the principle taught by Bâdarâyana in the Sûtra, 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14, the तादात्म्योपदेश can well be explained. The काष्ठश्रुति teaches that just as water, coming in contact with pure water, becomes तादृक्, so the soul of the muni, knowing Brahman, becomes तादृक्. The word is तादृक् and not तत्. If Jîva were परमार्थतः Brahman, then this illustration cannot be explained. 'वासवः प्रविशित्वाये अस्य दृष्टान्तस्य सर्वथा नुपपत्तेः'. Thus we are driven to the conclusion that the Sûtrakâra's long list of Sûtras confirms the view that Jîva is अणु, his विमुक्त्य is spoken in the state of ब्रह्मभाव to establish his Brahmanhood. Dr. Thibaut also remarks that it is strange that पूर्वपक्ष could be so very lengthy.

If the reasoning above adopted is correct, then S'ankara's remark, 'तस्माद् दुर्ज्ञानत्वाभिप्रायमिदमणुत्ववचनमुपाव्यभिप्रायं वा द्रष्टव्यम्', has no bearing whatever so far as the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana are concerned. It also follows from what has been said above that S'ankara's interpretation of the next three Sûtras 23-30 31-32 does not seem to bring out the view of the Sûtrakâra. The Sûtrakâra nowhere suggests this बुद्धिसंयोग or उपाधिसंयोग. The Sûtra, 'ब्रह्मत्वव्यापकत्वात् न दोषः तद्दर्शनात्,' is not very clear. The objection why low हीन-Jiva is said to be the highest Brahman is set aside by saying that once the Brahmanhood of the Jivâtman becomes manifest, he continues for ever to experience Brahmatva and with it विमुत्त्व also. It is well said:—

‘व्यापकत्वध्रुतिरतस्य भगवत्त्वेन युज्यते ।
आनन्दांशमिव्यक्तौ तु तत्र ब्रह्माण्डकोटयः ।
प्रतीयेरन् परिच्छेदो व्यापकत्वं च तस्य तत् ॥’

Anu Bhaṣya. 2-3-30.

The Brahmanhood—विमुत्त्व, etc., before the Jivâtman experiences ब्रह्मभाव, is latent in him; in the state of ब्रह्मत्व, विमुत्त्व, etc., develop in him on the analogy that पुंस्त्व which is latent in a child develops in him when he attains puberty. ‘पुंस्त्वादिवत् तु अस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात्’ 2-3-31. The next Sûtra confirms this view. Hence the Jivâtman according to Bâdarâyana is अणु, and not व्यापक or विमु as S'ankara says; the Jivâtman is spoken of as Brahman in a secondary sense so long as he is in संसारदशा, but when he is in मुक्तिदशा, when his ब्रह्मत्व becomes प्रकट—his ब्रह्मत्वव्यपदेश is मुख्य-वृत्त—in primary sense. Thus it appears that S'ankara has clearly misunderstood the Sûtra 2-3-29. Regarding this Dr. Thibaut also observes: - ‘Now, in the first place, nothing in context warrants the explanation of the first ‘*ut*’ by *buddhi*. And—which is more important—in the second place, it is more than doubtful whether according

to S'āṅkara's own system the qualities of the Buddhi such as pleasure, pain × × etc., can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the soul even in the saṃsāra state. The essence of the soul in whatever state, according to S'āṅkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential, or, more strictly, unreal, false. (Vedānta Sūtra 1-page 55.) Hence S'āṅkara is not right in turning the जीवास्तुत्त्वबोधक Sūtras as belonging to पूर्वपक्ष.

The next adhikaraṇa, consisting of Sūtras 33 to 39, establishes that the Jivātman is a kartā. In support of the Jivātman's *kartr̥itva*, the Sūtrakāra gives the following reasons:—(1) शास्त्रार्थवत्त्व, (2) विद्वारोपदेश, (3) करणोपादान and (4) क्रियाव्यपदेश. The 'च' in the Sūtra 2-3-36, 'व्यपदेशाच्च क्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः' ends the list of reasons given by the Sūtrakāra in support of the Jivātman's *kartr̥itva*. The next three Sūtras deal with the question how it is that Jiva who is a kartā does sometimes good or bad to himself. The Sūtra says just as the eye sees pleasant as well as unpleasant objects, so the Jivātman does actions which are sometimes beneficial or harmful to himself, because his powers are crippled, and he has no समाधि which helps one to perceive what is हित or अहित. 'उपलब्धिपदनिग्रहः,' 'शक्तिविपर्ययात्,' 'समाध्यभावाच्च,' 2-3-37-38-39. The 'च' in the last Sūtra, 'समाध्यभावाच्च' ends the list of reasons given for हिताहितकरण. After once referring the Sūtra 'उपलब्धिपदनिग्रहः' to हिताहितकरणदोष, S'āṅkara's referring the next Sūtra ' ' ' ' ' to refute Buddhi's *kartr̥itva*, and then again the last Sūtra 'समाध्यभावाच्च' to show that the Jivātman is a kartā, is rather forced. The propriety of 'च' comes in the way, and Bādarāyaṇa's reading 'समाधिभावाच्च' instead of 'समाधिभावाच्च' is also a difficulty to meet which we have to strain ourselves to make out the sense.

The next Sûtra is 'यथा च तक्षोभयथा' 2-3-40. It is very important. The diversity in the interpretations of this Sûtra by different Bhâshyakâras has enhanced our interest in it. S'ankara in this Sûtra puts forth the view that the *kartritva* of the Jivâtman, established by Bâdarayâna in the previous adhikaraṇa, is not Jivâtman's स्वाभाविक *kartritva* but उपाधिनिमित्त; the Jivâtman's *kartritva* is a product of nescience; as a matter of fact, the human soul is अकर्ता. With this end in view, S'ankara proceeds to interpret the Sûtra thus:—The 'च' in the Sûtra is used in the sense of 'तु,' and thereby it refutes the view, put forth in the previous adhikaraṇa that Jivatman is a स्वाभाविककर्ता. The Jivâtman's कर्तृत्व, according to S'ankara, is not स्वाभाविक in the sense that heat is स्वाभाविक in fire; on the contrary as in the case of तक्ष who busies himself with the axe and other tools in his hands, and feels pain, but afterwards goes home, lays aside his axe and other tools, and in his natural state rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul as long as it is affected by the duality founded on ignorance, is busied in the state of dreaming and waking and feels pain, but when it enters into itself to throw off weariness into the highest self, it is freed from the complexity of the organs of work, is not an agent and feels pleasure in the state of deep sleep; it is the same in the state of liberation where it is केवल, reposes and is happy after gloom of ignorance is driven away by the torch of knowledge. The simile of the carpenter is to be taken as follows:—the carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work such as fitting, etc., and with regard to certain tools such as his axe, etc., an agent, but not an agent so far as his body goes, so too the soul in its exertions with regard to the organs, *manas*, etc., is an agent, but not an agent with regard to his own self. The soul, as opposed to the carpenter, has not like him, limbs with which it could take

up the organs, *manas*, etc., or lay them aside, as the carpenter with his hands takes up, and lays aside his tools.

Though this interpretation appears to have been worked out very ingeniously, it is nevertheless a forced one. How can it be for a moment supposed that Bâdarâyana uses the 'च' in the sense of 'तु'? How can one convince the opponent that 'च' is used in the sense of 'तु'? It is more than probable that S'ankara is trying here to put forward a view that seems to have been never thought of by the Sûtrakâra. It is certain that this is not the view of the Sûtrakâra, and one cannot seriously dispute that S'ankara here is reading his own individual opinion into the Sûtra of Bâdarâyana. This opinion is strengthened by Dr. Deussen who, in his 'System of Vedânta' page 319, referring to S'ankara's taking 'च' in the sense of 'तु,' says thus:—'a remark which possibly hints at fundamental differences between Bâdarâyana and S'ankara.'

It is better to take the Sûtra as Râmânûja does, as a supplement to what has been said before. If the human soul were a स्वभाविक कर्ता, as is taught in the preceding adhikaraṇa, then, says the opponent, he would always remain as such—कर्ता—and hence he would never be free from action. To such an objection this Sûtra furnishes an answer:—Just as a तक्ष even having with him an axe, etc., works or does not work at will, so the Jîvâtman even though possessed of organs of speech, etc., (तक्षते वा न तक्षते वा), at will works or does not work. Hence no अनिर्दिष्टत्वम्.

Vallabha also considers this Sûtra to be a supplement to the theory of the Jîvâtman's कर्तृत्व propounded in the preceding Sûtras. According to him, the Jîvâtman is not only a *Kartâ* but a *Bhoktâ* also. It is not necessary, says Vallabha, that *Kartâ* and *Bhoktâ* ought to be separate; just as तक्ष having made the chariot rides in it, so the Jîvâtman

does something, and enjoys it. Vallabha further says that कर्तृत्व by its very nature is not दुःखरूप—unpleasant; drinking milk, etc., is सुखरूप pleasant.

In either case the view that the Jīvātman's कर्तृत्व is औपाधिक or आविधिक, and that he is परमार्थतः an अकर्ता is not accepted. Whether one accepts Rāmānuja's or Vallabha's rendering, it does not matter much; both seem to be more natural than that of S'āṅkara.

It has been shown that S'āṅkara's rendering of the Sūtra, 'यथा च तक्षोभयथा' 2-3-40, is forced. The Sūtra does not seem to consider the question whether the Jīvātman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक or औपाधिक, but as Rāmānuja remarks, this Sūtra teaches the कर्तृत्व or अकर्तृत्व of the Jīvātman at will, just as a carpenter works or takes rest at will. S'āṅkara cannot quote any Sūtra to prove the कर्तृत्व of the Jīvātman to be औपाधिक or आविधिक. This Sūtra cannot help him much. If the Jīvātman's स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व is to be questioned at all, it can be referred to be due to परब्रह्मन् on the authority of the next Sūtra, 'परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः' 2-3-41, rather than to बुद्धि or उपाधि. S'āṅkara has, however, independently of the Sūtrakāra, advanced the following arguments against the Jīvātman's स्वाभाविक कर्तृत्व. (1) If Jīva's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक, then as अग्नि cannot be free from heat, so Jīva cannot be free from कर्तृत्व, hence अनिमोक्षप्रसंग. (2) कर्तृत्व is दुःखरूप. (3) मोक्षसिद्धि is referred to नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त soul. (4) Some श्रुति passages teach Jīva's कर्तृत्व to be आविधिक. For these reasons, says S'āṅkara, the Jīvātman is an अकर्ता.

The first objection can be met by taking the interpretation of the Sūtra like Rāmānuja. On the other hand, if बुद्धि's कर्तृत्व is insisted upon, then as बुद्धि is अचेतन, there can be no motive for भोगावाञ्छा, etc., hence कर्तृत्व would be नित्य. Vallabha also advances the same arguments in different words. He observes;—'न च सहजकर्तृत्वे

अनिर्मोक्षः, पराधीनकर्तृत्व एवैतदिति, सांख्यस्य तन्मतानुगारिणो वान्यस्य भ्रम एव, कर्तृत्वे न मुक्तिरिति, ननुसक एवमुच्येतेति बाह्यवत्, निरिन्द्रियस्यैव समाधिरित्यपि, करणत्वेन बुद्धिवन्न केनापि दृष्यते, तस्मात् जीवस्य स्वाभाविकं कर्तृत्वम्, व्यायतीव लेलायतीवेत्यपि परधर्मानुकरणम् । अयमप्येको धर्मः, स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योर्ब्रह्मव्यपदेशं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वविघ्नं वदन् उपेक्ष्यः'. Again one fails to understand why S'ankara calls any sort of कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप. It depends on how one takes it. Considering कर्तृत्व to be दुःखरूप, imagining the existence of दुःख in आनन्दमय—all these go to suggest that S'ankara is influenced by deeply pessimistic leanings. When कर्तृत्व is taken in the light of the ब्रह्मविद्, when individual soul's कर्तृत्व is declared to be Brahman's, then there seems to be no valid objection. With great force does Vallabha observe in 1-1-1:—'न च ब्रह्मरूपात्मविज्ञाने देहाद्यध्यासाभावेन कर्तृत्वाभावात् कर्मानधिकार इति वाच्यम्, निरध्यस्तैरेव देहादिभिः कर्मकरणसंभवात्, अत एव जीवन्मुक्तानां सर्वे व्यापाराः, तथाच स्मृतिः, 'नैव किञ्चित् करोमीति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्ववित्, पश्यन् शृण्वन् स्पृशन् जिघ्रन् अश्नन् गच्छन् स्वपन् श्वसन्, प्रलपन् विसृजन् गृह्णन् उन्मिषन् निमिषन् अपि, इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थेषु वर्तन्ते इति धारयन्, ब्रह्मण्याधाय कर्माणि संगं त्यक्त्वा करोति यः, लिप्यते न स पापेन पद्मपत्रमिवांभसा'. 'ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविः ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं, ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना'. These quotations from Geeta show how कर्म are to be performed. They do not say that Jiva is an अकर्ता, but that he has to be a कर्ता with ब्रह्म by his side. The misery is due to अस्मिन्न and not to कर्तृत्व. Hence Pādarāyana teaches that Jiva's कर्तृत्व is due to पर-ब्रह्मन्.

The श्रुति passages can be explained otherwise. The quotation from छान्दोग्य does not teach कर्तृत्वाभाव, but that कर्तृत्व is due to आत्मन-ब्रह्मन् (7th प्रपाठक). Bādarāyana teaches the same in परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः 2-3-41. To add to all this, the Sūtrakāra never suggests any of S'ankara's arguments, but boldly goes on declaring Jiva's कर्तृत्व. Hence the most skilful advocate of S'ankara would fail on this point. Thus the Jivātman's कर्तृत्व is स्वाभाविक.

The next two Sûtras 2-3-41-42, declare that though the Jîvatman is कर्ता, he derives his कर्तृत्व from Brahman-पर. It is impossible for any balanced thinker to reconcile S'ankara's reasoning with that of the Sûtrakâra in 2-3-41-42 'परात् तु तच्छ्रुतेः' 2-3-41. Bâdarâyana says that श्रुति teaches Jîva's कर्तृत्व to be derived from पर-ब्रह्मन्; he does not say उपाधि. The next Sûtra is 'कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षं विहितमिति हि वेदोक्तं' 2-3-42. This Sûtra seems to have been written by Bâdarâyana to refute the objection of वैषम्य and नैर्घृण्य accruing to Brahman, by its being declared to be the final source of all activity-and thence of happiness and misery prevailing in the world at large. If S'ankara's interpretation is taken by itself without any reference to his esoteric doctrine of कर्तृक्रियारहित Brahman, it is quite in harmony with 2-1-34. All the Âchâryas take कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष in the sense of जीवकृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष, and say as प्रवाह is अनादि there is no वैषम्य, etc., because Brahman is जीवकृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष. In 3-2-38, 'फलमत उपपत्तेः,' it is taught that Brahman allots fruits, and Jaimini's view that धर्म or कर्म allots fruits is refuted. Again in 3-2-5, 'परामिध्यानात् तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ, bondage, etc., of the Jivâtman are referred to परब्रह्मन्'s अभिध्यान. The Vedic passage, 'एष हि एव साधु कर्म कारयति यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उद्विनीयति,' etc., teaches that the Supreme Lord makes a human soul do good or bad actions according to His will to raise or lower him. The Sûtra, 'परात् तु तच्छ्रुतेः,' states that the human activity has its source in Brahman. Hence it appears that when Brahman is the sole doer, He ought to be held liable for the misery and happiness of the Jivâtman, and they should not be made to suffer or enjoy the fruits of actions which are not strictly their own.

1. S'ankara renders the Sutra thus:—He refers the अभिध्यान to जीवकर्तृरुपराभिध्यान. तिरोहितम् is rendered in the sense of अतिरोहितम्. This is far-fetched. It seems better, with Râmânuja, Madhva, Nimbârka and Vallabha, to take it as परब्रह्मन्'s अभिध्यान.

If we follow S'āṅkara's reasoning, this दूषण of वैषम्य-
नैर्घृण्य goes away. But then we have to cast aside the
purport of all the Sūtras. Hence Bādarāyaṇa must have
in his mind a view, which refutes this objection of वैषम्य,
etc., and at the same time, is thoroughly consistent. The
difficulty can be solved in two ways:—*viz.*, (1) by refer-
ring this contradiction to Brahman's अचिन्त्यैश्वर्य and the
letter of the Veda; the Veda teaches that Brahman
gives fruits; it may be according to कर्म, or may not be;
though giving fruits according to कर्म, Brahman is inde-
pendent of कर्म; when Brahman gives fruits according to
His sweet will, even then He is not liable to वैषम्य, etc.,
for Veda teaches so; (2) by taking the कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष not as
जीवोऽप्यपेक्ष as all the आचार्यस have done, but as पर—(ब्रह्म)
कृतप्रयत्नापेक्ष. The advantage of taking the Sūtra this way is
clear. We have not to bring in the word जीव from the drift
of the प्रकरण, but from the Sūtra just preceding. Accord-
ing to this view, the whole सृष्टि becomes ब्रह्मप्रयत्न. In आत्मकृतेः
परिणामात् 1-4-26, it is taught that the सृष्टि is आत्मसृष्टि and
आत्मकृति; in 2-1-33 'लोकवत्तु लीला कैवल्यम्', it is taught that this
आत्मसृष्टि आत्मकृति is लीलाकैवल्यम्; in 2-3-43 'अंशो गतः सत्त्वमपेक्षानात्', etc.,
it is taught that the Jīvātman is an अंश of ब्रह्मन्; in 'परामिथ्यानात्
तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो' 3-2-5, it is taught that the Jīvāt-
man's Brahmanhood is तिरोहित—has become latent—by the
अभिध्यान of Brahman, and to Brahman are due bondage, etc.
Hence it appears that Brahman, for His own sport alone,
out of His sweet will, develops Himself into Jada-Jiva,
and still remaining transcendent, determines that a parti-
cular Jīvātman will do a particular action, and He will
give him a particular fruit. So according to
Brahman rules His अंशs, Jīvas. As अंशs they are अनन्य
with ब्रह्मन्. The human soul's position can be compared to
an actor. He has to play the part allotted to him in

ब्रह्मलीला; the happiness and misery trouble him so far as he forgets that his कर्तृत्व is Brahman's and not his own; in fact, happiness and misery are both creatures of Brahman, and cannot be said to be the criterions of deciding Brahman's partiality and cruelty; the moment the human soul realises that Brahman for His sport guides him to do this or that, he ceases to be miserable; his limited ideas of प्रियत्व vanish; he experiences 'साधूनां वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्'. Forgetting his own कर्तृत्व, and remembering Brahman's कर्तृत्व, the human soul ceases to be responsible for his so-called actions; he feels buoyant. Like Brahman, he sees in the लीला of Brahman आनन्द. The कर्तृत्व becomes thus a source of pleasure, आनन्द—and not a source of misery as S'āṅkara says. Brahman makes Jīva work according to His अभिव्यञ्जन and लीलायै-कृतप्रयत्न, otherwise His विहित and प्रतिषिद्ध would be purportless. The part allotted to Jīva by Brahman to play would be jeopardised. Thus this Jada-jīvâtma—Nāmarûpâtma—Sṛishti being आत्मपरिणाम-आत्मकृति, being Brahman's केवललीला, Brahman is not liable to the shortcomings of partiality and cruelty. The wording of the Sûtra, विहित. प्रतिषिद्ध—instead of विधिनिषेध—also helps us. In this way also, we have to deny in Jīva his अभिमान in कर्तृत्व, and emphasise that he is a creature guided by Brahman's will in all his actions. This seems to be the view of Bâdarâyaṇa suggested from the Sûtras. With S'āṅkara we can deny Jīva's अभिमान in कर्तृत्व, but unlike him we prefer to refer all human activity to Brahman as source, and not to उपाधि बुद्धि, etc.

The section, consisting of Sûtras 2-3-43-53, deals with the question of the relationship of the soul to Brahman. According to Bâdarâyaṇa, the Jīvâtman is the अंश of Brahman; Brahman is अशिन्, while the Jīvâtman is अंश. Like master and servant, the human soul is not different from Brahman, but like spark and fire, he is अनन्य with Brahman.

The Vedic mantra, पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि, and the Gīta passage, 'ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः,' teach that the Jīvātman is the अंश of Brahman. This is the view of the Sūtrakāra. However, S'āṅkara does not like to accept this view. Accordingly, S'āṅkara changes 'अंशः' into 'अंश इव'. To take अंश in the sense of 'अंश इव' is clearly modifying the view of Bādarāyaṇa. Even though certain passages of the Upanishads declare Brahman to be निष्कल-निरवयव, that does not justify us in rejecting the texts which teach the अंशत्व of the Jīvātman. Adopting the reasoning which Bādarāyaṇa has worked out in 2-1-26-27—'कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निरवयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा,' श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्, the difficulty can be removed by accepting Brahman's swarūpa to be निरवयव, and at the same time having अंशः. In a शब्दप्रमाणशाला like this, reasoning as such has very little scope.

This view is not singular. In this view, Vallabha is with us when he observes:—'ननु ब्रह्मणो निरवयवत्वात् कथं जीवस्यांशत्वमेति वाच्यम्, नहि ब्रह्म निरंशं सांशमिति वा कचिद् लोके सिद्धम्, नैव तन्मिमांसया, ना च श्रुतिः यथोपपद्यते तथा तदनुद्धरणेन वेदार्थविज्ञानार्थं युक्तिर्वक्तव्या, × × तत्रैषा युक्तिः—

विस्फुलिङ्गा इवामेहि अजनीना विनिर्गताः ।

सर्वतःपाणिभादान्तात् सर्वतोऽग्निदिग्नेतृत्वात् ॥

निरिन्द्रियात् स्वरूपेण तादृशादिति निश्चयः ।

सदंशेन जडाः पूर्वं चिदंशेनेतरे अपि ॥

अन्यधर्मतिरोभावान्मूलेच्छातोऽस्वतंत्रिणः ।

ब्रह्मवादे अंशपक्ष एव' 2-3-43. This seems to be a very fair view of interpreting Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras. But in spite of what Bādarāyaṇa and Vallabha might say, the fact remains that this difficulty has been fruitful in producing numerous theories as regards the relation of the human soul with Brahman. The very word अंश, though clearly meaning an अवयव, has been subjected to yield senses which, if not wrong, cannot be accepted to be correct, or at least cannot be supposed to represent the true view of Bādarāyaṇa.

S'ankara has been honest in saying that he does not accept the theory that the Jivâtman is अंश of Brahman, when he says that 'अंश' should be taken in the sense of 'अंश इव'. But other Âchâryas have worked, from the word 'अंश', a sense suitable to their views. It need not be remarked that, according to Bâdarâyana, अंश means a 'part'. The Vedic Mantra using the word 'पाद' also suggests the same thing. Let us see what Bhâskara says. He remarks, 'अंशशब्दः कारणवाची, यथा पटस्यांशः तन्तुरिति'; but this sense is not acceptable to him, and he remarks, 'तयोरिह ग्रहणं न भवति, किन्तु पादव्यवच्छिन्नस्यानन्यभूतस्य वाचकोऽयमंशशब्दः प्रयुक्तो यथाशेषेऽपि तदुक्तिरस्य'. Thus, according to Bhâskara, अंश means इवमव्यवच्छिन्न अनन्वभूत. निरवयव Brahman has अंश, the जीव, because the Vedic passage, 'यथाग्नेः क्षुद्राः विस्तृङ्मिताः', teaches so. This अंश is निमित्त with Brahman, his अभिवृत्त is स्वाभाविक, while भिन्नत्व is औपाधिक. Bhâskara is right in remarking that the Jivâtman is अंश of Brahman as spark is of fire, and that he is भिन्नाभिन्न, because श्रुति and सूत्र support it, but he is wrong in saying that भिन्नत्व is औपाधिक, for the श्रुति passage quoted does not support it.

Râmânujâ takes the word अंश in the sense of विशिष्ट-वस्त्वेकदेश, and so does S'reekantha. The relation between Brahman and the Jivâtman is that of विशेष्य and विशेषण.

Nimbârka¹ takes अंश to mean शक्ति. The Jivâtman is a शक्ति of Brahman. Hence, according to him, the relation between the Jivâtman and Brahman is that of शक्ति and शक्तिसत्. S'reekantha² also accepts this view.

According to Madhva, अंश³ are different like sons and others, or non-different like hands, feet, etc. To the

1. 'अंशो हि शक्तिस्यो वाक्यः 2-3-42. of S'reenivâsa Nimbârka.

2. Sir R. Bhandarkar's Vaishnavism p. 161.

3. Vide Râmânujâ's and S'ree Kantha's Bhâshyas on this Sutra and Madhva's Bhâshya.

first class belongs human souls and to the second मत्स्यादि incarnations of Viṣṇu.

Rāmānuja, S'reekantha, Nimbārka, Madhva, and Viṣṇanabhikṣhu accept the भेद between the Jīvātman and Brahman to be स्वाभाविक. Viṣṇanabhikṣhu like Bâdarâyaṇa accepts वास्तव अंशत्व of the Jīvātman on the analogy of spark and fire or son and father. भेद and अभेद are both स्वाभाविक. Vallabha says that भेद is ऐच्छिक. One notices that all these writers are labouring under difficulties. They do not like S'ankara say that अंश means 'अंश इव', but still, like Bâdarâyaṇa, Bhikṣhu and Vallabha, they are not prepared to take अंश in its natural significance of a 'part.' It is safe with Bâdarâyaṇa to take the Jīvātman to be अंश—part of Brahman, on the analogy of spark and fire on the authority of the same S'ruti passage, and to say that they are अनन्य on the principle laid down by the Sûtrakâra in 'तद्वन्मयमनसोऽङ्गशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14.

The next two Sûtras 2-3-46-47 declare that even though the Jivatman is an अंश of Brahman, and hence अनन्य with Brahman, Brahman does not suffer because the Jīvātman suffers. 'प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः, स्मरन्ति च'. These two Sûtras are quite consistent with what Bâdarâyaṇa has said before in 2-1-21-22 'इतरव्यपदेशाद्विताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः', and 'अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्'. Though the Jīvātman is अनन्य with Brahman, still Brahman is अधिक, greater than the Jīvātman. The same reasoning is followed here by Bâdarâyaṇa. He says though the Jīvātman is the अंश of Brahman, and अनन्य with Brahman, still the परमात्मा is not affected by the miseries, etc. of the Jīvātman because Brahman is पर-अधिक greater than the Jīvātman. This reasoning would be possible only when the Jīvātman's कर्तृत्व and भोक्तृत्व were स्वाभाविक, and not औपाधिक. How can the Jīvātman; who is the अंश of Brahman, and अनन्य with

it, be different from Brahman so far as his sufferings, etc., are concerned? How can the Jīvātman be thus भिन्नाभिन्न with Brahman, because भेद and अभेद are contradictory and cannot be in the same place? To such questions Bhāskara has well replied in 2-1-22, 'अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्':--

‘प्रमाणान्धेषु प्रतीयेत को विरोधो भवेत् ।

विरोधे चाविरोधे च प्रमाणं कारणं मतम् ॥’

The प्रमाण is श्रुति, and श्रुति teaches so, therefore, there is no विरोध. The Veda and the Sūtras teach both. According to the reasoning of S’āṅkara, these Sūtras draw a distinction without difference, for happiness and misery are both creatures of nescience, अविद्या. The illustration given in the Sūtra also goes against S’āṅkara.

The next two Sūtras refute a further objection that though the Jīvātman is the अंश of Brahman, and अनन्य with Brahman, the karmas, enjoined in the Veda, have only an application to the Jīvātman and not to Brahman, the reason for this being the Jīvātman’s देहसंबन्ध. There is सन्तति of देहसंबन्ध in one life, hence one is known as Brāhmaṇa, etc., during the period of that life, and he has to perform karmas accordingly. The सन्तति does not extend to next life, hence Jīva has to perform karmas according to देहसंबन्ध in that life. Here it appears that Bādarāyaṇa gives देहसंबन्ध to be the cause of karmakarana; so when one realises that his soul is different from the देह, he would cease to have any connection with the karmas and their fruits. Then he has to perform karmas on the principle, laid down in ‘परात् तच्छ्रुतेः’, and ‘ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविर्ब्रह्माग्नौ ब्रह्मणा हुतं ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसमाधिना’, गीता. From this it appears that S’āṅkara is right in his rejection of देहाध्यासकर्तृत्व, but wrong in his absolute rejection of the Jīvātman’s kartṛitva. It also explains how देहाध्यासरहित जीवन्मुक्त sages, like Vasishṭha, S’uka, Sanatkumāra per-

formed कर्म actions. To them the कर्मकरण was neither बन्धरूप nor दुःखरूप nor आविद्यक, but a परकर्म—ब्रह्मकर्म. They had a manifestation of ब्रह्म in कर्म. 'कर्मसु ब्रह्माभिव्यक्तिः'. This seems to be the proper view of looking at the connection between the two Mīmāṃsās, and it appears that Sāṅkara is perhaps driving at the same thing when he observes in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्' 1-1-4, 'न हि धनिनो गृहस्थस्य धनाग्निमानरहितस्य तदेव धनापहारनिमित्तं दुःखं भवति, न च कुण्डलिनः कुण्डलित्वाभिमानरहितस्य तदेव कुण्डलित्वाभिमाननिमित्तं सुखं भवति, न च प्रत्यक्षः संबन्धहेतुः'. So it follows, from what Bâdarâyana and S'āṅkara say, that देहाध्यास is a cause of misery, but then the कर्तृत्व without देहाध्यास—देहसंबन्ध is not to be referred to अविद्या, बुद्धि or उपाधि as S'āṅkara says, but to Brahman—पर as Bâdarâyana says. Thus the performance of karmas, without देहाध्यास, as ब्रह्मकर्म, produces in one ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in कर्म, and ब्रह्मज्ञान produces in one ब्रह्माभिव्यक्ति in ज्ञान. The two Mīmāṃsās thus help each other, and suggest the ideal of Brahman as ज्ञानक्रियाविशिष्ट, the क्रिया referring to सद्रूप, ज्ञान to चिद्रूप, and the two together to आनन्दरूप, thus giving the full conception of सच्चिदानन्द ब्रह्म. This seems to be the view of Bâdarâyana, and we are unable to reconcile S'āṅkara's reasoning in 'तत्तु समन्वयात्', and the second interpretation of आनन्दमयाधिकरण with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. According to Bâdarâyana, the human soul can be free from misery, etc., only when he realises that he does not do anything, but Brahman *Para* does it—or makes him do it. *Avidyâ* as such has no place in the system of Bâdarâyana.

Then comes the Sûtra, 'आभास एव च'. This is read by Bhâskara as 'आभासा एव च'. He rejects the reading of S'āṅkara with this remark:—'आभासस्यावस्थानात्तद्विषयत्वान्न तद्विषयः शब्दविषयकल्पस्याचेतनस्य कुतो बन्धो मोक्षो वा कर्माधिकारो वा । न च परमात्मनः पुरस्तादतो नार्थ पाठ इति'. Rāmānuja wants to favour Bhâskara's reading, and renders it by हेत्वाभास. It matters little whether the Sûtra is read as 'आभासः' or 'आभासाः'. From what has been said above, it is not possi-

ble that Bâdarâyaṇa could have meant 'आभास' to refer to the Jīvâtman's being a मिथ्या-आभास of Brahman. Vallabha drives at the same thing, when he observes, 'ननु सच्चिदानन्दस्य ब्रह्मणोऽंशः सच्चिदानन्द एव भवेदतः कथं प्रवाहे प्रवेशो भगवतश्च सर्वकार्याणि तत्राह, 'आभास' एव जीवः, आनन्दांशस्य तिरोहितत्वात् × × न तु सर्वथा प्रतिबिम्बवन्मिथ्यात्वं × × अतो न मिथ्यात्वरूप आभासोत्र विवक्षितः'.

Before concluding the जीवविचारणा, the Sûtra 1-4-22 may be considered. S'āṅkara adopts the view of काशकृत्स्नः—'दर्शितं तु पुरस्तात् पक्षस्य दुर्गमत्वात् × × काशकृत्स्नस्यावार्द्धत्वावि-कृतः परमेश्वरो जीवो नान्य इति मतम्, आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि जीवस्य परस्मादन-न्यत्वमभिप्रेतं, तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वमिधानात् कार्यकारणभावः कियानपि अभिप्रेत इति गम्यते, औडुलोमिपक्षे पुनः स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ भेदाभेदौ गम्येते, तत्र काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं धृत्यनुसारीति गम्यते, प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति मतम् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिभिः'. S'āṅkara interprets काशकृत्स्नमत thus—'अस्यैव पर-मात्मनोऽनेनापि विद्वान्भगवत्प्रेषणान्तरादुपपन्नमभिप्रेतमिति मतम्'. Rāmā-
nuja also takes काशकृत्स्न's view as सिद्धान्त view, and explains thus:—'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मनोऽन्तर' इत्यादिना जीवात्मनि परमात्मन आत्मतया अवस्थितेः'. Vallabha explains it thus:—'भगवत एवा-वस्था जीवः', but he takes काशकृत्स्न's view to be different from that of Bâdarâyaṇa—'अवस्थया व्यवसायात् सिद्धान्ताद्विशेषः'. What-
ever may be said as regards the view of काशकृत्स्न, it is certain that we cannot say with perfect confidence that it is the view of the Sûtrakâra. Bâdarâyaṇa distinctly says that the Jîva is अंश; and hence to take काशकृत्स्न's view as that of Bâdarâyaṇa, and to take it either in S'āṅkara's sense or Rāmānuja's sense is certainly a strain on the Sûtra. When the scope of the वाक्यान्वयाधि-
करण is considered, one sees that after establishing the ब्रह्मवाक्यत्व of मैत्रेयीब्राह्मण, Bâdarâyaṇa quotes the opinions of these writers, viz., आश्मरथ्य, औडुलोमि and काशकृत्स्न, to show that according to their views also the ब्रह्मत्वप्रतिपादकत्व मैत्रेयी-
ब्राह्मण is not बाधित. Therefore it is not proper to work out Bâdarâyaṇa's view that अविद्धतग्रहण is the same as जीव freed from अविद्या, etc., from काशकृत्स्न's view.

Hence the conclusion is that 'ब्रह्मैव अविविक्तान्तं जीवः' is not the view of the Sûtrakâra, neither is the human soul a प्रतिबिम्ब nor an आभास of ब्रह्मन् in S'ankara's sense. According to the Sûtrakara, the Jîvâtman is अंश of Brahman as a spark of fire, it is अनन्य with Brahman, as अंश is with the अग्निः, still Brahman is अधिक, greater than the Jîvâtman. The Jîvâtman is a कर्ता inheriting his कर्तृत्व from Brahman. He is निव्य. He is अणु, but in the stage of ब्रह्मभाव, he experiences विद्युत्, etc., which ever remain permanent, on the analogy that the crown-prince becomes the king. It appears thus that Bâdarâyana accepts 'भेदसहिष्णुरभेद', and not S'ankara's absolute 'भेदासहिष्णुरभेद'. This conclusion is strengthened by the remark of Sir R. Bhandarkar that S'ankara's system should be more fitly called 'Singularism', rather than Monism or Advaitisin. *Vide* Vaishṇavism, p. 159.

JAGAT.

The second Sûtra of Bâdarâyana gives the लक्षण of Brahman. From this definition of Brahman we know that according to Bâdarâyana this universe is Brahman's कृति and परिणाम. Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. It is important to note here that the definition of Brahman given by Bâdarâyana must be of the same Brahman whose investigation he has proposed to undertake in the first Sûtra 'अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा', that is, Brahman alone, pure and simple, whose investigation Bâdarâyana has undertaken, is the material as well as the efficient cause of this universe. Bâdarâyana again reverts to this question in 1-4-23-27. While refuting the Sâṅkhya's प्रकृतिकारणवाद, he elaborates his doctrine which he has expressed in brief before. The Sûtra 'प्रकृतिश्च प्रणिज्ञाद्यन्तानुसोषात्' 1-4-23 declares against the Sâṅkhya that Brahman is उपादान as well as

निमित्तकारण of the universe. The प्रतिज्ञा and दृष्टान्त of Uddâ-laka naturally yield the same sense. To support Brahman's कर्तृत्व and प्रकृतित्व, Bâdarâyana cites ब्रह्मन्'s अभिध्या. Brahman's ईक्षा, काम and बहुभवन support Brahman's उभयविधकारणत्व. The श्रुति and स्मृति both teach that the universe has its प्रभव and प्रलय in Brahman. This is also a reason why Brahman is both the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe. The next Sûtra, 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' 1-4-26, throws much light on the system of Bâdarâyana. Whether one takes 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्' as one Sûtra, or 'आत्मकृतेः' and 'परिणामात्' as two distinct Sûtras, the result is almost the same. The Sûtra is based on a passage from the तैत्तिरीय 2. 7. 'आत्मानं स्वयमकुरुते'. This passage suggests the कर्मत्व and कर्तृत्व of Brahman, 'आत्मानमिति कर्मत्वं, स्वयमकुरुतेति कर्तृत्वम्'. How can the 'पूर्वसिद्ध' sat Brahman be कर्तृ and कर्म? The answer to this objection is 'परिणामात्'. The पूर्वसिद्ध sat आत्मा-ब्रह्मन् developed itself into the universe. Brahman is योनि. Thus Brahman's प्रकृतित्व is प्रसिद्ध. 'एवं ब्रह्मणः प्रकृतित्वं प्रसिद्धम्'. 1-4-27. Though Brahman is the material cause, it does not require a separate निमित्त as in the case of an earthen pot and a potter. In the world, one sees that the उपादान and निमित्त are always separate, but this rule has no bearing whatever here. The svarûpa of Brahman is to be learnt from Veda alone, and since Veda teaches that Brahman itself becomes the उपादान and निमित्त, it should be accepted as such. 'आत्मैक-मीक्षापूर्वकं कर्तृत्वं निमित्तकारणेषु एव कुलादिषु लोके दृष्टं ज्ञेयम्'. न लोकवदिह भवितव्यम्, न अवमनुमानमयोऽर्थः, शब्दगम्यत्वात्त्व-स्यार्थस्य भवितव्यम्, शब्दधेक्षितुरीश्वरस्य प्रकृतित्वं प्रतिपादयतीत्यवो-चाम्'. This is what S'ankara observes on 1-4-27. The inter-pretation of S'ankara here is exactly in the spirit of Bâdarâyana. Brahman with its ईक्षा develops itself into the universe and still remains transcendent. Though the interpretation of S'ankara on these Sûtras (1-4-23-27) is correct as it stands, the qualification which he has in his

mind and which he suggests by the use of the word 'ईश्वर' instead of Brahman, cannot be justified as legitimate. A Nimbârka writer Keśavabhattacha Kâshmîrin thus criticises S'ankara:—'परमते तु तत्त्वं दुर्घटं, कार्यस्य कल्पितत्वांगीकारेण गोचरप्रत्यक्षनिर्णीयमित्यादिना नाना × × दृष्टान्तासंभवादिति संक्षेपः. N. B. pp. 351-352. The same writer then criticises Râmânujâ, 'केचित्तु चिदचिद्विशिष्टं ब्रह्मोपादानम् etc., pp. 352-353 N. B. Thus in order to emphasize अविकृतत्व of Brahman, Râmânujâ and S'reekantha accepted चिदचिद्विशिष्टब्रह्मन् as उपादान, Bhâskara and Nimbârka accepted ब्रह्मन्'s शक्ति as उपादान, Madhva accepted प्रकृति to be the उपादान, Vijñanabhikshu also accepted प्रकृति to be the उपादान, the difference being that his प्रकृति is अविभक्त with Brahman, and that it becomes the उपादान under the उपप्लव्भ of Brahman, while ब्रह्मन् is only a साक्षिन्. Here it is quite clear that all these writers, though modifying the शुद्ध ब्रह्मन्'s उपादानता, do not reject it altogether. Now remain the two writers S'ankara and Vallabha. Their views are entirely opposed. S'ankara by delegating Brahman's उपादानता to the sphere of अविद्या rejects it, while Vallabha like Bâdarâyana, following strictly the letter of the Veda, accepts it out and out. In rejecting Brahman's उपादानता, S'ankara has to subject the whole body of the Vedânta Sûtras to a secondary sense. श्रुति teaches अद्वयपरिणाम and at the same time its अविकृतत्व. Bâdarâyana does not care for the objections based on तर्क if the letter of the श्रुति is strictly followed. This view is followed by Vallabha, who, like Bâdarâyana, gives greater weight to the word of the श्रुति than to pure reason शुद्ध तर्क, when they appear opposed to each other. Other Achâryas have tried to follow Bâdarâyana with slight changes to satisfy reasons. It is only S'ankara who in rejecting 'शब्दबलेन विरोधपरिहारः' has chalked out lines of reasoning *which run in an entirely opposite direction*. Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar says the same in his recent book *Vaishnavism etc.*, pp. 158-159, 160-161.

Drawing a distinction between Spinoza's Pantheism and Upanishad Pantheism he says:—'Brahman is not exhausted in the world, but it exists separately also. But the objection to this view is that Brahman, being of the nature of spirit, is not like the body divisible into parts, so that one may become developed into the world and another remain outside; ××. This inconsistency is removed by Bâdarâyana in Brahmasûtras (2-1-26-27). The argument is that though the Upanishads state that the constituent cause of the world is Brahman, they at the same time affirm the existence of Brahman separately from the world. (Ch. U. III, 12 6 and VI, 3, 2.). The two are inconsistent on the theory that Brahman is a spirit and not discernible into parts. Though they are thus inconsistent, they must both be accepted on the authority of the sacred texts, since the true nature of Brahman and the world is beyond the reach of human intellect. This solution of the difficulty is inadmissible to non-believers in the sacred texts, but it shows that Bâdarâyana does not agree with the latter part of Spinoza's definition of Pantheism, *i. e.*, according to him the sacred texts do not affirm that "God exists only as realised in the cosmos: the cosmos exists only as a manifestation of God." The inconsistency pointed out by him is based on the impossible conception of Brahman's being divisible into parts. But it will not arise if, instead of bringing in this conception, we suppose that in one aspect Brahman is the material or constituent cause of the world or realised in the world, and from another point of view it remains pure and becomes the object of contemplation and devotion. Whatever it may be, Bâdarâyana's view appears to me to be correct, and the Pantheism of the Upanishads is not exactly the same as that formulated by Spinoza. × × × ×

We have noticed above the manner in which Bâda-

ātman removes the inconsistency between God's developing himself into the world, while at the same time he is transcendent, and his being a simple spirit without parts. S'āṅkarāchārya fairly explains, I think, Bādarāyaṇa's view. But raising a further objection he brings in his own doctrine eventually that the so-called development of Brahman into the world is fancied by ignorance and is not true, that is, the world is an illusion. There are two doctrines indicative of the relation of God to the world, the so-called Parīṇāmavāda and the Vivartavāda. The former implies real development, and the latter, an illusive development. This last is the doctrine of S'āṅkarāchārya, wherefore his system should be called Singularism rather than spiritual monism; while the first is that clearly held by the author of the Sūtras. This is evident from his very definition of Brahman as that from which everything originates, in which everything lives, and into which everything resolves itself in the end, and from the manner in which in the first Pada of the second chapter, he answers the objections based upon the theory that an intelligent being cannot develop into non-intelligent or insensate matter; and S'āṅkarāchārya himself acknowledges at the end of his comment on 2-1-14, that the author of the Sūtras follows the Parīṇāma doctrine, though to save his theory he imagines without any grounds that Bādarāyaṇa has in his view the ordinary or illusory condition of things in doing so. S'āṅkarāchārya's Vivartavāda it was which the later schools of Vaiṣṇavism and S'aivism contended against; for according to him it leaves no scope for the relation of the ruler and the ruled, *i. e.* God and the devotee in the condition of reality when all illusion is dispelled and one spirit alone exists (2-1-14). Most of them adopted Bādarāyaṇa's Parīṇāmavāda, but the distinctness of God,

man and the world, which was necessary for the validity of their doctrines of worship and devotion, they secured by qualifying the mode of development. By this qualification they also steered clear of the inconsistency pointed out by Bâdarâyana in 2-1-26. So that his mode of satisfaction was not necessary for them." After this, Sir R. Bhandârkar gives in brief the doctrines of Râmânûja, Nimbârka, Vallabha, Madhva, and S'rikantha S'aivâchârya, shows how they have followed or qualified the Parinâma-vâda of Bâlarâyana, and concludes thus:—"Thus most of these schools avoid the Pantheism of Spinoza, and the incompatibility between God's development into the world and his transcendency by holding that the rudiments of the material and the spiritual world associated with God as his characteristics¹ or as his body² or as his power,³ only undergo development, he himself remaining pure. Vishṇusvâmin and Vallabha, admitting as they do, the development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency, follow Bâdarâyana. The mysterious⁴ power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible, may be compared to the self-determining power of God involved in Spinoza's statement." Thus it follows that S'aṅkara in rejecting the ब्रह्मपरिणामवाद of Bâlarâyana, has failed to represent the correct view of the Sûtrakâra, that Brahman alone is the material cause of the world.

Thus according to Bâdarâyana the universe is an आत्मकृति and or if we substitute the word 'ब्रह्मन्' for 'आत्मन्' then ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम; the same Brahman whose investigation Bâlarâyana has undertaken, is itself both उपादान and निमित्त, causa materialis and causa efficiens

1. २-१-२६. 2. Nimbârka. 3. Bhaskara. 4. 'आदिर्भावतिरोभावौ शक्ती ब्रह्मणः'.

of the universe. Madhva, not accepting this, has failed to make out anything of the Brahma-Sûtras. Sir R. Bhandârkar most accurately remarks, 'He denies his (Brahman's) being the material cause of the world. All the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana which set forth that doctrine have been interpreted by him in an entirely different way. Probably he would have set aside the Brahma-Sûtras altogether, but he could not do so, since the work had acquired an uncontested authoritativeness as regards religious truth before his time. He had therefore to show that his system did not go against the Brahma-Sûtras and therefore accepted them and interpreted them in almost a fantastic manner. Texts from the Upanishads, too, which do not agree with his doctrines he treats similarly.' *Vaishnavism S'aivism*, p. 58.

To a certain extent this remark of Sir R. Bhandârkar applies to Vijnâna-Bhikshu also. The difference between Madhva and Bhikshu is this:—Madhva wants to emphasize भक्त्युत्पादकप्रवृत्तिनादात्म्य, while Bhikshu is 'anxious to work out an अक्षिप्त between the सांख्य, वैशेषिक, योग and Vedanta etc., an effort though praiseworthy, cannot be justified. But the most important reason which led all the writers to modify the ब्रह्मकारणता of Bâdarâyana is the fear of विकृति. If Brahman were taken to be the material cause, it would undergo change, and consequently it would be अनित्य and cease to be Brahman, नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्त. To avoid this difficulty S'ankara delegated Brahman's causality to अविद्या. 'अविद्या-कल्पितेन च नामरूपलक्षणेन रूपमेदेन ज्याकृताज्याकृत्यात्मकेन तत्त्वातत्त्वाम्यामतिर्वचनीयेन ब्रह्म परिणामादित्येवमद्वैतसिद्धिर्न प्रतिपद्यते' 2-1-27. Râmânuja for the same reason did not accept the ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणाम, and substituted चिदचिद्विशिष्टशरीर instead of pure Brahman of Bâdarâyana. 'मृत्युवर्णादिवद् ब्रह्मस्वरूपपरिणामस्तु नैवाम्युपगम्यते, अविकार-त्वनिर्दोषत्वाद्विश्रुतेः' 2-1-13. R. B. Anand Press, II. 23. Similar is the reasoning of S'reekantha. Nimbârka and Bhâskara

for the same reason substitute ब्रह्मशक्ति instead of Brahman, 'ब्रह्म स्वशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकारं आत्मानं परिणामयति' N. B. 347-57. परिणामो द्विविधः, स्वशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकारं आत्मानं परिणामयति, × × श्रीपुरुषोत्तमः स्वात्मक-स्वाश्रितितन्निजशक्तिविक्षेपेण जगदाकारं स्वात्मानं परिणामयति' केशवभट्टकाशमीरिन् & 'परिणामात् परिणामोऽत्र शक्तिविक्षेपरूपो, न तु स्वशक्तिविक्षेपेण विकारसंभावना-वकाश इति' परपक्षगिरिव्र. p. 369. Thus according to Nimbârka writers, परिणाम is not Brahman's but its शक्ति's, the modification owing its existence to the fear of विकार. Similarly Bhâskara writes 'शक्तिविक्षेपं कृतवान्'. 1-4-25, p. 85 Bhâskara-Bhâshya.

‘अप्रच्युतस्वरूपस्य शक्तिविक्षेपलक्षणः ।

परिणामो यथा तन्तुनामस्य पटतन्तुवत् ॥’ 2-1-14.

‘स हि स्वेच्छया स्वात्मानं लोकेष्विदं परिणामयन् स्वशक्त्यनुसारेण परिणामयति’. भास्करभाष्य. 2-1-14. Thus Bhâskara also does not accept ब्रह्मपरिणाम. Vijnânabhikshu for the same reason rejects Brahman's उपादानकारणता and substitutes अधिष्ठानकारणता of Brahman 'ब्रह्मणश्च स्वाभिन्नशक्त्यनुसारेण साक्षितामात्रेणेति जगत्कारणत्वे-ऽपि न ब्रह्मणो विकारित्वं'. मिथुभाष्य. p. 32. 1-1-2. Madhva also for the same reason refuses to accept Brahman's उपादानकारणता. Vallabha only is an exception to this rule. He accepts like Bâdarâyana that Brahman alone is the उपादानकारण. Thus he accepts प्रत्यक्षपरिणाम. In this he seems to be following Bâdarâyana as remarked by Sir R. Bhandârkar on pp. 160-161, in Vaishnavism etc. It has been shown above that according to Bâdarâyana, Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, in other words, this Jagat is ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम. To this the Sâṅkhya raises an objection in 2-1-26. 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निर्वयवत्व-शब्दकोपो वा'. If Brahman were the material cause, then either there would be कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति, and hence मूलोच्छेद, or the निर्वयवत्व-प्रतिपादक Vedic passages would have to be strained. To this the answer furnished by the Sûtrakâra is very significant. The Sûtrakâra says 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. As श्रुति,

teaches both, we accept both, that is, though Brahman is the material cause, still it is transcendent, it remains अविकृत, the reason being that the Swarūpa of Brahman is to be learnt from Veda alone, and as Veda teaches that Brahman is निरवयव and material cause without 'कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति' one must accept both. As Brahman is शब्दमूल the difficulty of विकार or निरवयवत्व does not stand. Tarka as such has no place in the system of the Sūtrakāra. Hence it appears to be clear that all the Âchâryas, except Vallabha, who have modified the शब्दमूलकारणता have failed to realise the attitude of Bâdarâyana to the letter of the Veda. But except S'ankara, none is bold to reject the 'परिणामवाद' of Bâdarâyana. The S'ankara Bhâṣya on 2-1-27 is a prominent instance where one sees S'ankara trying to create imaginary difficulties and to superimpose his views on those of the Sūtrakāra. Explaining the Sūtra in the strain of the Sūtrakāra, S'ankara rightly concludes 'तस्मात् शब्दमूल इति सिद्धिर्भवति न विकारिणः'. But with this, he is not satisfied and he remarks that even शब्द cannot set aside विरोध. Here we feel that S'ankara entirely misses the aim of the Sūtrakāra. His conclusion that the whole world is अविद्याकल्पित owes its existence to an imaginary difficulty of कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति-विकार created by himself, which in its turn owes its origin to his failure to revere the text of the श्रुति as infallible as the Sūtrakāra has done, and whatever we may say as to his philosophical merits, the undoubted fact remains that S'ankara is not following the express words of the Sūtrakāra.

It has been shown above that S'ankara does not follow the Sūtrakāra when he rejects Brahman's उपादान-कारणता; now we shall see how far he is correct in rejecting Brahman's निमित्तकारणता. On this question Rāmānuja, Nimbârka, Madhva, S'reekantha and Vallabha are unanimous. All of them follow Bâdarâyana. If Brahman were the efficient cause, kartṛi, it would be liable to the faults

of partiality and cruelty says S'āṅkara. To remove this difficulty he refers Brahman's activity to *अविद्या*. But that is not what Bâdarâyana has said. According to the Sûtrakâra Brahman is neither partial nor cruel, for it is *कर्मसापेक्ष*. The जगत्प्रवाह is beginningless, and Brahman is possessed of all *धर्मः*. 'वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्, तथाहि दर्शयन्ति, न सापेक्षतादिनि वैषम्यनिवृत्त्यात्, सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च'. Though S'āṅkara gains the advantage of removing Brahman's *वैषम्यनैर्घृण्य* by referring Brahman's *कर्तृत्व* to *अविद्या*, and thereby rejecting its *कर्तृत्व*, the other commentators do not accept it because it deals a terrible blow to all devotion and meditation, by delegating the Brahman's *माहात्म्य* to the sphere of sceptic illusion. 'अपि . . . , भास्ती p. 406., N. S.

The first pad of the second *अध्याय* gives us greater insight into the view of the Sûtrakâra regarding the universe. In the first Chapter, Bâdarâyana has declared that Brahman alone is *causa materialis* and *cause efficiens* of the world. This proposition is laid down by Bâdarâyana in the first *Adhyaya* on the authority of the Vedic texts. Now the Sāṅkhya opposes the Sûtrakâra by putting before him certain *Smṛitis* which teach the Sāṅkhya tenets. To this Bâdarâyana replies that when we meet two sorts of *Smṛitis*, those in harmony with the Veda are to be preferred to those not following it. *Manu* and others teach *व्यवहारणता*, hence they are to be preferred since they follow the Veda. This principle is also laid down by Jaimini in 'विरोधे तु अनपेक्ष्यं स्यादसति हि अनुमानम् । 1-3-3.' Now when the Sāṅkhya loses both on the grounds of *श्रुति* and *स्मृति*, he opposes the Sûtrakâra on the platform of reason. The Sûtrakâra, though he meets the Sāṅkhya on purely rational grounds, distinctly says that reason as such has no place in his system ultimately. His reasoning must be the reasoning favoured by the Veda. Had this been borne in mind by S'āṅkara, we do

not think, he would have proceeded to qualify the sense of the Sûtras after once explaining them accurately. And where S'ankara does not expressly qualify the sense of the Sûtra, his commentator does so. See भामती and गोविन्दानन्द on प्रकृत्यधिकरण. The Sāṅkhya³ begins by saying that as a rule cause and effect are similar, but since there is a dissimilarity between the cause Brahman which is चेतन, and the effect Jagat which is *jada*, Brahman cannot be the material cause of Jagat. To this Bâdarâyana replies that we do see an effect dissimilar to the cause, hence the objection does not stand. But here too we notice Bâdarâyana's tendency to reject independent reasoning and falling back upon the words of the श्रुति 'तर्कप्रतिष्ठानात्' etc., 2-1-11.

The Sûtra 2-1-13 also is important. It deals with the question that even though the cause Brahman is the

1. अत्र सूत्रे परिणामशब्दः कार्यमात्रपरः, न तु सत्यकार्यात्मकपरिणामपरः, 'तदनन्यत्वम्' इति विवर्तवादस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । रत्नप्रभा. pp. 341, 342. N. S. edition.

2. इयं चोपादानपरिणामादिभाषा न विकाराभिप्रायेणापि तु यथा सर्पस्योपादानं रज्जुरेवं ब्रह्म जगदुपादानं द्रष्टव्यम् etc., भामती pp. 342-343. N. S. edition.

3. In 2. 1. 4. 'न विरक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्' S'ankara quotes a view of some one whom Govindānand calls एकदेशी thus:—'योऽपि कश्चिदाचक्षीत श्रुत्वा जगत्क्षेतनप्रकृतिकतां तद्वलेनैव समस्तं जगत्क्षेतनतामभिव्यक्तिं, प्रकृतिरूपस्य विकारे भन्वयदर्शनात्, भविभावने तु चैतन्यस्य परिणामविशेषाद् भविष्यति, यथा नामप्यात्मनां स्वापमूर्च्छावस्थासु चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते, एवं काष्ठलोष्टादीनामपि चैतन्यं न विभाव्यते, यतस्मादेव च भविभावनां च कार्यकारणानामात्मनां च चेतनत्वाविशेषेऽपि गुणप्रधानभावो न विरोक्ष्यते, तथा च भविभावनाविशेषेऽपि मांससृष्ट्यादीनां प्रत्यात्मवर्तिनो विशेषात् परस्परोपकारित्वं भवत्येवमिहापि भविष्यति, प्रविभागप्रसिद्धिरप्यत एव न विरोक्ष्यते' इति । तेनापि कथंचित्तेतनाचेतनत्वलक्षणं विरक्षणत्वं परिह्रियेत, शुद्धशुद्धित्वलक्षणत्वं नैव परिह्रियते'. In the 2-1-6, 'दृश्यते तु', S'ankara remarks on this view thus:—'योऽपि चेतनकारणश्रवणबलेनैव समस्तस्य जगत्क्षेतनतामुत्प्रेक्षते तस्यापि 'विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च' इति भेदाभावेन विभागप्रवणं विभावनाविभावनाभ्यां चैतन्यस्य शक्यत एव योजयितुम्'. Thus S'ankara supports the view of the एकदेशी. Who is this एकदेशी? Can this view be referred to Sir R. Bhandarkar's view about Vallabha 'The mysterious power which causes the differences by rendering certain qualities imperceptible.' Vaishnavism etc., p. 161.

same, and the भोक्ता and भोग्य are अनन्य with Brahman, the भोक्ता does not become भोग्य nor भोग्य भोक्ता. This is a fact evidenced by our everyday experience. फेन, बीची, तरंग etc., though अनन्य with the समुद्र, there is no इतरेतरभावापत्ति. A ring, a necklace, though as gold ornaments are अनन्य with gold, the ring does not become the necklace, nor the necklace the ring. S'āṅkara, after once explaining the Sūtra accurately, adds 'यद्यपि भोक्ता न ब्रह्मणो विकारः, 'तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत्' इति स्रष्टुरेवाविकृतस्य कार्यानुप्रवेशेन भोक्तृत्वश्रवणात्, तथापि तदेवैवमुपपादि-निमित्तो विभाग आकाशस्येव घटायुपाधिनिमित्त इत्यतः परमकारणत्वात्, भोग्यत्वेऽपि उपपद्यते भोक्तृत्वमन्यत्वाच्च विभागः न स्रष्टारंगविच्छेदेऽप्युक्तः.' The instance of समुद्रतरंग is approved of by Bhāskara and others, but this latter addition is strongly criticised by Rāmāṇja. The wording of the Sūtra does not favour S'āṅkara's addition. Again, S'āṅkara wants to refer this Sūtra to व्यवहार, while the latter Sūtra refers to परमार्थ stage according to him. This " " of व्यवहार and परमार्थ is not accepted by any other Āchārya, nor is it referred to by the Sūtrakāra. The wording of the Sūtra cannot unquestionably be taken to suggest S'āṅkara's distinction. The words ' ' ' merely refer to the everyday experience. The experience is so very common that the Sūtrakāra does not consider it even desirable to point to any particular instance to support his view. The view expressed by S'āṅkara that भोक्ता Jīvâtman is the same as Brahman, the difference being caused by उपाधि, has been shown to be not countenanced by the Sūtras of Pāṇārāyaṇa. In a sense, the Jīvâtman is no विकार of Brahman,¹ but an अंश. But the Sūtrakāra here wants to point out only this much, that though the Jada Jagat and the Chetana Jīvâtman, both of them have their source in Brahman, still the Jada does not become Chetana, nor Chetana Jada. Hence the " " is not open to any objection.

Then we come to the Sûtra 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14. This is one of the most important Sûtras in the Brahmanimânsâ. Except Madhva, all the Âchâryas are unanimous in their referring this Sûtra to a passage from the 6th prapâthaka of the Chhândogya. Bhâskara says he has written a Bhâshya on the Chhândogya, but it is not available, hence we shall have to satisfy ourselves with what he has observed on the question in his Brahma-Sûtra-Bhâshya 2-1-14. When we look at the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana as a whole, it appears clear that they fulfil a double function, *viz.*, removing doubts that might arise through the aberrant genius of several Vedic thinkers, and at the same time summarising the principal teachings of the Upanishads. Thus the Sûtra 'तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः' 2-1-14 has been written to set aside the doubt caused by words like आरम्भ, नामधेय etc. Accordingly, the Sûtrakâra says that these words mean that cause and effect are अनन्य. It is to be noticed that the Sûtrakâra does not say that the effect is the same as the cause, but that they are अनन्य. From the word 'अनन्यत्वम्' one fails to work out the sense that विकार has no existence. 'न तु वस्तुत्वेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति'. Neither the श्रुति passage referred to, nor the wording of Sûtra lends support to what Sankara observes here:—'तस्माद्यथा तद्विकारकाद्याकाशानां महाकाशानन्यत्वं, यथा च मृगवृक्षिणकोदकादीनामूपरादिभ्योनन्यत्वं ह्यनन्यस्वरूपत्वात्, स्वरूपेणानुपाख्यत्वात्, एवमस्य भोग्यभोक्त्रादिप्रपञ्चजातस्य ब्रह्म-यतिरेकेणाभाव इति द्रष्टव्यम्' 2-1-14. This absolute negation of the existence of the प्रपञ्च as such is very seriously criticised by Bhâskara, Râmânuja, Vijnânabhikshu, Keśava Bhatta Kashmîrin and Vallabha. The text of the Chhândogya here referred to is this:—'यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं याद्वै चारम्भेन विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्'. The meaning that naturally suggests itself from the text is this:—The knowledge of one ball of earth gives knowledge of all that is made of earth, though there is a different name and also form

विकार-रूप (as " . . . takes it), or though there is a difference of name and form, still all the things made of earth are earth, and as earth they are सत्य. The passage cannot certainly be taken to mean that effects like pot etc. do not exist at all like the mirage, but that they exist in cause, they have no independent existence; the difference in name does not create a new object independent of the cause. Rightly does Vallabha observe:—‘वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति, तत्र विकारो वाङ्मात्रेणैवारभ्यते न वस्तुत इत्यर्थः प्रतिभाति, तथा च सति कस्य ब्रह्म कारणं भवेत्? अतः अद्विवादस्यार्थनादः, आरंभण-ब्रह्मादिभ्यः सदनन्यत्वं प्रतीयते, कार्यस्य . . . , न मिथ्यात्वम् ।’ The sage Uddālaka wants to teach his son S’vetaketu ‘the knowledge of all by the knowledge of one.’ Now the knowledge of ‘all’ is possible only when ‘all’ has existence and is अनन्य with one; then only the knowledge of ‘one’ can produce the knowledge of ‘all.’ To explain this, the sage Uddālaka gave three instances, from all of which the relation of cause and effect is suggested—that is—Uddālaka means to say that the relation between the world and Brahman is the same that exists between the earthen pot and earth, Brahman is the cause and the world is the effect, the knowledge of cause Brahman produces the knowledge of effect the world, the reason being that they are अनन्य, as effect is अनन्य with the cause. From this it is impossible to concede that the cause Brahman exists while the world is non-existent, like mirage. *The fact that the Upanishad gives three instances of earth, gold, and iron touching the relation of cause and effect, and nowhere mentions, any of the instances viz., रज्जुसर्प, शुक्तिरजत etc., which S’ankara so very zealously puts side by side with the above-mentioned ones, in his Bhāṣya on the Chhândogya, as well as here, suggests a very strong inference against S’ankara that the Sātrākāra has in his mind not the doctrine of चिद्वत् of S’ankara, but the doctrine of परिणाम of Brahman alone,*

and that the world is not an effect of illusion, but that of Brahman, the world is not a dream on a grand scale, but a real positive something which has its origination, existence and absorption in Brahman. True that in the Sûtra

तु कात्स्न्येनानभिव्यक्तस्वरूपत्वाद् 3-2-3, the Sûtrakâra distinctly says that the स्वप्नसृष्टि is मायामात्र, and whether we take 'माया' in the Bhâskara's sense of अर्थप्रत्ययद्वन्द्वत्व, or in Nimbârka's and Râmânujâ's sense of आश्चर्यात्मिकत्व, or in Vallabha's sense of सर्वभवनसामर्थ्य, or in S'ankara's sense of सृष्टनष्टस्वरूपत्व or अनिर्वचनीयत्व, the fact remains that according to the Sûtrakâra, the world is विधर्मि, from स्वप्न. 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्', that the स्वप्नसृष्टि may be मायामात्र, but the ब्रह्मसृष्टि is not so, it is not मायामात्र but ब्रह्मरूप and ब्रह्मानन्य. Bhâskara well observes in 3-2-3:—'ये पुनर्जागरितावस्थापि मायान्तरादित्युपलब्धेः ते मूत्रकाराभिप्रायं नाशयन्तः श्रोत्रियजनं मोहयन्ति'. Again in 'वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्' 2-2-29 he observes to the same effect:—'ये तु बौद्धमतावलंबिनो मायावादिनस्तेष्वनेन न्यायेन सूत्रकारेणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः, यदि बाह्योर्थो नाभिप्रेतः स्यात् किमर्थमिदं यतते सूत्रकारः?' etc. The Sûtra 'नभाव उपलब्धेः' (2-2-28) also suggests that according to the Sûtrakâra the world is not a nonentity. Thus though the world is not a nonentity, it does not follow that the Sûtrakâra takes it to be a separate entity from Brahman and independent of it. This is what he drives at, in the अर्हन्नाधिकरण. The श्रुति passage also reads 'सृष्टिका इति एव सत्यम्' and not 'सृष्टिकैव सत्या', and the Sûtrakâra also words the Sûtra as 'तदनन्यत्वं' and not 'तन्मिथ्यात्वं' or 'तदेकत्वं'. These facts also go against S'ankara's view of जगन्मिथ्यात्व, or जगन्नास्तिक्यं.

From this, it follows that the view of the Sûtrakâra is exactly similar to, if not actually the same, as S'ankara tries to refute in 2-1-14:—'नन्वेकात्मकं ब्रह्म, यथा वृक्षोनेकशाखः एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म, अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव, यथा वृक्ष इत्येकत्वं शाखा इति नानात्वं, यथा च समुद्रात्मनैकत्वं फेनान्तरायात्मना नानात्वं, यथा च मृदात्मनैकत्वं घटशरावाद्यात्मना नानात्वं, तत्रैकत्वांशेन ज्ञानान्मोक्ष-

व्यवहारः सेत्स्यति नानात्वांशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयो लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यत इति, एवं नृदादिदृष्टान्ता अनुसूया भविष्यन्तीति' + + + 'ननु नृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रत्यक्षत्वात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्राभिमतमिति गम्यते, परिणामिनो हि नृदादयोर्था लोके समविगता इति'. The view expressed in these lines seems to be more in harmony with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana, than S'ankara's own view given in refutation of the same. His objection 'न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामवर्मत्वं तद्रहितत्वं च शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं, etc. is also groundless in face of 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्' 2-1-27. His other objections are met at length by Bhâskara, Râmânûja, Keśava Bhatta and Nimbârka, but space at our disposal forbids us from entering into the full discussion of the same here. The श्रुति 'यत्र तु अस्य सर्वमात्मा एव अभूत् तत्केन किं पश्येत्' also teaches not 'सर्वाभावः' but 'आत्मनः सर्वभावः'. In the stage of ब्रह्मभाव the सर्व does not cease to exist, but the consciousness that सर्व is a different entity from Brahman vanishes and the consciousness that Brahman alone is सर्व is generated. Against S'ankara's 'जगन्मिथ्यात्व' Vijnâna-Bhikshu advances a queer but not unreasonable argument thus:—'प्रपञ्चस्यात्यन्त-मभावे च जगत्प्रमाणमस्ति तत् सन्न वा, आद्ये बाधः, अन्त्ये हेत्वसिद्धिः, तस्मात् जगत्प्रमाणमस्ति' (तत्रैव प्रमाणमस्ति) प्रमाणैः प्रपञ्चात्यन्तमभावो न सूत्रकारेणानुन्मतेन साधयितुं शक्यते' p. 281 मिथुमाष्य. Ch. se. Bhâskara also observes in 2-1-14 thus 'न हि सूत्रकारः कचिन्मायाशब्दं प्रायुक्तं, यत्र प्रमाणमस्ति तत् कात्स्न्येन अनिश्चित्यत्वात् प्रमाणमिति हि यत्रोक्तं वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवदिति वैधर्म्यमुक्तम्, ईक्षतेनाशब्दमिति चारम्य प्रत्यधिकरणं स्मृतिमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते सूत्रकारस्य, स्मृत्यनवकाशदोष इत्यारम्य तांख्याशुद्धादितत्त्वकोट्यर्थं प्रत्यधिकरणं प्रयासोनर्थकः स्यात्, मायामात्रत्वे 'न विदुः श्रुतेः' चारम्य भूतानामुक्त्या विनिर्वाचनार्थकः स्यात्' × × × अपि च न नृदादिदृष्टान्तप्रमाणमस्ति कृत्स्नो वेदः सुप्रमेयं स्वर्गापवर्गलक्षणं यथाभूतं प्रमाणमस्ति तद्वत्त्वमिति वा कल्पयितुमिति ज्ञानेन प्रवर्तते वेदार्थं यथा बह्वर्ध्वमशक्त्या यथा प्रवर्तन्तामिति' भा. भा. pp. 99-100. One cannot but concede that the above-mentioned arguments of Bhâskara have much force. Keśava Bhatta Kashmîrin, Râmânûja and Purushottama have also said much against S'ankara. All the writers on the Vedânta Sûtras, in some form or other, accept the परिणामवाद and जगत्सत्यत्व, and this

fact by itself is an almost certain indication that the Sūtrakāra has neither in his mind the doctrine of विवर्त nor मिथ्यात्व of the world. In his zeal for मायावाद S'āṅkara forgets to what he is being drifted when he remarks 'तदेवमविद्यात्मनोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्षेनेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वं सर्वशक्तिनत्वं, न परमार्थतः' etc. He himself feels conscious that Bādarāyaṇa's ब्रह्मविचार-प्रतिज्ञा and 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' are being put to a strain. The Sūtras following in this अधिकरण also confirm the view expressed above. The Sūtra 2-1-15, S'āṅkara reads also as 'भावाच्चोपलब्धेः'. The explanation which follows this Sūtra reading, according to S'āṅkara himself, confirms the view that the world is only an अवस्थान्तर of ब्रह्मन् as पट of तन्तुः, and as पट is अनन्य with तन्तुः, so is the world with Brahman. From this it is quite clear that according to the view of the Sūtrakāra as interpreted by S'āṅkara here, the 'अनन्यत्व' does not mean मिथ्यात्व of जगत्, but merely an अवस्थान्तरत्व. The next Sūtra 'सत्त्वाभावस्य' also teaching the सद्रूपत्व of Jagat, confirms the अनन्यत्व existing between a cause and an effect. The Sūtras 2-1-19 and 20 also confirm the view of अनन्यत्व expressed above. Difference in रूप and क्रिया does not produce a new substance, पट may be in a different form from the तन्तुः, प्राणस may perform different functions but still the पट is अनन्य with तन्तुः, and उदान, etc. are अनन्य with प्राणवायु. 'सगतिविरहितप्रकृतम्'. A. B.

The Sūtras 'उपसंहारदर्शनाच्चेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्दि' and 'देवादिवदपि लोके' 2-1-24-25 deal with the question that Brahman does not need any external साधन. By its own natural powers like gods it develops the universe out of itself. The Sūtras 2-1-26-27 declare that as Veda teaches the अस्तित्व of ~ and ब्रह्मपरिणाम, there is no कृत्स्नप्रसक्ति or ~. The सृष्टि is in itself, its powers are wonderful. 'आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि'. The Sūtras 2-1-30-31 take up another similar question. 'सर्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्' 'विकरणत्वादिति चेत् तदुक्तम्'. Brahman is possess-

ed of all powers, and even though it has no organs, it creates the universe etc., the Veda teaches so. S'āṅkara's remark on सूत्र 'प्रतिषिद्धसर्वविशेषस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सर्वशक्तियोगः संभवतीत्येतदप्य-
विचार्यते' is quite out of place. The Sūtra-
kara declares the सर्वशक्तियोग of ब्रह्मन् as based on दर्शन, Veda,
while S'āṅkara wants to refer it to अविद्या.

Why should self-satisfied Brahman create this world when it has no प्रयोजन to fulfil? To this question an answer is furnished by 'लोकवत्तु लीला कैवल्यम्'. 2-1-33. S'āṅkara very beautifully explains the Sūtra thus:—यद्यपि अस्माकमियं जगद्विम्बरचना गुह्यतरसंरम्भेवाभाति, तथापि परमेश्वरस्य लीलैव केवलेयं, अपरिमित-शक्तित्वात् । यदि नाम लोके लीलास्वपि किञ्चित् सूक्ष्मं प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्ष्येत तथापि नैवात्र किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमुत्प्रेक्षितुं शक्यते, अत्र न प्रयोजनं नाप्यप्रवृत्तिरुन्मत्तप्रवृत्तिर्वा, सृष्टि-श्रुतेः सर्वज्ञश्रुतेश्च'. This is quite in the strain of the Sūtra-
kâra and we cannot understand why after this beautiful explanation, he thinks it necessary, practically against the Sūtrakâra, to add 'न चेयं परमार्थविषया सृष्टिश्रुतिः, अविद्याकल्पित-नामसंभववत्तुलोपवत्तयाद् ब्रह्मणोऽनवग्रहिवात्प्रमाणेत्येतदपि नैव विस्मयतव्यम्'.

The learned Sūtrakâra has dealt with the question that Brahman is the उपादान कारण, and though it is उपादान कारण it is without any sort of विकार, the विरोध being set aside by an implicit faith in the words of the texts of the Veda. Now in 2-1-34-35-36, he deals with the question that even though 1 Brahman is the efficient cause, even though it is कर्तृ, it is not liable to the faults of partiality and cruelty as Brahman allots fruits according to the Karmas of the individual souls. The जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, hence this is possible.

In the last Sūtra Bâdarâyana removes all contradic-
tions by remarking that Brahman is सर्वधर्मयुक्त. In the pre-
vious अधिकरण, he said that जगत्प्रवाह is अनादि, hence it was
possible for Brahman to allot fruits according to कर्मस of

1. This question is dealt at length in जीवावधारणा.

the individual souls, but this directly goes against the श्रुति passage 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीत्' which distinctly teaches the एकत्व and अद्वितीयत्व of Brahman. To such a difficulty Bâdarâyana's answer is on the same principles which he has laid down in 2-1-27. The swarûpa of Brahman is such. The प्रवाह may be अनादि, still ब्रह्मन् is एक and अद्वितीय, Brahman though giving fruits according to कर्म's is independent of it. In short, it is possessed of all कर्म's, there is no contradiction as such.

According to the reasoning of S'aṅkara, the explanation given by the Sûtrakâra in refutation of the वैषम्य-नैर्घृण्य is quite out of place. According to him the विषमता and निर्घृणता, the कर्तृत्व of Jîvâtman and Paramâtman are all creatures of अविद्या and with the removal of अविद्या, they vanish into nothingness.

To conclude, the Sûtrakâra holds that this world is an effect of Brahman, is real. Brahman has, for its लील केवल, without any other प्रयोजन, and without any organs or any external means, by the natural powers of itself, developed itself into the universe without itself undergoing any change. The world is अनन्य with Brahman in all its three stages. It has no existence independent of Brahman, but at the same time it is neither मिथ्या nor an absolute non-entity. It is not a विवर्त of Brahman, but a real wilful परिणाम of Brahman. It is आत्मकृति and अत्मपरिणाम or ब्रह्मकृति and ब्रह्मपरिणाम. शरीर, शक्ति, प्रकृति, परमाणु, अविद्या, माया and others, have nothing to do with it so far as its primary cause is being investigated.

LIBERATION.

The fourth chapter of the Brahma-Sûtras deals with the question of liberation. The first pâda deals with the question of जीवन्मुक्ति or liberation in life of the Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman puts an end to कर्म's good

and bad which have not begun to be enjoyed, 4-1-13-14-15 After the knowledge of Brahman is acquired, the कर्म, which are then performed, do not touch the ब्रह्मविद्. The body¹ of the ब्रह्मविद् continues to live so long as his आरब्धकर्म are not ended, 4-1-19. When the body² falls away, he becomes joined with Brahman. ³Agnihotras etc., which are नित्यकर्म, are to be performed by the ब्रह्मविद्, for they are useful in the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान. This is the general reasoning of the Sâtrakâra, but this reasoning directly goes against that of S'ankara. According to S'ankara, कर्म, शरीर, etc., are the creature of nescience. By the ब्रह्मज्ञान, the अविद्या is destroyed, and when the अविद्या is destroyed, its effects viz., कर्म, शरीर etc., must also vanish, on the principle that effect and cause are अनन्य, and that in the absence of cause, the effect cannot exist. So there comes in the impossibility of जीवन्मुक्ति, for, with the rise of विद्या, the अविद्या with its effect शरीर etc., is destroyed, and the ब्रह्मविद् becomes Brahman at once. If this position is not accepted as being contradicted by our experience, then two alternatives come in, viz., either the ब्रह्मज्ञान is not thoroughly obtained, in which case there is no जीवन्मुक्ति, or if ब्रह्मज्ञान is obtained, then body etc., which continue to exist after the नाश of अविद्या are not creatures of अविद्या. From this it appears that the body etc., continue to exist even after the acquirement of ब्रह्मज्ञान, the difference being that, after ब्रह्मज्ञान, कर्म and its products शरीर etc., do not touch him (ब्रह्मविद्). The ब्रह्मविद् performs कर्म, but these कर्म are ब्रह्मकर्म, and not his own. It is worthy of note that the ⁴ says 'अश्लेष,' meaning thereby that कर्म do not touch the ब्रह्मविद्. He becomes असंग. Thus though the ब्रह्मविद् is living and doing every-

1. तदधिगम " " " " तद्व्यपदेशात् 4-1-13. इतरस्याप्येवमश्लेषः पाठे तु 4-1-14. " एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः 4-1-15.

2. भोगेन हितरे क्षययित्वाथ संपद्यते 4-1-19.

3. अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् 4-1-16.

thing, he is untouched by good or bad actions. His existence is for the enjoyment of कर्मसु begun to be enjoyed. This seems to be the view of the Sûtrakâra about जीवन्मुक्ति. S'ânkara himself remarks that this has reference to सगुणविद्या, i.e., in निर्गुणविद्या there is no need of mentioning this. 'सगुणास्तु तावद्विद्यास्तु विद्यत एव विधानम् । तास्तु च वाक्यशेष ऐश्वर्यप्राप्तिः पाप-निवृत्तिश्च विद्यावत् उच्यते । तयोश्चाविवक्षाकारणं नास्तीत्यंतः पाप्मप्रहाणपूर्वकैश्वर्यप्राप्ति-स्तासां फलमिति निश्चीयते । निर्गुणायां तु विद्यायां यद्यपि विधानं नास्ति, तथाप्य-कर्त्रात्मबोधात् कर्मप्रहाणमिति । 4-1-13.

When the प्रारब्धकर्मसु are ended by enjoyment by the body, that body of the Brahmanid falls away. The second पाद describes the process by which the body is dissolved. The उत्क्रान्ति of विद्वान् and अविद्वान् is common to a certain extent, of नाडीप्रवेश. The विद्वान् then passes by शताधिका. 4-2-16. In 4-2-13, 'स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्' S'ânkara remarks:—तस्मादविद्वद्विषये प्राप्तयोः गत्युत्क्रान्त्योः विद्वद्विषये प्रतिषेध इत्येवमेव व्याख्येयं, व्यपदेशार्थ-वत्त्वाय । न च ब्रह्मविदः सर्वगतब्रह्मात्मभूतस्य प्रक्षीणकर्मणः उत्क्रान्तिरिति तेषामपि निमित्ताभावात् । 'अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते' इति चैवजातीयकाः श्रुतयो गत्युत्क्रान्त्योरभावं सूचयन्ति ।'. The उत्क्रान्ति here spoken of by the Sûtrakâra is quite consistent with his arrangement. In the first पाद the Sûtrakâra describes the state of ब्रह्मविद् in life, in the second उत्क्रान्ति, in the third how and by which path he reaches Brahman (गति), and in the fourth the फल—the ब्रह्मविद् enjoys after reaching Brahman. In this general arrangement the Sûtrakâra nowhere expressly says that the उत्क्रान्ति and गति have no reference to the ब्रह्मविद्. The question of सद्योमुक्ति is altogether different, which is possible only through the singular grace of Brahman. In the case of the favoured ब्रह्मविद्, there is no detention even for enjoying आरब्धकर्मसु. His दायकर्मसु are taken away by his sons, good कर्मसु by his friends and bad ones by his enemies. 'तस्य पुत्रा दायमुपयन्ति सुहृदः साधुकृत्यां द्विषन्तः पापकृत्याम्'. Bâdarâyana suggests this in 'अतोऽन्यापि ह्येकेषामुभयोः' 4-1-17.

Thus through the grace of Brahman, the कर्मs are ended, and the ब्रह्मविद् at once enjoys Brahman. This is only a suggestion which is not possible to carry further than this. All the आचार्यs refer to Jaimini and Bâdarâyana by the word उभय, and refer the श्रुति passage to काम्यकर्मs. But the objection to this view as is pointed out by Vallabha is that Jaimini is not spoken of either before or after in this पद 4-1, and that वापकृत्य cannot be वापयितव्य. Whatever it may be, it seems almost impossible that Bâdarâyana views the गतिश्रुति as belonging to अविद्विषय. In the third pâda of the fourth chapter after describing the stations through which the soul of the ब्रह्मविद् passes by the path of देवयान, Bâdarâyana says that the ब्रह्मविद् reaches Brahman from where there is no return. In the same pâda Bâdarâyana mentions two views—of ¹Bâdari who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid is said to reach is कार्य, and of ²Jaimini who holds that the final goal to which the Brahmavid reaches is परब्रह्मन्, and not ' ' ' S'ankara accepts the view of Bâdari and rejects that of Jaimini. In 'न च कार्ये प्रतिपत्त्यभिसंधिः' 4-3-14, S'ankara takes great pains to show that the गतिश्रुतिs are not to be accepted in their primary sense, but as referring to lower Brahman, they are to be finally rejected. The principal reasons which led S'ankara to reject the गतिश्रुतिs in their primary sense are expressed by him thus:—'न ह्यसत्यपि संभवं ग्रहणमिति कश्चिदाज्ञापयित्वा विद्यते । परविद्याप्रकरणेऽपि च तत्स्तुत्यर्थं विज्ञापयितुं शक्यं । 'विष्वङ्मत्वा उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति' इतिवत् । 'प्रजापतेः समां वेदम प्रपद्ये' इति तु पूर्ववाक्यविच्छेदेन कार्येऽपि प्रतिपत्त्यभिसंधिर्न विरुध्यते । समुपेऽपि च ब्रह्मणि सर्वात्मत्वसंकीर्तनं 'सर्वकर्मा सर्वकाम' इत्यादिवदवकल्पते । अत्रापि ब्रह्मविद्या गतिश्रुतयः ।' 4-3-14. S. B. N. S. p. 497. From this one sees that S'ankara's main difficulty consisted in the 'असंभव' or विरोध between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व of Brahman. In the absence of संभव,

says he, there is no reason why the गतिश्रुतिः should be accepted in their primary sense. His other explanations *viz.*, 'कार्येपि प्रतिप्रत्यभिसंधिर्न विवक्ष्यते' and 'सगुणेपि ब्रह्मणि × × अवकल्पते', are questions of plausibilities which stand or fail with the main argument. From what has been stated above it is important to note that S'āṅkara does not adduce any Sūtra of Bādarāyaṇa in support of his theory, and therefore the sustained reasoning that he has worked out for rejecting the गतिश्रुति loses all its force. Before we examine his argument in favour of the rejection of the गतिश्रुति and insistence of the निर्विकल्पकः, let us advert to the question of the असंभव. It is admitted on all hands, that the गतिश्रुतिः, as they stand, do present a contradiction with the व्यापकत्व of Brahman. But on this ground alone, it would not be proper to reject the गतिश्रुति. With this we have to bear in mind what the learned Sūtrakāra has said about Brahman and the letter of the Veda. As a faithful interpreter of the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, one has to abide by his reasoning and conclusion. The position would be the same which he assumed in 2-1-26-27, 'श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्'. The difficulty put forth by S'āṅkara arises only when unlike the Sūtrakāra one fails to put an implicit faith in the letter of the Veda. In the संप्रमाणिक्य as is written by the Sūtrakāra, one is surprised, why S'āṅkara tries to modify and correct not only the clear sense of the श्रुति, but that of the Sūtras also. The result of this is often unpleasant when one sees that S'āṅkara's modified interpretation not only goes against the wording of the Sūtras, but directly contradicts what he himself has just said 'before. In this connection, Bhāskara rightly defines the position of the Sūtrakāra in

1. Second interpretation of अविद्याशक्तिः. Second interpretations in 2-1-27, 2-1-29, are instances out of many.

his Bhâshya on page 238, 4-3-13, thus:—‘उभयात्मकं तद्वस्तु + + न चारमाकर्मथवादत्वकल्पना, यथाश्रुतार्थग्रहणे किं नामानुपपन्नम्. Thus Bhâskara sees no difficulty in accepting गतिश्रुति in their proper sense and व्यापकत्व of Brahman. Vallabha's position is also similar. According to him the गतिश्रुति has no contradiction with the व्यापकत्व of Brahman, for both are taught by the Vedas, and that Brahman's swarûpa is such as would admit the possibility of both the alternatives. Vallabha's commentator also observes on page 1368:—‘किञ्च, तैरपि कचिद् गौणः शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दभेदगौणी कल्पना न्याय्या’ (अ. भा. प्रकाश B.S.S.). On the question of गतिश्रुति Râmânujâ, Nimbârka, Madhva, Vallabha, S'reekantha and Bhâskara are all at one, and this seems to be a strong ground to hold that the Sûtrakâra had never in his mind the difficulty of ‘असंभव’ between the गतिश्रुति and the व्यापकत्व. The Sûtrakâra's attitude is the one declared by Vallabha in 1-1-4, ‘विरुद्धसर्वधर्माश्रयत्वं तु ब्रह्मणो भूषणाय’. It follows therefore, that S'ankara's interpretation of the गतिश्रुति in the लक्षणाधिक sense is not viewed by any other commentator with favour, and we cannot but think that here also S'ankara is not faithful to the Sûtrakâra.

S'ankara has however paid very serious attention to this question. The following are the arguments advanced by him in 4-3-14—S. B. N. S. pp. 497-502:—

- (1) Brahman is व्यापक.
- (2) Brahman is निर्विशेष.
- (3) Jîva is अविद्योपाधिपरिच्छिन्न.
- (4) गतिश्रुति refer to अपरब्रह्मन् !
- (5) No गति is spoken of in परविद्या.
- (6) The distinction between पर and अपर ब्रह्मन् is based on the श्रुति passages.
- (7) गमन is due to बुद्धयुगाधि.
- (8) Jaimini's view is mentioned by the Sûtrakâra later for the ' ' ' of intellect (प्रज्ञाविकास).

The first objection is met by Bhâskara and Vallabha by showing the possibility of गमन as being due to भोगजनक प्रारब्ध. 'ब्रह्म सर्वभोगनिमित्तं सर्वप्रपन्ननिमित्तमिति निमित्तसप्तम्येवेत्यदोषः' says Bhâskara in 4-3-13. 'न च व्यापकत्वं गन्तव्यत्वे बाधकं, प्रारब्धभोगं विना तत्प्रारब्धसंभवात्, यदा यत्र लङ्घ्यते तदा तत्र' says Vallabha in 4-3-14.

The second and third objections are answered by what has been said before in reference to Brahman and the human Soul.

It has been shown that the Sûtrakâra does not hold the distinction between पर and अपरब्रह्मन्, hence the fourth and sixth objections are answered. This question has been exhaustively treated by Vallabha's commentator on pages 1362 to 1365. A. B. P. B. S. S., and by Bhâskara in 4-3-13; and but for want of space we should have quoted the same in full here.

The fifth objection is dealt with by Bhâskara thus:— 'न चास्माभिरित्यं गतिः कल्पिता, श्रुतयोत्र प्रमाणम्, परविद्यासु गतयो दृश्यन्ते'. 4-3-13. Then he quotes from छान्दोग्य, प्रश्न, कठवल्ली, ऐतरेय, गीता, पुराण and वाजसनेय, to support his view that there is गमन in परविद्या.

The tendency of the Sûtrakâra is to accept the श्रुति always in their primary sense, hence गमन is in the primary sense, and not in a secondary sense, as due to उपाधि. Thus the 7th objection is answered.

The last objection is certainly very weak. One does not understand why the Sûtrakâra should put his doctrine in the mouth of Bâdari, why he should place the सिद्धान्त view first and पूर्वपक्ष view after it. S'ankara says that it is done with a view to develop intellect प्रज्ञा. True, but since this is a solitary unusual circumstance, one must be thoroughly convinced before he accepts S'ankara's

view. It appears that S'āṅkara's interpretation though fairly correct so far the Sūtras are concerned, becomes altogether opposed to the view of the Sūtrakāra the moment S'āṅkara's interpretation is viewed in the light of his 'Esoteric doctrine' in the words of Dr. Deussen. Once it is shown that there is real ब्रह्मगमन, the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa become quite consistent. The holy words 'अनादृतिः शब्दात् अनादृतिः शब्दात्', teaching the non-return of those who have reached Brahman, cannot with justice be referred to a secondary hypothetical sense, for an ultimate rejection. That Bādarāyaṇa should begin and end with Sūtras which can on no account be reconciled with S'āṅkara's reasoning, leads one to suppose that there is a flaw in S'āṅkara's reasoning so far as his faithfulness to the Sūtrakāra is concerned. Rāmānuja and Nimbārka have clearly an advantage over S'āṅkara in this, that their views evolve from the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa with less difficulty. When the Sūtras and S'āṅkara's commentary dealing with his परा विद्या are compared, one cannot but honestly admit that there is a clear contradiction between the two. Sūtras, viewed in the light of S'āṅkara's esoteric doctrine, lose all their force in their criticisms of Sāṅkhya, Kāṇāda and other systems. Thus, it is not right with S'āṅkara to deprive the गतिवृत्ति of their primary significance, for, it is a view not favoured by Bādarāyaṇa, or at least we are not in a position to support it from the Sūtras.

Having established in the third पाद that the Brahman-vid reaches Brahman, or rather is ¹led there, the fourth पाद describes the mode of his enjoyment there. After reaching Brahman, the Brahman-vid gets ²अविर्भाव, but all the same ³he is अविभक्त with Brahman. For the sake of enjoyment, he becomes manifest in a new form which, though अविभक्त

1. अप्रतीकाशं ब्रह्मनामयतीति बादरायण तत्कृतुश्च 4-3-15. 2. सम्प-
याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात् 4-4-1. 3. अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् 4-4-4.

with Brahman, is ¹ब्राह्म according to Jaimini, ²चिद्रूप according to Audulomi, while उभयरूप according to ³Bâdarâyana; there is no विरोध between Jaimini's and Audulomi's views, as both are possible according to Bâdarâyana. Being अविभक्त with Brahman the Brahavid derives everything by Brahman's ⁴संकल्प. Like Brahman he is ⁵अनन्याधिपति. There is a difference of opinion between the views of Bâdari and Jaimini, the ⁶former believes in the absence of शरीर etc., of the ब्रह्मविद्, while the ⁷latter believes in the presence of शरीर etc., on the authority of Chh. U. 7-26-2, ⁸while Bâdarâyana believes in both the views, (उभयविधम्). With these शरीर etc., the Brahavid enjoys भोग. The ⁹absence of भोग spoken of in श्रुति has reference to स्वाप्यय, and श्रुति teaching भोग refer to संपत्ति. The ¹⁰ऐश्वर्य of the Brahavid is limited to the extent that he cannot like Brahman create Jagat. His ¹¹ऐश्वर्य is eternal. With ¹²Brahman the Brahavid by ब्राह्म form enjoys eternally. He ¹³does not return to Sansâra.

This seems to be the general outline of the mode in which the Brahavid enjoys in the Brahmaloka. The Brahmaloka is eternal. In this there is a general agreement among Râmânujâ, Nimbârka and Vallabha. The Sûtras of Bâdarâyana stand naturally reconciled with the above view. There is no suggestion in these Sûtras of the ideal of Moksha which S'ankara mentions in 1-1-4.

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1. ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः 4-4-5. 2. चिति तन्मात्रेण अद्वैततत्त्वादिभिः 4-4-9. 3. उभयरूपेण वादरायणः 4-4-7. 4. संकल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः 4-4-8. 5. अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः 4-4-9. 6. अभावं वादरिराह होवम् 4-4-10. 7. भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पात्मननात् 4-4-11. 8. ऐश्वर्यस्य चित्तवृत्तिरिति वादरायणोऽः 4-4-12. 9. स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षामविष्कृतं हि 4-4-16. 10. जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसंनिहितत्वाच्च 4-4-17. 11. विकारवर्ति च तथाहि स्थितिमाह 4-4-19. 12. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च 4-4-21. 13. अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् अनावृत्तिः शब्दात् 4-4-22.

‘इदं तु पारमार्थिकं कृत्स्ननित्यं, व्योमवत्सर्वव्यापि, सर्वविक्रियारहितं, नित्यकृष्णं, निरवयवं, स्वतन्त्रं, निरुपादानम्, यत्र धर्माधर्मौ सह कार्येण कालत्रयं च नोपावर्तते, तदेतदक्षरीरत्वं मोक्षाख्यम्’.

“As may be seen from this passage, the conception of Liberation contains the same characteristics as serve, as a rule, to define Brahman; and indeed, Brahman and the state of liberation are identical terms; for liberation is nothing else than the becoming one with Brahman, or rather, since the identity of the Soul with Brahman has always subsisted and has only been hidden from it by an illusion, liberation is nothing else but the awakening of the consciousness that our own self is identical with Brahman. Accordingly, in liberation there is no question of becoming which does not already exist, but only of the attainment of the knowledge of what has existed from all eternity. It is because of this, that liberation is not accomplished through any sort of work, nor through moral improvement, but by knowledge alone.” *System of Vedânta*. p. 401. It is absolutely clear that this reasoning cannot be traced to any Sûtra of Bâdarâyana. S’ankars’s conception of Liberation has much in common with that of the Sâṅkhya. The highest aim of the Sâṅkhya¹ is to free himself from the ऋति, so the greatest aim of a S’ankara is to free himself from the अविद्या. With the destruction of अविद्या, its creatures *viz.*, his Jîvatva, his ऋद्धान्ति, everything vanishes, and he remains what he was, *viz.*, Brahman, the subject of all negations except existence. That this view is foreign to the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana can be seen from the summary of the Sûtras given above. S’ankara’s attempts to force up his doctrines in औदुलोमि and Bâdari suggest his departure from the lines of the Sûtrakâra. His attempt to reconcile Audulomi’s view with that of Jaimini on the authority

of Bâdarâyaṇa in 4-4-7, 'इत्युक्तं तत्र तद्वैभवादिभिरेव वादरायणः' results in a contradiction. He says:—'एवमपि पारमार्थिकवैतन्यमात्रस्वरूपान्म्युपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्यापि इत्युक्तं तद्वैभवादिभिरेव वादरायणः' 'अतस्तत्त्वस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं वादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते'. The contradiction arises from the fact that there come in ऐश्वर्य, etc., creatures of Ignorance after the Ignorance is destroyed. Govindânanda thus puts it 'अतस्तत्त्वस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं वादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते' कुत आहानिकधर्मयोग इति'. *Vide* also अणुभाष्यप्रकाश pp. 1396-1401. The liberation in the sense of Bâdarâyaṇa is not merely the end of miseries, but also the attainment of ever-lasting bliss.

CONCLUSION.

From what has been said before, it follows that the Sûtrakâra's conception of Brahman is at great variance with that of S'ankara. As Dr. Tibbana observes:—'They do not set forth the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman, that they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Îśvara in S'ankara's sense.' *Vedanta Sûtras*. I. p. 100. According to the Sûtrakâra, the Brahman is possessed of all attributes, and all wonderful powers. By its very swarûpa, it is possessed of all contradictory attributes. The negative vedic passages like 'नेति नेति' deny in Brahman all the earthly attributes, while those like 'सर्वकामः' etc., affirm in Brahman all divine attributes. Thus Brahman is उभयलिङ्ग as is accepted by Vallabha and Nimbârka. The absolute negation of all attributes, and describing Brahman as निषेवशेष, is a view which does not find any expression in the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. The subject of negation in negative Vedic passages has reference to what is non-Brahman as is remarked by the author of Bhâshya-Prakâśa. B. S. S. p. 953. 'अतोऽन्यनिषेधो यो वर्तते स सर्वं ब्रह्मणोऽन्यनिषेधति, न तु सर्वं गिह्याकृत्येति नृयुर्गिरिवधेयम्'. Neither is Brahman devoid of all attributes. 'अतो विशेषाणां नास्तताऽपि तु

‘नेति नेति’ or as ‘सर्वकाम’ is an independent कर्तृ. It is Sad-Chid-Ânanda. For the sake of sport alone it develops itself into the universe, but unlike the Pantheism of Spinoza, as is shown by Sir Râmakrishna Bhandârkar, it is not exhausted into the universe, but remains transcendent. Residing in the heart, it becomes अन्तर्यामिन्, and existing outside, though ‘agamyâ’, becomes ‘gamyâ’ by meditation and devotion, when it likes. It is the fountain-source from which all activity, all intelligence, all joy proceed. It is Brahman which evolves names and forms, and makes अव्याकृत व्याकृत. The universe with its immense diversity has its source in Brahman. The human souls have their source in Brahman. The Brahman of the Sûtras is not only a personal God, but it is one of its phases. Brahman is *avyakta* when one tries to find Him by means of intellect alone, but becomes व्यक्त through meditation and devotion. The innermost soul of the human souls is Brahman, hence it is to be meditated upon as the आत्मन्. 4-1-3. The infinite² variety is united in the Brahman. Sages like Vâmadeva, in the stage of Brahma-Bhâva, have experienced this *Sarvatva*. Brahman is अनुस्यूत in the universe by Sad, Chid, and Ânanda. It follows from this, that the author of the Sûtras follows a process quite opposite to that of S’ânkara’s, in working out his Pantheism. He does not deny everything of Brahman, but unlike S’ânkara, affirms everything of Brahman.

In the case of the human soul also, the view of the Sûtrakâra is opposed to that of S’ânkara. As Dr. Thibaut puts it, the Sûtras ‘do not, with S’ânkara, proclaim the abso-

1. आत्मेति तूपाच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च । 2 तत्र सर्वेषां सर्वभोवे सर्वानन्त्यप्रसंगात् सर्वमकमेवेति वक्तव्यम् । Anu Bhâshya B. S. S. p. 262. 1-1-29.

lute identity of the individual and the highest Self.' Introduction to Vedânta Sûtra I. p. 100. According to the Sûtrakâra, the human soul springs out of Brahman as spark out of fire. It is atomic. It is part-अंश of Brahman, and as the अंश of अंशिन् Brahman, it is अनन्य with it. It is Kartri and Bhoktri, but its activity has its source in Brahman. In the stage of Brahmabhâva it experiences विभुत्व, etc., with its Añutva. It is neither an अभास nor a प्रतिबिम्ब of Brahman. It is not a creature of nescience, nor is it the same as Brahman differentiated by अविद्या. It is not a non-entity but a real entity.

As regards the universe also, Bâdarâyana and S'ankara are opposed. As Dr. Thibaut puts it:—"They do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world." According to the Sûtrakâra, the universe has for its material and efficient cause Brahman alone. Though Brahman alone is the material cause, it does not undergo any change while developing itself into the universe. As efficient cause Brahman is neither cruel nor unjust. The world is अनन्य with Brahman, in the sense that the effect is अनन्य with the cause. As the effect exists in the cause in all the three stages of origination, existence and absorption, similarly the universe, in all its three stages, exists in Brahman, and is अनन्य with it. It is a real development of Avikṛita Brahman. The Sûtrakâra does not, like S'ankara maintain that the universe is a dream on a grand scale. He does not hold that the universe is a figment of nescience. The universe has for its cause Brahman, still there is an infinite variety in effects. The creation of the universe is a Kevala Lîlâ of Brahman and not a Mâyâ.

From the description given of the path leading to Brahman, and the mode of enjoyment of ऐश्वर्य in the

fourth Adhyâya, the conception of Moksha, according to the Sûtrakâra, is different from that of S'ankara. It is a stage attained by a gradual course of spiritual development, and not a stage which has existed at all times, but which is concealed through अविद्या, and which is revealed by the destruction of अविद्या.

From the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana like 'आत्मकृतेः परिणामात्', we distinctly understand that the Sûtrakâra favours the परिणामवाद and not the विवर्तवाद of S'ankara. In this respect, as is shown before by a quotation from Sir R. Bhandârkar's Vaishnavism etc., Vallabha's ब्रह्मपरिणाम is the one approved of by the Sûtrakâra. It should not be supposed that thereby either of them accepts the proposition that Brahman thereby undergoes any विकार. According to both of them, Brahman's causality and transcendency are both possible. In all the instances given by the Sûtrakâra, and in the older Upanishads, nowhere do we find any instance given, which S'ankara so very often quotes to support his doctrine of विवर्त. This fact suggests a very strong inference against him. Where the श्रुति gives the instance of सृष्ट् and वृत्, S'ankara tries to incorporate श्रुक्ति and रजत. *Vide* छान्दोग्यभाष्य. VI.

There is again a distinction to be drawn as to the attitude of the Sûtrakâra and S'ankara towards other systems. S'ankara's attitude to the पूर्वसीमांसा seems to be very hostile, while Râmânûja and Bhâskara look upon both the Mîmânsâs as forming one S'âstra. Upavarsha, whose view, Bhâskara follows, is said to have written one Bhâshya on the two Mîmânsâs. *Vide* भास्करभाष्य p. 6. and अमुकप्रकरण. p. 47. According to S'ankara, nothing remains to be done in the stage of ब्रह्मविवर्तनि. 'तस्माच्चाननेनं मुक्त्वा क्रियाया गन्धमात्रस्याप्यनुप्रवेश इह नोपपद्यते'. S. B. 1-1-4. p. 18. This absolute rejection of कर्म cannot be traced to any

Sûtra of Bâdarâyana. In 4-1-16, the निन्दकर्मस like अग्निहोत्र etc., are to be performed by the Brahmaavid. This would go to show that the Brahmaavid has not to reject the performance of कर्मस, but the mode of performance is different. Again in 3-4-26, 'सर्वपिज्ञा च दक्षद्विदुतेरुत्तरा', the absolute disregard of कर्म is not accepted. It cannot be taken that the two Mîmânsâs form one S'âstra, but the mutual helpfulness cannot be denied. *Vide* Anu Bhâshya p. 42. and pp. 110 to 114. *Vide* also 3-3-1-25 Sûtras.

While meeting the Sâṅkhyas, Kâṇâdas, and the Bauddhas, S'ankara follows the Sûtrakâra in maintaining the strict reality of the universe, and the causality of Brahman; but once that is done, he rejects the same view, consigning it to अविद्या. S'ankara has been rightly and repeatedly charged with these contradictions by his opponents.

From what has been said above, we come to the conclusion that S'ankara's esoteric doctrine, *viz.*, the Mâyâ-vâda is the development of the Sâṅkhya and Buddhistic tenets, blended with misinterpretations of the passage of the Brihadâranyaka Upanishad, referring to the creation of the dreaming soul on the lines of Gaudapâda, and it has nothing to do with the Sûtras of Bâdarâyana. After showing numerous contradictions in the system of S'ankara from his Bhâshya, Col. Jacob remarks:—'To me, therefore, it seems impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनः, or some similar school, were in possession of the field in S'ankara's time, and that his own mind was so saturated with their doctrines as to be unable to shake them off even when propounding an antagonistic system.' Vedânta-Sâra. Intro. p. 9. This suggestion of Col. Jacob is as original as it is true. If we take S'ankara's Bhâshya, and do away with those portions which superim-

pose his doctrine of अविवक्षा, from what is left of his commentary, a general system, representing Bâdarâyana's view, can fairly be worked out. Vallabha's Aṇu Bhâshya seems to answer the above description. When we read Col. Jacob's remark with the observations of Sir R. Bhandarkar, pp. 160-161. Vaishṇavism etc., the inevitable conclusion one comes to is this, that Bâdarâyana represents in his Sûtras a system which corresponds with one which Vallabha propounds in his Bhâshya, viz., 'The development of Purushottama into the world and at the same time his transcendency.' p. 161. Vaishṇavism. That S'āṅkara himself was conscious of such a doctrine can be seen from his Bhâshya in passages like 'ननु मृदादिदृष्टान्त-प्रणयनात् परिणामवद् ब्रह्म शास्त्रस्याभिमतम्' 2. 1. 14. 'यत्तुक्तं स्वरूपोपमदर्शनन्तरेण कस्यचित्कृदस्थस्य वस्तुनः कारणानुसारेणान्यथाज्ञानोपनिमित्तकमिति, तद् दुस्तकम्, स्थिरस्वभावानामेव प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानानां ह्यवकाशकारणभावदर्शनात्' 2. 2. 26. p. 246. Thus while dealing with Sāṅkhya, Bauddha and others, he puts forth Bâdarâyana's doctrine, but that being done, he rejects Bâdarâyana's view, and puts forth his own. Hence the conclusion is that Bâdarâyana and S'āṅkara both hold different, if not opposed, views. Rao Bahâdur Rangâcharya has published a book, called तत्पार्यायिक of S'āṅkarâchârya. This book is different from that of Madhava's. The noteworthy feature of Rangâcharya's book is that fourteen *matas* are mentioned there, the last two of which refer to Vedavyâsa and Vedânta. And though this view of Vedavyâsa purports to be based on the Mahâbhârata, there is a significant fact that S'āṅkarâchârya, the author of the book, drew a distinction between the two views. Other writers also refer to two views of Vedânta which go to show that Bâdarâyana and S'āṅkara hold different views. In the Tâtparyâ Tika of the न्यायसूत्रs, 4-1-19, a reference to the two views is thus made:—'मा सूदयं नामरूपप्रपञ्चः शून्यतोपादानः,

अपि तु ब्रह्मोपादानो भविष्यति, ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्चरूपेण विद्यमानं च नित्यमेव घटशरावोदच-
नादिभावेन, न च एवं नित्यत्वव्याघातः, परिणामेऽपि तत्त्वानपायात् तत्क्षणत्वाच्च
नित्यतायाः, यदाह यस्मिन् तत्त्वं न विहन्यते, तदपि नित्यमित्येकं दर्शनम्, 'अपरं
च ब्रह्मैव अनादिभेदेऽप्यनभेदम्' नामरूपप्रपञ्चभेदेन विवर्तते मुखमिव एकमनेकमपि,
कदाचानभेदेऽपि प्रतिविम्बभेदेनेति, तत् एतद् दर्शनद्वयम्'. It is quite
clear from this quotation that even Naiyāyikas had to
draw a distinction between the ब्रह्मपरिणाम of Bâdarâyana
and विवर्तवाद of S'āṅkara. Moreover, S'āṅkara's preference
for the views of Bâdari, Kâśakritsna and Audulomi, sug-
gests the inference that S'āṅkara had in his mind a system
different from that of the Sâṅkhya. To add to this,
S'āṅkara's own statement, at the close of the introduction
of his अध्यासभाष्य, suggests the same conclusion, as is pointed
out by R. B. Rangacharya, 'that the aim of S'āṅkarâ-
chârya was to try to evolve what he himself took to be
the teachings of the Upanishads out of the Vedânta
Sûtras of Bâdarâyana—that is, to put into the Sûtras what
he himself understood to be the teachings of the Upa-
nishads,' and not what Bâdarâyana understood them to
be. 'यथा चायमर्थः सर्वेषां वेदान्तानां तथा वयमस्यां शारिरकजीवांसायां
प्रदर्शयिष्यामः'. 'Even orthodox Advaitins seem to accept
this view in a general sort of way, and there is a stanza
attributed to Madhusûdana Sarasvati which gives a not-
ably clever expression to it. The stanza is:—

न स्तौमि तं व्यासमनभेदार्थं सम्यङ् न सूत्रैरपि यो वदन्व ।

विनापि तैः संग्रथिताखिलार्थं तं शंकरं नौमि सुरेश्वरार्थम् ॥

It is evident from this that it is granted by some
Advaitins themselves, that the Vedânta Sûtras of Vyâsa
are not responsible for the whole philosophy of S'āṅkarâ-
chârya; and one need not therefore be surprised when one
sees them occasionally making a distinction between the
Sâtrakâra mata and the Bhâshyakâra mata. The distinc-
tion between a Vyâsa mata and a Vedânta mata as

brought out in the Sarva-Siddhānta-Sangraha clearly confirms the position of Dr. Thibaut as to what kind of Vedānta it is, that is really represented by the Vedānta Sūtras.' Introduction to S. S. of Rāṅgachārya pp. 16-17. From this it appears that so far as the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa are concerned, S'āṅkara's claim to be the faithful expositor is very weak.

The question as to whether Bādarāyaṇa's or S'āṅkara's teachings stand nearer to the Upanishads, though to the orthodox it appears at the first sight absurd, is rather very interesting. Gough, Deussen and Thibaut have declared in S'āṅkara's favour. Our subject forbids us from entering into this question, but certainly we cannot concede that the question is settled. The views of Gough and Deussen are not entitled to as much weight as that of Thibaut, since the former two do not seem to have looked to anything except S'āṅkara's interpretations, while the latter had the advantage of being familiar with a powerful critic of S'āṅkara viz., Rāmānuja. Hence let us hear what he says on p. 121 of his Introduction to Vedānta Sūtras I. 'S'āṅkara's method (of higher and lower Brahman) thus enables him in a certain way to do justice to different stages of historical developments; to recognize clearly existing differences which other systematisers are intent on obliterating. And there has yet to be made a further and even more important admission in favour of his system. It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than other systems; but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upanishads than those of the other Vedantic systems. Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by S'āṅkara between Brahman and Īśvara is known to the Upanishads, but

we must now admit that if, for the purpose of determining the nature of the highest being, a choice had to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as nirguṇa and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, S'āṅkara is right in giving preference to texts of the former kind. ××× The older Upanishads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes of the Highest Being, and hence, S'āṅkara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatized personal Íśvara a lower place than to his absolute Brahman. That he also faithfully represents the prevailing spirit of the Upanishads.' ×× 'If so, the philosophy of S'āṅkara would on the whole stand nearer to the teaching of the Upanishads than the Sūtras of Bâdarâyana.' p. 126. This may be or may not be, much can be said on both sides, but there is one thing which needs be pointed out here, and it this. For the purpose of determining the Highest Being, Bâdarâyana or any Vaidika Âchârya would not like to make a choice between the two

1. Compare Jayagopâla's introduction to his *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*—तावदुपनिषदनेकविधाः, काश्चन केवलपूर्णपुरुषोत्तमतत्त्वासिद्धाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, काश्चन केवलपुरुषोत्तमतत्त्वाप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा गोपालतापिनीकृष्णोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन रूपतत्त्वासिद्धाधनसम्पादकाक्षरब्रह्मज्ञानविषयीभूताक्षरब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमेन सह सर्वकामभोगरूपफलस्य च प्रतिपादिकाः, यथा वैशिष्ट्योपनिषदादयः । काश्चन केवलविभूतितत्त्वासिद्धाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा वासुदेवोपनिषत्तारायणोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन केवलशून्यतत्त्वासिद्धाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा बृहदारण्यकछान्दोग्योपनिषदादयः । काश्चन सुकृतिस्वर्गादिसिद्धाधनसम्पादकाक्षरब्रह्मज्ञानविषयीभूताक्षरब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमेन सह सर्वकामभोगरूपफलस्य च प्रतिपादिकाः, यथा सुखाद्योपनिषदादयः । काश्चन केवलविभूतितत्त्वासिद्धाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा वासुदेवोपनिषदादयः । काश्चन केवलशून्यतत्त्वासिद्धाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा बृहदारण्यकछान्दोग्योपनिषदादयः । काश्चन सुकृतिस्वर्गादिसिद्धाधनसम्पादकाक्षरब्रह्मज्ञानविषयीभूताक्षरब्रह्मस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमस्वरूपस्य पुरुषोत्तमेन सह सर्वकामभोगरूपफलस्य च प्रतिपादिकाः, यथा सुखाद्योपनिषदादयः । काश्चन भक्तिमार्गसिद्धाधनप्रतिपादिकाः, यथा गुरुोपनिषदादयः । *Vide also* Sir R. Bhandarkar's remark:—The opinion expressed by some eminent scholars that the burden of the Upanishad teaching is the illusive character of the world and the reality of the one soul only, is manifestly wrong, and I may even say, is indicative of an uncritical judgment. As stated in the text, the Upanishads, from the very nature of the compilations, cannot but be expected to teach not one, but many systems of doctrine. Vaisnavism. p. 2, note. 2.

sorts of Vedic passages, but he would refer them both to Brahman, or, in the words of Vallabha, the Sûtrakâra's position would be this:—"तथा सत्त्वं रजस्तम इव विविक्तानां एवात्मानं करोतीति वेदान्तार्थः संगतो भवति, विद्वज्जैवधर्माश्रयत्वं तु ब्रह्मणो ह्यगम्यम् A. B. p. 121. If Bâdarâyana were to accept a position like this, his Brahman would be capable of amalgamating more heterogeneous material than S'ankara's higher and lower Brahman put together. Preference and giving prominence to one sort of Vedic passages results in rejection and ignoring of others, and to believers in the infallible wisdom and eternity of the Vedas, such a one-sided preference would be fatal to his claim to be called a Vaidika. The duty of the Vaidika is to interpret the sense of Veda and not to subordinate one to the other. 'आन्नातस्यार्थं प्रतिपत्तुं प्रभवामो नाम्नातं पर्यनुयोक्तुम्' 1.4.3.p. 150. S. B. (text. N.S.P). 'नहि वेदोक्तानां कस्यचिदर्थवत्त्वं कस्यचिदनर्थवत्त्वमिति युक्तं प्रतिपत्तुं, प्रमाणत्वाविशेषात्' 3-2-15 p.p. 357. S. B. text. Thus according to S'ankara also, the authoritativeness of Saguna and Nirguna Vedic passages is equal, and so far as the learned Sûtrakâra accepts both sorts of श्रुति and refers them both to his Highest Being, Brahman, his interpretation must with justice be preferred to that of either S'ankara who gives prominence to Nirguna श्रुति; or Râmânûja, Madhva, and others, who put forth only Saguna श्रुति. In this respect Bâdarâyana is followed by Vallabha alone. Hence, except in reference to Vallabha, Dr. Thibaut would not be quite wrong in saying that S'ankara by accepting two Brahmans Viz., Saguna and Nirguna gives some scope to all the श्रुति, while other systematisers like Râmânûja and Madhva do cast into the background the Nirguna श्रुति; but Dr. Thibaut's claim that S'ankara's system would stand nearer to the Upanishads than that of Bâdarâyana cannot be accepted as unchallenged, since Bâdarâyana's mode of interpretation and harmonising the conflicting Vedic

passages is better than that of S'āṅkara, since Bâdarâyaṇa unlike S'āṅkara bears in mind the प्रमाणाविशेषत्व of different Vedic passages as shown above, and does not prefer the one to the other, but accepts them all as carrying equal authority and deserving equal prominence.

Thus disagreeing with Thibaut in accepting that S'āṅkara is a better exponent of the Upanishads than Bâdarâyaṇa, we must admit that S'āṅkara's system might have had its representatives in Bâdari, Kâśakṛitsna and to a certain extent in Audulomi. If the towering personality of Bâdarâyaṇa, with his irresistible and hitherto unquestioned authority were to be ignored from the field, then a chain of tradition of S'āṅkara's system can be maintained from Bâdari to Gaudapâda, Govinda and S'āṅkara, and with this reservation Gough's position would not be wrong. It may be, as pointed out by Bhâskara,¹ that S'āṅkara's system was independent of the Sûtras, and that by the force of his powerful genius he attempted to superimpose his system on the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa. No other commentator has tried to correct or modify the Sûtras of Bâdarâyaṇa, while S'āṅkara's commentator² actually lays down the rule that where सूत्रs conflict with the Veda, they are to be misinterpreted. This is possible only if Sāṅkaras understood that there was a difference in the interpretation of the Upanishads between Bâdarâyaṇa and themselves.

The spirit of S'āṅkara's system is certainly pessimistic. His imagining the existence of दुःख in the आनन्दमय, his declaring that ³activity is दुःखरूप, and a preference for the

1. सूत्राभिप्रायसंयुक्ता रसमिमांसा कश्चनः ।

व्याख्यातं वैरिदं शास्त्रं व्याख्येयं तन्निवृत्तये । भा. भा. P. 1.

2. मेधाकृतमिति 'गुणे त्वन्यायकल्पने'ति सूत्राण्यन्यथानेतव्यानि । भामती S. B. N. S. 1-1-19. P. P. 128. 129.

3. अपि च आनन्दप्रचुर इत्युक्ते दुःखस्तत्त्वमपि गम्यते etc., 1-1-19. p. 41. S. B.

4. 'कर्तृत्वस्य दुःखरूपत्वात् ।' 2-3-40. S. B. p. 192.

negative श्रुतिs, tend to the same conclusion. His rejection of आनन्दमय's Brahmanhood, and imagining the existence of misery in it have been the subject of an almost bitter remark¹ of Vallabha's commentator. From the way in which he defines his conception of Brahman, by negating everything of it except its existence, and declaring Brahman to be अविद्य, he makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish his system from Buddhism, and it appears that his system has evolved in a transition period when the Buddhistic doctrine of Void was being driven out of the field.

‘धाम्ना स्वेन सदा निरस्तकुहकं सत्यं परं धीमहि ।’

1. अत एव सत्यपि यत् तदविद्यारेणाणन्दमये दुःखास्तिस्त्वकथनं तद् ग्रन्थकृतो महादुःख-
संस्कारस्य प्राबल्यमेव गमयतीति दिक् । अ. भा.^१ प्रकाश. B. S.^१ S. pp. 198. 199.

Appendix A.

तेन यतैः लोकेषु प्राणयान् परापरे द्वे ब्रह्मणी अक्षीकृत्य, यदविद्याकृतनाम-
न्यविनिर्दिष्टप्रतिरोधेन तत्प्रतिरोधैर्निमित्तकं तत् परम्, यत्पुनर्गन्तव्यमित्येवम्
केनचिन्निमित्तकस्यात्मनोऽपि विद्वद्भ्यो 'मनोमयः प्राणशरीर' इत्यादिनामैकव्यवस्थामिति प्रति-
पादितम् । तत्र किं मानम् ? न तावदस्थूलादिवाक्यम्, मनोनयवाक्यं च । तत्र परा-
परशब्दयोरश्रवणात् । आद्ये अक्षरशब्देनैव व्यञ्जितमिति । यदि च मुण्डके 'अथ
परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते' इत्यादिप्रमाणं परत्वश्रावणात् तद्वेद्यस्याक्षरस्य परत्व-
मिष्यते । वाढम् । तदा पुरुषस्य ततोऽपि परत्वमेव द्रष्टव्यम् । 'दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः स
बाह्याभ्यन्तरो ह्यजः, अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः पर' इति तत्रैव श्रावणात् ।
न च तस्य अन्वयिदोषमन्वयत्वात् । तदप्रे 'एतस्माज्जायत प्राण' इति मन्त्रेण तत् एव
सृष्टेः श्रावणात् । अत्रिदोषमिति चेन्न । नान्यक्षरस्य तथात्वम् । अस्थू-
लादिवाक्यमोक्षं प्रशासनस्य वेद्यत्वद्रष्टृत्वादीनां आत्मत्वेऽप्युक्तत्वं च श्रावणेन,
तथापि विद्वद्भ्यो 'यद्भूतयोनिं परिपश्यन्ती' इत्यादिप्रमाणानुसारात्परा-
त्वादीनां श्रावणेन अन्वयिदोषमन्वयत्वात् वाक्तुमशक्यत्वात् । अत एव वाक्यान्तरेष्वपि
द्रष्टव्यम् । सर्वत्र एकस्यैव ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपाद्यत्वात् । अत एव श्वेताश्वतरेपि 'प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञ-
पतिर्गुणेशः,' 'यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्वं'मित्यादीन् नानाधर्मबोधकानेव मन्त्रानुक्त्वा
'निष्कलं निष्क्रियमित्युक्तम् । 'स वा एष महानज आत्मे'त्यत्रापि शारीरब्राह्मणे,
'अन्नादो वसुदान इति सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान' इत्यादयो धर्मा उक्ताः । 'स वा एष
नेति नेति' इत्यादि । 'अगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते, अशीर्यो न हि शीर्यते, असङ्गोऽसितो न
सज्जते न व्यथत इत्येवं निषेधो विवृतो, न तु निषेधो द्रष्टव्यम् । अतो
यत्रोत्कर्षस्य विश्रान्तिः, अक्षराद्वा यदुत्कृष्टं तदेव परमिति भावः । उक्तमुण्डक-
श्रुतेः । 'अव्यक्तात् पुरुषः परः पुरुषान् परं किञ्चित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति' रिति काठक-
श्रुतेः । 'अम्भस्यपार' इत्युपक्रम्य, 'अतः परं नान्यदशीयसं हि परात् परं यन्महतो
महान्त'मिति तैत्तिरीयश्रुतेश्च । पुरुषस्य च निषेधोऽप्युक्तत्वात् ।
एतदेव परत्वम् । गीतासु च 'अव्यक्तोऽक्षर इत्युक्तस्तमः परमां गतिम्, यं प्राप्य
न निवर्तन्ते तद्धाम परमं मम । पुरुषः स परः पार्थ भक्त्या लभ्यस्त्वन्नन्ययेति ।
'द्वाविमौ पुरुषौ लोके क्षरश्चाक्षर एव च, क्षरः सर्वाणि भूतानि उच्यते ।
उत्तमः पुरुषस्त्वन्यः परमात्मेत्युदाहृतः, यो लोकत्रयमाविश्य विमर्त्यव्यय ईश्वरः ।
उत्तमः, अतोस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तम' इति
। अत एव, 'न दृश्यते' इत्यादिषु तस्य
निषेधोऽपि युज्यते । न च पुरुषोत्तमाक्षरयोः अद्वैतश्रुतिविरोधः ।
गणितागणितानन्दत्वधर्मभेदेऽपि वस्त्वभेदेन द्वैताभावे तदभावात् । अमित्रादिवद्वैत-

विरुद्धसम्पदूषणानामेकस्य तादात्म्यात्मिकत्वात् । अथवा, शब्दब्रह्मैवेयं परम्, शब्दब्रह्मा-
बापरम् । पञ्चस्कन्धे चित्रकेतुं प्रति ‘शब्दब्रह्म परं ब्रह्म ममोमे शाश्वती तन्न’ इति
भगवानाक्रियस्य द्वे ब्रह्मणी वेदिताये शब्दब्रह्म परं च यत् । शब्दब्रह्मणि निष्णातः परं
ब्रह्माधिगच्छतीत्यादिवाक्यस्य च स्वारस्यात् । ‘एतद्दे सत्यकाम परं च ब्रह्मेति वाक्य-
विचारेऽङ्घ्रोद्धारस्य, ‘एतद्दे यजुर्नयी विद्या प्रतीति धृतौ : सर्ववेदमूलत्वेन वाच्या-
भिन्नत्वेन बोध्यरूपत्वं प्रतिहाय तदभिधानफलकधने एकाग्रित्तयाऽप्रमाणाय नृसा-
निर्मिक्तमुल्लेखतोस्तोलकोक्षमालोकितु यथायथं नास्मानुभव फलमुखार्थचतुर्थमात्रेषोक्ता-
रेण ध्याने, “...” चोक्त्वा, ‘स एतस्माजीवधनात् परात् परं पु रि-
शयं पुरुषमीक्षते’ इति फलमुक्तम् । शङ्कराचार्यमतेऽत्र त्रिमित्र एवोद्धारोदीकृतः । स
पाठो युग्मपीक्षाधीनतन्मयः पुस्तकेभ्यः पाटलिभिः पठ्यमानात् पाठाच्च विरुध्यते, तथापि
त्रिमित्रध्यानेपि ‘अमित्येतैनैवासुरेण परं पु रीशयं पुरुषमीक्षते स तेजसि परे सम्पन्नो
यथा पादोरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह वै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्त’ इत्येतावतो ग्रन्थस्य
‘स एतस्माजीवधनात् परात् परं पु रीशयं पुरुषमीक्षते’ इति ग्रन्थस्यात्रिनश्वेकद्रव्यस्य च
वर्तमानत्वेन शब्दब्रह्म अपरं सृष्ट्युपमन्मात्राप्रतिपाद्यं बापरं जीवधनरूपो यो हिरण्यगर्भः
क्षरः पुरुषस्तस्मात् परमक्षरं ब्रह्म । परं ततोपि यः परः पुरिशयोन्तर्यामी उक्तः, श्री-
केपि ‘तमोद्कारेणैवायनेनान्वेति विद्वान् दत्तश्चन्द्रिकासरिताम्भात् परं परायणं चे’
त्युक्तः स एव पर इति सिध्यति । तथा चात्र परायणं चेति चकारादक्षरात् परः
पुरेशोपि परं परायणं यस्येति योगादक्षरधामवासी बोधितः । तेन मुण्डकवदेत्राप्यर्थः ।
अपरं तु ब्रह्म वेदात्मकम्, हिरण्यगर्भस्य शब्दब्रह्मात्मकत्वात् । ××× मुण्डके ‘यथोर्ण-
नाभिः सृजते गृह्णेते चेत्यादिना अक्षरात् सृष्टिमुपक्रम्य ‘तस्मादेतद् ब्रह्म नामरूपमन्नं
च जायते तदेतत्सत्य’मिति निगमनात् । ‘तदेतद् ऋषिः पश्यन् वामदेवः प्रतिपेद’
इत्यादिश्रुत्युक्ताऽबाधितब्रह्मवित्प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वात् । व्यावहारिको नानरूपप्रपञ्चः, स्वो-
क्तकृष्टसत्ताकतत्प्रपञ्चपूर्वकः, नास्ति। प्राज्ञादिवृत्तिर्विलक्षणविशिष्टा साध्यविशेषण-
योगे सुस्थितिः कल्पनीया । अतो नानरूपादीनामपि न भवेत्तन्मयत्वमिति
सिध्यति । एवं सति ‘मनोमयः प्राणक्षरीरो भारूपः’, ‘अयमात्मापहतपाप्मा विजरो
विद्वत्तूर्विभक्तो विजिघत्सोऽपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्प’ इत्यादिषु । ...
भूमनियाप्रार्षितसप्तधागततन्मायकाय काय विश्वैस्तन्निष्ठोपपत्तिर्यं यदुपासानायोप-
दिश्यते, ... कुतोऽवधारितं येन तस्यापरब्रह्मत्व-
मुच्यते । न भाष्यनुमत्यापि ग्राह्यम् । अजातभाविसिद्धे तथात्वनियमस्य काव्यसिद्धत्वेन
प्रमाणान्न्यत्वात् । न च ‘यन्ननस्ता न मनुते देनाहुर्मनो मतं तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं
चेति ज्ञानायोपपत्तिर्यं यदुपासेते’ इत्यादिषु । अन्यथा, द्वितीयेद-
प्रयोगेनैव प्रमादित्यर्थं प्रागेवोपपादितत्वात् । ‘तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि’ इति वि-

धीयन्तान्नानविधेयस्य ब्रह्मणः पूर्वम्, न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छतीत्यादिना यावत्करणगम्यताया
 ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षादिरूपताया बहुनक्त्यत्वादुपसक्ततात्पर्य एव पर्यवसानेन
 तद्विषयस्य परस्वाप्यपरत्वापत्तेश्च । ननुतुल्यतात्पर्यतायात् । सर्वत्र परस्य ब्रह्मण
 एकत्वेन तस्य च विरुद्धधर्माधारताया उपपादितत्वेन तदभावस्यैवाभावात् । एतेनैव
 अवचनेनैव प्रोवाचेत्यनेनापि प्रत्यक्षत्वात्तदुक्तम् । तद्वानुमान्तत्वं त्वस्यैवोक्तत्वात् ।
 तैश्चिद्व्यापकैश्चिद्विधैश्चैव तत्सिद्धेश्च । एवमिन्द्रो ज्ञानविदित्वेन विदितव्यतामाप्नुय-
 क्षित्वाधिकरणविकार एव विचारितत्वात् तैरपि प्रत्यक्षस्थानावकाशः । अतः

सूक्तानामन्यत्राप्युक्तानां परब्रह्मधर्माणामनाविधकत्वादलौकिकैर्नानागुणैर्यु-
 क्तमप्युपास्यरूपं नापरब्रह्मरूपमिति नौपाधिकम् । × × × × × × × ×

किञ्च, तैरपि कचिद्गौणः शब्दो दृष्ट इति नैतावता शब्दप्रमाणकेथे गौणी न्याय्या,
 सर्वत्रानाश्वासप्रसङ्गादिति । 'तन्निष्ठस्य मोक्षोपदेशादिति सूत्रव्याख्याने यदुक्तं तदपि
 विस्मृतम् । अथवा, 'विदित्विज्ञानकारणे वेदान्तवाक्येभ्य एव युक्त्याभासवाक्याभा-
 सावष्टम्भाः संख्यादिन दिनः उत्तिष्ठन्ते । तत्र पदवाक्यप्रमाणज्ञेन आचार्येण वेदान्त-
 वाक्यानां ब्रह्मावगतिपरत्वप्रदर्शनाय वास्तव्यसामुपयोगानामप्रतिपादः पूर्वपक्षीकृत्य
 निराक्रियन्त इति कथनालक्षणां विरह्य चैव प्रमाणानामन्यत्रैव सम्मतम्,
 नास्माकमिति बोधितमिति प्रभुचरणैर्दिकपदप्रयोगेण ज्ञापितम् ॥ p. p. 1362—
 1368. Anu Bhāshya Prakāśa.

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B. A., LL. B.



Born, 23rd September, 1887. Left this Earth, 26th June, 1927.

The winner of the Bombay University prize for the foregoing essay passed away on 26th June 1927, at the early age of thirty-nine, and thus the life of a brilliant young man, wholly devoted to the cause of the uplift of **गुणिनी**, suddenly came to an end. A short sketch is given here, depicting his life-work, and showing under what difficult circumstances, majority of Indian scholars have to work. He was born on 23rd September 1887 (Aso Sud 7, 1943) in the ancient and holy city of Bhargu-cutchha or Broach situated on the right bank of the Narmada. It was here that king Bali performed his दशाश्वमेध, and gave Lord वामन three steps of earth. It is the abode from most ancient times of Bhargava and other Brahmins well-versed in कर्मकाण्ड. Further up the river are situated the holy places of व्यासाश्रम and शुक्रतीर्थ, the abodes of व्यास and शुक्रनारायण. He was born in a very rich and famous family of विश्वामोड वैश्य. The caste being a very small one, his grand-father Mr. Lalbhai was not married till he was about 55 years old. He went to the pilgrimage of श्रीनाथद्वार and कांकरोली, and at कांकरोली, गोस्वामी श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी, (who flourished later than his namesake the writer of प्रकाश on अणुभाष्य) gave him a blessing that he would have two sons. He replied that he was unmarried and there was no chance of marriage at that age, but the गुरु smiled and asked him to go home. The वरदान came to be true, he married and he had two sons. The family business of cotton also prospered, and their firm had agents at Palej, Miyagaum and other places, and a branch at Bombay. A marriage of a member of the family was performed at

Gulalwady in the 3rd Bhoiwada, Bombay, with great
 pomp, and large vessels were given in gift by the family
 of Gulalwady, which even now may be traced. Their
 prosperity increased, and the cellars of their house were
 filled with silver bars. But when God shows special
 favour to any one, he takes away the burden of wealth,
 and it happened so in this case. A year before the
 birth of Mulchandra there came a sudden crash, there
 was a heavy loss and all the money vanished. On
 account of worldly worries and troubles with which his
 parents were surrounded, Mulchandra inherited a very
 poor, lean, physical body. At any time of life his weight
 was not more than 72 lbs., but this slender body con-
 tained a spirit, which was dauntless, not ruffled by any
 outward show or pomp, and could easily spurn wealth,
 which his family had more than enough till his birth.
 His early years were spent in playfulness and he was
 accustomed to run on the city-walls and swim in the
 river. But he was always the top-boy in his class. His
 memory was so sharp that he could easily remember
 what he read once. He was the pet of his teachers.
 The light jovial nature of this pigmy monitor command-
 ed willing obedience from the strongest, tallest and most
 ambitious boy in the class. After passing his Matri-
ulation Examination in 1905 he joined the Wilson Col-
 lege for further studies. In the College hostel he picked
 up some knowledge of singing and music from his Deccani
 friends. He graduated B. A. with वेदान्त as his optional
 subject in 1909, and he was a favourite student of Mr.
 Madhokamkar, Professor of Sanskrit. In the absence of
 any other calling, he took up government service, as a
 teacher in the Elphinstone High School, Bombay. Thence
 he was selected for the Training College with a scholar-
 ship of Rs. 50 per month, and this gave him an opportu-


nity to read up the course for LL. B. For some time, he lived with Mr. Khimji Cooverji at Walkeshwar, as a tutor to his son.

The first वैष्णवपरिषद् met at Baroda in 1906, the second at Patan in 1907, and the third at Nandurbar in 1909. After this, पुष्टिनिर्दिष्ट the well-known monthly magazine was started, and though he was a student, his constant and powerful contributions marked by his independent thinking and fearless expression created a stir in the वैष्णव world. Mr. Maganlal Ganpatram Shastri, the founder of the Parishad and the Magazine, found in him a young, able and resourceful co-worker. The fourth session of the परिषद् was held at Surat in 1910, and there also he attracted great attention.

He passed his final LL. B. in 1914, and in all probabilities it appeared that he would begin practice at Broach, as the same was his native place, but all were surprised when he took a High Court Sanad and came to settle in Bombay. The reason which led him to this decision without consulting any one, is as under:—

From infancy, he often got dreams in which he found himself flying in the air, and some dreams were suggestive of future events. While at Broach, one early morning before leaving the bed, he got a dream in which he saw श्रीनाथजी, the स्वरूप in the Broach temple, swinging in पलना and smiling at him. He got up with great joy, and after प्रातःनित्यकर्म he went for दर्शन. He was greatly delighted to have the same दर्शन there, not in dream, but in reality. There was पलनामनोरथ and the स्वरूप was adorned in the same वस्त्रालङ्कार as he had seen in the dream, and there was the same joyful, smiling look. While he was returning home, Mr. Jaikisandas, a life-long friend of Teliwala family, called him at his shop, congratulated him

on his passing the 2nd LL. B. examination, advised him to practise in the Bombay High Court, and gave him Rs. 500 required for taking out a Sanad. Mulchandra saw God's hand in all this and without waiting to consult any one, he came to Bombay, took the Sanad, and began practice. He shared the chamber of the late Mr. Kashidas Narayandas Dalal who was the sub-tenant of Mr. Bhailal and who was the Secretary of Pandit Gattulâlâji's संस्था. He helped Mr. Kashidas in preparing the annual टिप्पणी, and from that time Mr. Kashidas took a liking for him. He allowed him full access to the Library manuscripts fully appreciating his great erudition and learning, and finally got him appointed a trustee of the संस्था along with the late Shet Tribhovandas Vurjivandas J. P. The reader will thus see that but for वरदान to his grand-father, the जन्म of Mulchandra was impossible, that at the time of his birth, the worldly wealth was all taken away by way of अनुग्रह, the suggestion and facility to settle in Bombay was all due to the Almighty's helping hand, and finally the greatest convenience for his life-work, viz the possession of an excellent manuscript library of the सम्प्रदाय was provided for him by God; and but for divine help, not one of these series of important events could



have been brought about by his own efforts. The astrologer of his family predicted from his कुण्डली that he would perform a great and memorable यज्ञ, and after more than half of his valuable publica-

tions were out, Mulchandra himself understood the meaning of this यज्ञ, and whenever there were difficulties in his work on account of illness or want of funds or want of manuscripts, he prayed to God, and the prayers were in many cases heard and difficulties solved.

Long before this, Mr. Maganlal Shastri had begun to utilise the वैष्णव परिषद् fund for getting manuscripts copied from पं. गङ्गूलाजी's library in consultation with Mulchandra, but the fund was small, and the work was stopped after some time. In December 1914, Mr. Maganlal Shastri was transferred to the Deccan College, Poona, and he had to leave Bombay in January 1915. The daily Katha Mandli at the Khakhar Building came to a stop, and thereupon at the request of his friends, Mulchandra began reading अणुभाष्य and निबन्ध, every night. The Bombay University prescribed for सुब्रह्मसूत्रज्ञान वेदान्त prize for 1915 the following essay—'Discuss how far शंकराचार्य truly represents the view of the author of the ब्रह्मसूत्रs'. Mulchandra had gone through the प्रकाश of श्रीपुराणोत्तमजी about four or five times, and with his powerful memory he had materials enough for the required discussion. He thought of writing the essay just a month before it was due, and with the wonderful concentration of mind that he possessed, he wrote it out and gave it on the last due date. The language, the outer garment he had no time to correct or adorn, but the thought is so deep, the discussion so balanced, the judgment so impartial, that it is difficult to find fault anywhere, while the comparative method and the wide knowledge that he had gathered from प्रकाश having been fully utilised here must have compelled admiration of his examiners. The prize was divided between him and Mr. Kurtkotli. The essay is published and is very widely read. Scholars like Dr. Bhandarkar, Dr. Thibaut, and many other Orientalists have long ago come to the conclusion that शंकर's interpretation of ब्रह्मसूत्रs does not represent वादरायण's views, but they had not before them अणुभाष्य and प्रकाश, and so they thought that शंकर had, however, well succeeded in making a समन्वय of all important उपनिषत्s. If this view were correct, शंकर would be wiser

than बादरायण. We have no doubt that a wide knowledge of अणुभाष्य, प्रकाश and रहसि would dispel this view. Copies of the Essay were sent to many scholars and many have praised it, and some have expressed their inability to pronounce any judgment as they had not studied the various भाष्य by the comparative method.

In about 1915, at the request of Mr. Tribhovandas of Nadiad to translate सेवाफल, he began collecting साहित्य on it, and at first collected twelve Teekas, some in हस्ताक्षर of authors themselves. Such a collection was never to be found before in any one library or with any one गोस्वामी or ordinary वैष्णव, and he thought of publishing them. Mr. Tribhovandas had no funds for this work, so Mulchandra approached श्रीः विनयलालजी of पोरबंदर for the same. He immediately consented and sent Rs. 500 for the publication. The work was begun at once, and the first volume of his memorable series was published in December 1916. It established his reputation in the पुष्टिसंप्रदाय. So many commentaries were never thought of before by any one, much less seen, and now they had them before their eyes all collected, beautifully printed, and with a lucid introduction in Sanskrit. Three more commentaries were subsequently traced and published along with जलमेद. In this प्रकरणग्रन्थ, श्रीवल्लभाचार्य gives a brief and clear idea of the three sorts of realisations, according to one's अधिकार i. e. (1) अलौकिक सामर्थ्य, by which a भक्त obtains a vision of God, and enjoys indescribable bliss with Him, as is revealed in the श्रुति 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन् सोऽश्रुते सर्वान् कामान् सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता; (२) सायुज्य, as is stated in 'ततो मां तत्त्वतो ज्ञात्वा विशते and (३) वैकुण्ठादिषु सेवोपयोगिदेह, as is stated in यो यदंशः स तं भजेत्. It also describes the three hindrances in the path of realisation, उद्वेग, प्रतिबन्ध and भोग, and various means to remove them. In spite of the चिक्वरण, and the fifteen commentaries, the ग्रन्थ is difficult to under-

stand. The work of publication thus begun went on till the end of his life, 1927. In september 1917, निरोधलक्षण, another प्रकरणग्रन्थ, was published with six commentaries. It relates the different sorts of experiences of a निरुद्धभक्त, shows how to act in the interval before reaching निरोध, and describes the various साधन in various stages. As many readers desired to have a Gujarati translation, the टीका of श्रीकुरुक्षेत्रजी was translated by his colleague and published with it. सन्यासनिर्णय was the third प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with eight commentaries, and a Gujarati translation as before. The circumstances under which सन्यास may be taken up by an aspirant are discussed in this ग्रन्थ. श्रीवृद्धभाचार्य says that in कर्ममार्ग it should not be taken, specially in कलियुग; in भक्तिमार्ग it should not be taken up in the साधन stage, for the convenience of ध्रुवण etc.; it can only be taken up for experiencing—for the realisation of the seperation of thousands of years from the Lord, viz., सत्सुखपरिवत्सारभितकालजातकृष्णधियोज्जिततापयेऽज्ञानन्दविभोयार्थम्. This सन्यास is very difficult to obtain. It can only be had by love, the love of the गोपिकाs, the greatest among devotees, the dust of whose feet was revered by उद्धवजी, and the obligation of whose self-less love; even the Lord of Love, Krishna Himself could not recompense. In ज्ञानमार्ग, सन्यास is not desirable either in the beginning or in the final stage. To men of the present generation, the discussion is more or less of academic interest only, but it does give some consolation to those devotees who find themselves in a world engrossed in trifling pursuits, and who are in search of a path to reach आनन्दमय ब्रह्मन्. This was followed by the publication of तैत्तिरीयोपनिषत् with the भाष्य of मध्वपति जयगोपालभट्ट. This उपनिषत् is the most important in the सम्प्रदाय, as श्रीवृद्धभाचार्य follows this शाखा. Besides it is the basis of some of the most important teachings of the सम्प्रदाय, containing the साधन of परमाप्ति, a clear description

of its फल, a description of आनन्दमय ब्रह्मन् and अन्नमय, प्राणमय, मनोमय and विज्ञानमय पुरुषाः. Though श्रीवल्लभाचार्य had no time to write भाष्यs on various उपनिषद्s, he clearly distinguished ब्रह्मवाद from मायावाद and other वाद्s, and chalked out a clear line; श्रीविठ्ठलेश्वर showed by his writings how to progress on the line, and श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and श्रीयोगिनोपेश्वरजी have done much by giving the meanings of various उपनिषद्s, whenever they got opportunities, specially in प्रकाश and रस्मि. It is the duty of साम्प्रदायिक scholars to collect all the passages and compose उपनिषद् भाष्यs on these lines. श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी has also written complete भाष्यs on some उपनिषद्s, and it is our duty to find them out and publish them. भक्तिवर्धिनी is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with fourteen commentaries. In order to make भक्तिबीज दृढ, a man should stay at home (not to leave गृहस्थाश्रम) and worship God with पूजा, श्रवण etc., without caring for व्यावृत्ति if possible, and always engage his mind in श्रवण etc., in such a way that he should gradually get प्रेम, आसक्ति and व्यसन, towards God. By प्रेम, the attachment to the world vanishes, by आसक्ति he gets अरुचि towards गृह and गृहस्थानां बाधकत्वं अनात्मत्वं च भासते, by व्यसन in कृष्ण, he becomes कृतार्थ, having followed the उपदेश in मन्मनाभव मद्भक्तो etc. Even after reaching this stage, he should be very careful and live in the company of other भक्तs engaging himself in सेवा or कथा till he lives. सिद्धान्तमुक्तावली is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with nine commentaries. The सिद्धान्त in a nut-shell is कृष्णसेवा. सेवा is तत्प्रवर्णं चेतः, and its साधन is again तनुजावित्तजासेवा. The चित्त thus becomes तन्मय in कृष्ण, संसारदुःख vanishes and ब्रह्मबोध is the result. कृष्ण is परब्रह्म, अक्षरब्रह्म has two forms, the second one being जगत्, which is neither मायिक, nor सगुण nor कार्य, as represented by various schools of philosophy, but तदेवैतत् प्रकारेण भवतीति श्रुतेर्मतम्. Just as the water of the Ganges is आधिभौतिक गंगा, the power of the Ganges to give a worshipper भोग and मोक्ष is आध्यात्मिक and the देवी गंगा is आधिदैविक, so are जगत्, अक्षरब्रह्म and कृष्ण.

Hence it is no wonder that कृष्ण could show the whole जगत् to यशोदा in His mouth. जीव is अक्षरात्मक and अणु in essence, and not by उपाधि. It becomes संसारी by उपाधि of अविविद्या. When अविविद्या is removed by प्रपत्ति, जीव knows its true nature of being ब्रह्मांश, and worships कृष्ण as stated in यो यदंशः स तं भजेत् or gets सायुज्य as stated in विशते तदनन्तरम्.

सिद्धान्तरहस्य is another important प्रकरणग्रन्थ published by him with eleven commentaries. He published with it the much-abused and misinterpreted ब्रह्मसम्बन्धमन्त्र, and wrote a long and considered introduction in English, so that those who care to know the truth and nothing but the truth about the पुष्टिसम्प्रदाय may know it at a glance, and prejudices caused by rumours may be removed. This ग्रन्थ teaches us that by establishing सम्बन्ध with ब्रह्म, all our दोष are removed, that in all कार्यसु all things should be dedicated to God, that we should reject all things not dedicated to God, and that we should lead the life of a servant of God.

That जीव is essentially of three different kinds is taught by श्रीचन्द्रभाचार्य in पुष्टिप्रवाहमर्यादा which is published with four commentaries. 'इच्छामात्रेण मनसा प्रवाहं सृष्टवान् हरिः । वचसा वेद-मार्गं हि पुष्टिं कायेन निश्चयः ।' In प्रवाह, फल is only जायस्व, म्रियस्व, in वैदिक मर्यादामार्ग, फल is स्वर्गमोक्षादिरूप, and in पुष्टिमार्ग, फल is कायेन, आत्मज्ञानादभ्रपादगुणोदरादिरूपेण. पुष्टिजीव is created for रूपसेवा of God, which सेवा is otherwise impossible. In स्वरूप, अवतार, लिङ्ग and गुण there is no difference between पुष्टिजीव and God. Among मिश्रजीवः, पुष्टपुष्ट are सर्वज्ञ, like नारद and ऋषभ, पुष्टिप्रवाहमिश्र are क्रियारत like धृतदेव and निमि, पुष्टिमर्यादामिश्र are गुणज्ञ like भीष्म. भगवान् is the फल of पुष्टिजीव, प्रकट or manifest in भक्तहृदय and in लीलास्थान वृन्दावन &c. नवर्तन is another प्रकरणग्रन्थ published with five commentaries. It teaches that a भक्त who has devoted himself to the service of God should give up all anxieties arising from any cause whatever, should remember that he is merely a servant of God, who is merciful, he should always keep his चित्त in सेवा and live peacefully, removing

चित्तोद्वेग, he should give up चिन्ता, thinking that whatever God does, is His लीला; thus he should stay on uttering श्रीकृष्णः शरणं मम.

पत्रावलम्बन, the challenge affixed to the door of काशी-विश्वेश्वर at Benares by श्रीवल्लभाचार्य, is published by him with the commentary of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. It is one of the most difficult ग्रन्थs on वेदान्त we ever met with. वेदान्ताधिकरणमाला is a very clear and beautiful analysis by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी of all the अधिकरणs. The माला of the Fourth अध्याय was re-written by श्रीदेविगोपेश्वरजी, as he could not get it. Mulchandra could fortunately trace a single manuscript in the Bhandarkar Research Institute, and published it together with गोपेश्वरजी's भावप्रकाशिका ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्ति which he published is composed by the master-minds श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रजी and श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. श्रुतिरहस्य contains the स्तुति of श्रीवल्लभाचार्य with quotations from वेदs of his अग्निस्वरूप. शृंगाररसमण्डन, स्फुरत्कृष्णप्रेमामृत, मधुराष्टक, प्रेमामृत, परि-वृढाष्टक, रसाब्धि, मनोदूत and हृदयदूत are the प्रमेय group of ग्रन्थs published by him. The full significance of रसो वै सः cannot be understood unless one studies (1) तैत्तिरीयोपनिषद् (2) रसनिष्पत्तिप्रकार given by श्रीवल्लभाचार्य in वेणुगीत and elaborately explained by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी, (3) श्रुति passages quoted and explained in रासपञ्चाध्यायी, (4) आनन्दमयाधिकरण, लिङ्गभूयस्त्वाधिकरण and फलाध्याय, (5) the synthetical view of श्रीनारायणत given in भागवतार्थनिबन्ध, and the various passages scattered in सुबोधिनी explaining the meanings of परब्रह्म, अक्षरब्रह्म, आत्मा and रस. If the ultimate reality were only अस्थूलम्, अनणु, अह्रस्व, अदीर्घ &c., and nothing more, it is a question why the Vedas selected for describing it the word ब्रह्म derived from वृद् to grow or increase, आत्मा derived from अत् to spread, and रस derived from रस् to taste. All the three words are positive, and signify growth like that of a वृक्ष, spreading like that of a पट, and sport or लीला like that of a नट, respectively. The words themselves exclude the idea of a mere विवर्त, which is an illusion of the mind,

and they inherently imply परिणाम, nay, स्वरूपपरिणाम. The श्रुति 'पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं' also explains that though the जगत् proceeds from ब्रह्म, ब्रह्म remains पूर्ण as before. श्रीगङ्गाधरपाण्डेय has explained भागवत in detail, giving the meaning (1) of the whole भागवतसंग्रह, (2) of each स्कन्ध, (3) of each प्रकरण (4) of each अध्याय and (5, 6, 7) of each वाक्य, पद and अक्षर, thus giving a synthetical view of the whole, and he states that a man who understands भागवत thoroughly becomes मुक्त. Fortunately the greater part of his commentary सुबोधिनी on भागवत has been published. The first three स्कन्धस have been already published and Mulchandra himself has published फलप्रकरण (दशमस्कन्ध पूर्वार्ध २६-३२) with all the available साहित्य on it, and he has also published दशमउत्तरार्ध (१-२१). The work of completing दशम स्कन्ध is in hand, and it will soon be in the hands of the reader. The depth and grandeur of श्रीवल्लभाचार्य's teachings will be known to the world only when these works are studied.

Sometimes four or five works were in the press at the same time, and his countenance was full of joy, if on some उत्सव day he could publish them all together.

His first marriage took place at Ujjain in 1911-12, and he was blessed with a wife who was very pious, spending about two hours every morning in religious highly devoted to her husband, and had a strong and healthy constitution. Mulchandra's mother also was called from Broach, and all lived in Bombay. His income being very limited, they had to live an extremely frugal life, devoid of all luxuries such as tea, vegetables and milk; but it was peaceful and contented. His first son was born in 1914, and a daughter was born in 1915. But even this little happiness did not last long. His daughter died, followed by his wife who died at Broach from fever incident on delivery in Diwali, viz., about October 1917, and Mulchandra and his son were

put to great difficulties for daily food. There were no means to engage a cook, or a servant to take care of the son. When the father went to court at 11 A. M. after locking the room, the son passed his time somehow with the neighbours, and if the father did not return at 6 P. M., the lonely son would sit in front of the door with a stream of tears flowing from his eyes down the cheeks, and with constant sobs which no amount of persuasion could check. When ultimately he did arrive, the boy would fly into his arms, and would not leave him even in bed and till next day's fateful hour 11 A. M. One source of his little income was some small commissions which were given to him by the Chief Judge of the Bombay Small Causes Court, who appreciated his value, thereby showing his great regard for him, for his sterling character and great learning. For this work, pleaders asked him to fix time after 5-30 P. M., which this junior Mulchandra did, but after some bitter experiences of the above nature, he avoided engagements after 5-30 p. m. It was under such difficulties that the life-work of Mulchandra was done.

In 1919 (Vaishakh 1975) he went to श्रीमन्मन्त्रालय and कांकरोली at the time of यज्ञोपवीत ceremony of श्रीमन्मन्त्रालयजी son of श्रीमन्मन्त्रालयजी. He had with him a company of friends including उत्सवलाल, चन्दुलाल, and others. With their help, he saw the libraries of कोटा and gathered important information from manuscripts from all possible sources. He also saw the Nathadwara Library. The library of श्रीविठ्ठलजी, the second house in which श्रीहरिरायजी and योगिगोपेश्वरजी flourished, could not be seen, though many efforts were made, and it still remains to be seen with a view to find out all the ग्रन्थs of श्रीहरिरायजी and श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी. It was at the time of this trip that the publication of श्रीटिप्पणीजी was undertaken, and the circumstances under which it was done, and the important discovery of the पाण्डु draft in the

हस्ताक्षर of श्रीगुरुसंज्ञी which it led to, are fully described in the introduction of श्रीगुरुसंज्ञी. His second marriage took place at Surat in 1920, in दशमोद caste. The dowry was fixed at about Rs. 750, but Mulchandra could ill afford this cash and he got a loan from a friend without asking for it. श्रीवज्ररत्नलालजी of Surat graced the marriage procession by his presence. His second wife has two sons and a daughter.

In 1917, his friend उत्सवलाल invited Mulchandra to Anand, and told him in the course of conversation that he had seen रश्मि at Surat. Mulchandra sent him to Surat to fetch it, which he did. It was a portion found in a very bad condition, and since then Mulchandra tried to collect रश्मि manuscripts from all sources, and one of his great desires was to be able to publish भाष्य प्रकाश and रश्मि together. Through the help of श्रीगोकुलनाथजी of वडामंदिर, Bombay, he succeeded in arranging in May 1925 to get funds from the Gordhandas Soondardas Trust administered by Sheth Lalji Naranji and others, and curtailed all other activities, so that he might be able to devote his undivided attention to the publication of this great work. He was able to publish only three volumes consisting of the First, Second and Third Padas of the Third अध्याय before his death.*

In 1927, Shree Tikāyat Maharaja Shree Gordhan Lalji and Lalbāvā Shree Dāmodarlālji invited him to श्रीनाथद्वार and he went there accompanied by his friend Messrs. Jamnadas Kanji, Gordhandas Pragji and Hira Lal Mulji. He was shown a few pages of the 3rd अध्याय and a complete manuscript of the 4th अध्याय of अणुभाष्य and he found them to his great delight in the हस्ताक्षर of श्रीगुरुसंज्ञी. In this manuscript the portion of the second interpret:

* After his death, the work is continued by us; the Fourth Pāda of the Third अध्याय is published, the First Pāda of the Fourth अध्याय is ready printed, and the Second Pāda of the Fourth अध्याय is in the press.

tion of the first two sūtras of the Fourth aṅgīya is subsequently added by Śrīgusāṅgī. A minute inspection of the manuscript left no doubt in Mulchandra's mind that the author of the work was Śrīgusāṅgī himself.

He had a very wonderful genius for research. His creative faculty, powerful imagination, extremely retentive memory and a deep alround knowledge of the Sāmpradāyika Gāthās helped this aptitude for research to such an extent that he compelled old worn-out manuscripts to speak out, to whom they belonged, from whom they were stolen, when they were written, in whose hand-writing they were and other special details about each of them, with a quickness and preciseness which would win the admiration of even the hero of a detective novel. We would give an instance and narrate the facts in his own words:—

“નવ પુસ્તકના આધારે શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીનું શોધન કરી અમે મુદ્રણકાર્યમાં ફલપ્રકરણના પ્રથમાધ્યાયના અન્તભાગપર્યન્ત આવ્યા. ‘ક્રિયા સર્વાપિ સૈવાત્ર’ એ સુખોપધીકારિકાનું વ્યાખ્યાન કાંઈક વિલક્ષણ લાગ્યું. આથી શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીત તત્પ્રકાશ જોયો. આ પ્રકાશ પણ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીનો નિજ શ્રીહસ્તાક્ષરે લખેલો અમારે ત્યાં વિરાજે છે. તે જોતાં નીચેની પંક્તિ વાચવામાં આવી:— ‘અત્ર કારિકાવ્યાખ્યાનં ટિપ્પણીપુસ્તકેષુ દ્રશ્યતે તત્ પાણ્ડુલિખને નાસ્તીતિ શ્રી-ગોકુલનાથાનાં તત્ પ્રતિમાતિ, લેખરીત્યાપિ તથેતિ ચ ।’ અહિં કારિકાનાં પાણ્ડુલિખનમાં થાય છે, પાંડુલિખનમાં નથી, તેથી શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું તે હોય એમ લાગે છે, લેખરીતથી પણ તેમજ લાસે છે. એ કારિકાવ્યાખ્યાન શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું છે એમ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી કહે છે તે વાતને એ જ કારિકા-વ્યાખ્યાનનું સ્વતંત્ર પુસ્તક જે અમારી પાસે વિદ્યમાન છે તે પુષ્ટિ આપે છે. તે પુસ્તકમાં આ પ્રકારે લખેલું છે:—શ્રીશ્રીવદ્ધમો જયતિ । દશમના અઘ્યાય ૨૬ ને સમાપ્તે શ્રીઆચાર્યજીની કારિકા ૫ ॥ છે, તે મધ્યે પહેલી કારિકા જે ‘ક્રિયા સર્વાપિ સૈવાત્ર પરં કામો ન વિચતે । તાસાં કામસ્ય સંપૂર્તિર્નિષ્કામેનેતિ તાસ્તથા ॥ ૧ ॥ શ્રીજીકૃત ણ્દુ લિખન.’ આના પછી મુદ્રિત શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીમાં વિદ્યમાન સંસ્કૃત વ્યાખ્યાન અક્ષરશઃ આવન્ત લખેલું છે. શ્રીગોકુલેશના અન્તરંગ સેવકા એઓ-શ્રીને પુરુષોત્તમભાવથી શ્રીજીસંજ્ઞાથી વ્યવહારે છે. આથી શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીનું કથન કે આ વ્યાખ્યાન શ્રીગોકુલનાથજીનું છે તે સુદ્ધ થાય છે. આ તો અપ્રસ્તુત પ્રસંગ થયો, પરંતુ આ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજીની પંક્તિથી અન્ય વાર્તા સ્ફુરી. આ લેખથી

એમ જણાયું કે શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી પાસે આ પાંડુલિખન શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીનું હોવું જોઇએ, અને શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી સુરતમાં થયેલા હોવાથી ઉક્ત પુસ્તક સુરતના શ્રીગોકુળના મંદિરમાં હોવું જોઇએ. આ અનુમાનોથી દોરાઈને અમે એક વિનંતિપત્ર આ સંબંધમાં શ્રીવજરતનજીને લખ્યું. મહારાજશ્રીએ નિજમંદિરમાં વિદ્યમાન સંગ્રહમાં તપાસ કરી, પરંતુ પાંડુલિખનનું પુસ્તક તેમાં મળ્યું નહિ. તેથી આપશ્રીએ અમને જણાવ્યું કે ઉક્ત શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીનું પુસ્તક અમારે ત્યાં સુરતના મંદિરમાં નથી. આ પ્રત્યુત્તરથી અમારા અન્તરાત્માને સંતોષ થયો નહિ, તેથી સ્વતઃ સુરત જઈ આનો નિશ્ચય કરવાનું સ્પર્ધ્યું. આથી દીવાળીની રજામાં ગત આશ્વિન શુકલ ત્રયોદશીને દિવસે અમે સુરત ગયા. તે જ દિવસે મહારાજશ્રીવજરતનજીને વિનંતિ કરી કે આપશ્રીને ત્યાં સેવામાં વિરાજતા હસ્ત-લિખિત પુસ્તકોનું દર્શન કરાવવા કૃપા કરો. મહારાજશ્રીએ કૃપા કરી અમારી વિનંતિ લક્ષમાં લઈ બીજે જ દિવસે-આશ્વિન શુકલ પૂર્ણિમા-રાત્રોત્સવને દિવસે-પ્રાતઃકાલે ગ્વાલ અને રાજભોગના અનવસરમાં ઉક્ત પુસ્તકોનું દર્શન કરાવ્યું. હસ્તલિખિત પુસ્તકોનું દર્શન કરતાં અમને બહુજ આનંદ તથા સંતોષ થયો. અમને માલૂમ પડ્યું કે શ્રીમદ્દેવકીશ્વર પ્રભુચરણના નિજ શ્રીહસ્તાક્ષરે લખેલા શ્રીટિપ્પણીજીના મૂલ પુસ્તકજી ત્યાં બિરાજે છે. અને આજ પુસ્તકનો ઉપન્યાસ શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી પાંડુલિખન તરીકે કરે છે.”

Its substance is:—Having corrected the press-copy of શ્રોટિપ્પણીજી with the help of nine manuscripts, we came to the end of the first અધ્યાય of ફલપ્રકરણ. The explanation of ક્રિયા સર્વાપિ સૈવાત્મ સેવાત્મ seemed strange to us; therefore we referred to શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી's પ્રકાશ on it. We have got a copy of it in his own handwriting. Therein we read the following line:—“The explanation of કારિકાસ is seen in ટિપ્પણી manuscripts, but it is not in the rough draft, therefore it appears to have been written by શ્રીગોકુળનાથજી; the style of writing also leads to the same conclusion.” This opinion of શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી is supported by another manuscript of કારિકા-વ્યાખ્યાન which is with us. The following is found written in that manuscript:—“At the end of the 26th અધ્યાય there are five and a half કારિકાસ of શ્રીઅત્યાદેજી, the first of which is ક્રિયાસર્વાપિ etc. This writing is composed by શ્રીજી.” This is followed by the explanation given in ટિપ્પણી manuscripts. This line of શ્રીપુરુષોત્તમજી led to another line of thought,

i. e., that the 'rough draft' must be of श्रीटिप्पणीजी, and it must be in श्रीबालकृष्णजी's मंदिर as श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी lived at Surat. Led by these inferences, we wrote a letter to श्री... about it who searched his Library, but he could not get the rough draft, and wrote to us accordingly. But this reply could not satisfy our inner self, and we thought of going to Surat for it. We went there on Aso sud 13, and requested श्रीवज्ररत्नजी to show us the हस्ताक्षर deposited in सेवा. The Maharaja kindly granted our request, and the next morning—the Rasotsava day, we were overjoyed to have the दर्शन of श्रीटिप्पणीजी in the handwriting of श्रीगुरुदासजी himself, referred to as rough draft by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी.

Besides tracing the original of टिप्पणी, some of the other important results of this genius for research which has put the whole Sampradaya in great obligation to him might be summed up as under:—

2. भरुची वैष्णव give the date of श्रीगुरुदासजी's birth as 1529, and not 1535, and the place of birth as चोडाग्राम and not चंपारण्य. Mulchandrarao got an old manuscript of कल्लोल from these भरुची, in which one old श्लोक (about 3rd or 4th) about नामकरण or ordinary matter was deleted, and the श्लोक specially mentioning date and place was substituted, scratching out the old one. There was not the slightest necessity of scratching out the old श्लोक but the writer purposely did it with an ulterior motive. The manuscript was returned, and since then it is not produced by वैष्णव उत्सवबालं भरुची though repeatedly demanded. From the time we saw the mss., we were convinced about the interpolation, thus leaving no doubt that the date given by भरुची 1529 is not correct, as also the place चोडाग्राम.

3. Very little was known to the सम्प्रदाय about श्रीकृष्णचंद्रजी. It was he who pointed out the deep obligation under which श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी was to his गुरु for adopting the comparative method of writing, to unearth and publish

as an appendix to Vol. III of भाष्यप्रकाशरश्मि, कृष्णचन्द्रजी's टीका on सुबोधिनिरुद्ध, and to draw attention to the different इतिश्री's in the भावप्रकाशिकावृत्ति showing which portion was written by श्रीकृष्णचन्द्रजी himself and which was collected, set right or written by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी.

4. It was he who obtained the Fourth अध्याय of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी's अधिकरणमाला from the Bhandârkar Research Institute, and published it. योगी श्रीगोपेश्वरजी could not get it, and so he wrote out the Fourth अध्याय himself, which also has been printed as an appendix, thus facilitating a comparison between the writings of two master-minds.

5. A copy of some portion of बृहद्भाष्य was found many years ago, and published in पुष्टिभक्तिध्या. It was well-known then to every student that this contained words, phrases and sentences which were also found in प्रकाश and वृत्ति. The portion was published for what it was worth for the information of the public. The matter rested there for several years. Two or three years ago, Mulchandra got a *rough draft* of the same portion of the बृहद्भाष्य, and he had no difficulty in tracing it to रामकृष्णभट्ट, the learned शास्त्री of काशीस्थ श्रीगिरिधरजी, and the टीकाकार of शुक्तिरहस्य. In the introduction to भाष्यप्रकाशरश्मि ३-१-१ published in samvat 1982, Mulchandra wrote on p. 12 as under:—"In conclusion we ought not to omit reference to one work which passes in the name of श्रीमद्भाष्य of श्री Vallabhâchârya. Some passages of the जिज्ञासाधिकरण and the First Pada of the Third Adhyâya and 11 Sutras of the Second Pada have been seen by us. The portion from the Third Adhyâya has been published by us in the monthly Pushti-Bhakti-Sudhâ. From the style, this seems to be a clumsy attempt of a writer of recent times. All copies seen by us are new. The style is such as leaves

* The draft is with us at present.

little doubt in our minds as to the spurious nature of this production." Notwithstanding this, Mr. Jethalal Shah, who has recently published અનુવાદ of ૧-૨ અગ્ર્યાયસ writes in his introduction on p. 9, "...સદ્ગત તેલીવાલા એવું માને છે કે શ્રીયજ્ઞભાષ્યને અભિસૂત્ર ઉપર એ ભાષ્ય રચ્યા હતા...તેના પુરાવા તરીકે પુષ્ટિભક્તિસુધાના વર્ષ ૬ માં પ્રકટ થયલા લખાણને રજુ કરે છે અને તે પ્રકટ થયેલું લખાણ તે "શ્રીમદ્ભાષ્ય અગર બૃહદ્ભાષ્ય" છે." To attribute to Teliwala what he deliberately considered "spurious" is misrepresenting a departed scholar, misleading oneself and misleading the public. His conclusion which he puts in bold type on p. 16., "પાછળથી દ્વિતીય-રજીએ બૃહદ્ભાષ્ય રચ્યું હશે" is also due to ignorance. To say that અણુમાળ્ય derives its name from the અણુત્વ of જીવ is absurd, because the જિજ્ઞાસા is not જીવજિજ્ઞાસા, but બ્રહ્મજિજ્ઞાસા, and the અણુમાળ્ય is not જીવદ્વિજ્ઞાણમાળ્ય, but બ્રહ્મદ્વિજ્ઞાણમાળ્ય. The present requirements of the સમ્પ્રદાય are not arguments based on antiquated opinions, but investigation and research which would throw more light on the સમ્પ્રદાય.

6. It was he who identified a manuscript of સુબોધિની now at Dabhoi, as originally belonging to શ્રીદામોદરલાલજી, son of શ્રીગિરિધરજી, the eldest son of શ્રીગુણંદજી. The additions made by શ્રીગુણંદજી to સુબોધિની are put into brackets in this manuscript. While reading સુબોધિની, it was found difficult to establish any connection between some sentences, which difficulty is removed by શ્રીગુણંદજી's additions being thus separated. The તામસકલપ્રકરણ is published from this manuscript, by Mulchandra.

7. The idea of collecting all the ટીકાસ on ષોડશગ્રન્થસ and publishing them together was his; he successfully carried it out, and helped ચીમનશાસ્ત્રી and હરિકૃષ્ણશાસ્ત્રી with manuscripts to complete the series.

8. He collected ટીકાસ of શ્રીગુણંદજી on સિદ્ધાન્તમુક્તાવલી and pointed out that શ્રીગુણંદજી had made additions to the ટીકા at least four times.

9. It was he who first found out that — of the first house wrote his टीकास and sent them to his गुरु श्रीवल्लभजी of the fifth house who made many changes in them. The copies made from the original became known as श्रीवज्रराजजी's टीकास, and those that were altered became known as श्रीवल्लभजी's टीकास.

10. He went to श्रीनाथद्वार, identified the Fourth अध्याय of भाष्य as written out wholly by श्रीगुसांइजी, in which second interpretation of first two सूत्रस is subsequently added, thus conclusively showing that the whole was written by श्रीगुसांइजी.

11. He found out फलप्रकरणप्रकाश in the हस्ताक्षर of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and published the same.

12. He collected two copies of भाष्यप्रकाश, first in श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी's own hand and got and identified a subsequent copy of प्रकाश in which additions and alterations were made by श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी. He adopted for publication the final copy of प्रकाश and hence we find differences in the readings of the प्रकाश in रश्मि, as रश्मिकार श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी had got only the first copy of प्रकाश with him.

13. He threw new light on श्रीगुसांइजी's life, which is published in रश्मि Vol. IV and विद्वन्मण्डन with dates as traced by him.

14. He found out that the सुवर्णमेखला that श्रीवल्लभान्वार्यजी presented was not to श्रीविठ्ठलनाथजी of पंढरपूर, but it was to श्रीविठ्ठलनाथजी of विजयनगर, where there was a temple of श्रीविठ्ठलनाथजी.

15. He obtained from श्रीवज्ररत्नलालजी of सुरत the will of श्रीपुरुषोत्तमजी and published the same.

16. He collected and published several स्वतन्त्रलेखस in पुष्टिमक्तिमुष्ठा and वेणुनाद.

17. He laboured hard and succeeded in collecting रश्मि, the monumental work of श्रीयोगिगोपेश्वरजी and with the help of श्रीगोकुलनाथजी of बडा मन्दिर, Bombay, he arranged for publication of the same.

On account of his wide knowledge about the history of the सम्प्रदाय together with a clear perception of the facts of the case put before him, he was consulted by गेस्त्रासि in their cases, and his services were utilised by S'ri Gokulnathji of Bombay and his son S'ri Krishnaji in Madras and Dharangaon cases, in both of which they succeeded, and also by Shri Gopeshwarji who also won his case at Madras.

Again, if there was an attack against the पुष्टिसम्प्रदाय and his presence was required at any place, he never refused, but started immediately. He had thus to go to सिहोर (near Indore), Mehemdabad, Patan, Savali and other places.

The necessity of a Research Institute for the सम्प्रदाय was recognised through the efforts of Mulchandra by Shri Tikayat Maharaja of Nathadwara, and Shri Vallabhacharyaji, son of S'ri Dattatreya offered him a decent block of four rooms in Chandrabag, and Mulchandra went to live there in Chaitra of 1923. But God willed it otherwise. He fell ill, went to Broach during the Summer vacation in the High Court, and when he returned in June 1927, he had not thoroughly recovered. He was attacked with unbearable neuralgic pain in the head on 18th June 1927, and he passed away on 26th June 1927.

Though he died young, his abilities as a great Scholar were recognised by Oriental scholars as well as Sampradayika scholars. Mr. Woodroffe, Mr. Keith, the late Mr. Tansukhram Mansukhram Tripathi, Anant Shastri of Shanti Niketan, Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya, Bal Shastri and Nandkishore Shastri, all acknowledged his scholarship. Mr. Tansukhram was always delighted with his conversation, and gave him from his vast collection whatever manuscript or book was requir-

ed by him. Mr. Keshav Harshad Dhruva was so much delighted to read his introduction of *शृङ्गाररसमण्डन* that he came to see him, and expressed a desire to read with him *सुखरसिका* works, and *दयारामनो अक्षरदेह* was entrusted to him by Mr. Govardhanram's brother to make suitable changes for the second edition.

The guiding principle of his life was 'अतोऽन्यदातेम्' a phrase in the *अन्यदातेन्द्राक्षर* of *बृहदारण्यक उपनिषद्*, meaning 'Everything else except God is painful.' He was born tired with the world, for which he had a deep-rooted disgust, and he had realised from very early age that real *आनन्द* was in *आनन्दमय भगवान्* only. There was therefore a touch of cynicism in his words, which were mildly sarcastic even when talking with men most highly placed in life, and a sort of non-attachment in all his worldly deeds. But his spirit was always young, buoyant and playful, and one enjoyed innocent, slightly mischievous joy in his company.

He had a very noble heart. Many Brahmins and friends came to him for *सुखरसिका* or support, and he did whatever he could for them. We were sometimes even puzzled to see how he could help one who had done him wrong or abused him. The whole of the *Nirnaya Sagar Press*, the Proprietor, Manager, Shastri, and compositors, all loved him, and they feel a void in their daily life without his cheerful presence. The compositors would whisper in your ears how he had helped them, and allowed their pro-notes passed to him for advances to be time-barred. It was due to this nobility that he freely acknowledged whatever help he received in his work by way of money, manuscripts or co-operation. This leads us to note another important trait of his which was complete *आश्रय*, viz., willing dependence on the will and wisdom of the Lord, at all times,

however critical and in all matters, however important. His mind was therefore always at ease, and he was never oppressed with burden or weight on his head for anything whatever. “भगवदिच्छा सर्वत्र मूलम्, न बुद्ध्यादिदोषाः शङ्कनीयाः ।” सु. ११. १. १८. This was ingrained in him, and hence under most trying circumstances, he was most light-hearted.

This आश्रय resulted in other important traits, *viz.*, अभय, स्वसान and निःस्वार्थ, fearlessness, self-respect and self-sacrifice. Though he had nothing, he seemed to possess everything; he could talk straight to a king on equal footing, and while engaged in सम्प्रदायसाहित्यसेवा, in his small room, he acted like a happy king, surrounded by co-working companions all merry-making, sometimes sitting two on broken chairs, or comfortably couched on the broad handles of a broken easy-chair. The chairs were sometimes discarded and heaped out of the room near the door, for making room for men. His children cried and ran to him to escape the wrath of the mother, and insisted on sitting on his table, full of old manuscripts, or in his lap, while he was deciphering some knotty passage in an old manuscript. The mother of the children perhaps silently cursed the man for his neglect of the house and its inmates, and even expressed her disapprobation in sharp significant words. This was all well as it was, because it was God's will, which is always best, and the work of comparing and correcting manuscripts, sometimes five, sometimes ten at a time, went on till midnight with the help of a jewel-lamp in the middle. गोस्वामी श्रीव्रजरत्नलालजी of Surat, as well as most prominent personages and वैष्णव from Kathiawad, Sind, Calcutta, Nainital and Madras saw him in this room. The difference between the small room and the great man, who was doing the abstruse work of deciphering and publishing old manuscripts was patent to all.

This *आश्रय* and *धैर्य* resulting from it kept him always collected, though there was the greatest cause for losing one's temper. If there was a caste-dinner at his place, and there was none to work and no invitations were sent, he was calm; if there was a procession, and no band was available, he was calm; if people did not pay the money due to him, it was God's will; if members of the family were laid up with illness, if he was unjustly attacked in news-papers, he was not the least disturbed. He went on quietly with his self-imposed work, with a concentration of mind and with a non-attachment to surroundings (*असंग*) simply marvellous. This concentration continued even in sleep, and then naturally he got dreams. His little room was filled with hallowed light (so he said and we fully believe him) and he saw, (at any rate he believed he saw) at one time श्रीगुरुदेवजी and at other times other great persons or *भक्त*s. When he woke next morning after such a dream, there was a joyous smile on his face which was unmistakable, and the writer can never forget the innocent smile on his face on the morning of the last day of his life on this Earth, the 26th June, which clearly showed that he had some *दर्शन* in dream.

His sudden death was a great loss to the *सम्प्रदाय*, and the hearts of almost all *वैष्णव*s were moved by this great loss. Two telegrams were received from गोस्वामी श्रीगोवर्धन-लालजी तिलकायित, one to take care of his wife and children, and the other to hold a meeting to which he promised to send his representative. A similar telegram was received from लालबाबा श्रीदामोदरलालजी to the same effect, and many others followed in quick succession. A meeting was immediately held in Bada Mandir, Bombay, and गोस्वामी ^ ^ ^ announced Rs. 500 as his subscription to the fund for a memorial to be raised after him. Mr. Ranchhoddas Patwari also subscribed Rs. 251. Meetings

were also held at Ahmedabad, Dabhoi, Sankheda, Mangrol and a dozen other places, and a grand meeting was held in Bombay on 24th July 1927 in Mulji Jetha Market Hall under the presidency of the Hon'able Mr. Justice Krishnalal Mohanlal Jhaveri. Goswami S'ri Gokulnathji moved the first resolution as under:—

“વેદાન્તના સુપ્રસિદ્ધ ગુજરાતી વિદ્વાન્ અને પુષ્ટિમાર્ગીય વૈષ્ણવ સંપ્રદાયના સદ્ગત વૈષ્ણવ મૂલચન્દ્ર તુલસીદાસ તેલી-વાલા બી. ઇ., ઇલ.ઇલ. બી., ઇમ. આર. ઇ. ઇસ., વકીલ, હાઇકોર્ટના, જેઠ વડ ૧૨ ને રવિવાર તા. ૨૬ મી જુન ૧૯૨૭ ની રાત્રિષ્ઠ થયલા અકાલ અવસાન વઢલ મુંવડના આચાર્યોની, વૈષ્ણવોની અને સદ્ગતના મિત્રોની તેમજ વચ્ચાણનારાઓની આ સભા પોતાનો અત્યંત શ્રદ્ધા પ્રદર્શિત કરે છે, અને તેમના અવસાનથી સમસ્ત ગુજરાતને, અને વિશેષતઃ પુષ્ટિ-સમ્પ્રદાયને ગયલી મોટી ઓટની દિલગીરી સાથે નોંધ લે છે, અને સદ્ગતના કુટુંબ ઉપર આવી પડેલી આ અળખારી આપત્તિમાં તેમના પ્રતિ પોતાની દિલસોજી દર્શાવે છે.”

This resolution was seconded in suitable language by Goswami S'ri Ranchhodlalji, son of S'ri Jivanlalji of Porebunder, and supported by Mr. Hanumanprasad M. A., the representative specially sent to Bombay from S'ri Nathadwar by S'ri Govardhanlalji Tilakayit Maharaja and his son S'ri Damodarlalji. He read in the Meeting the letter of condolence sent by His Holiness S'ri Govardhanlalji and gave Rs. 1001 for a suitable memorial. The second resolution was moved by Sheth Lalji Naranji and seconded by Rao Saheb Harjiwan Valji as under:—

સદ્ગત રા. મૂલચન્દ્ર અતિશય પરિશ્રમ સહીને પ્રાચીન દુષ્પ્રાપ્ય સામ્પ્રદાયિક સંસ્કૃત સર્વાંગ સુંદર પ્રકારે પ્રસિદ્ધ કરીને આપણને જે કળમાં મુક્તિ છે, તે કળમાંથી કાંઈક અંશે મુક્ત થવાને તેમનું યોગ્ય સ્મારક ડુંગર કરવાને તથા તેમના કુટુંબના શિક્ષણાદિ સર્વ પ્રકારક સંરક્ષણનો પ્રવંધ કરવાને તેમને આ વંતે વાવતની સર્વ વ્યવસ્થા કુલ કરવાને નીચેના સભ્યોની પોતાની સંખ્યામાં વધારો કરવાની સત્તાસાથે કમિટી નીમવાનો આ સભા ઠરાવ કરે છે.

Decent sums were announced for the memorial and a committee appointed to collect funds.

SELECT OPINIONS.

‘Discuss how far S’ankarâchârya truly represents the view of the Author of Brahmasûtras.’

A masterly essay, criticism sober, unbiassed and scholarly. Should be carefully studied by all the students of the Brahmasûtra.

—Modern Review for September, 1918.

This is an able and scholarly dissertation on the well-known subject of the correctness of S’ankara’s interpretation of the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyana. It must however be said to the author’s credit that he sets out the views of other Bhâshyakâras like Râmânuja, Shrikantha, Nimbârka, and Bhâskara in various places, and his exposition of the difficulties to which Sankarâchârya is reduced by his desire to get the nirgunavâda out of the Sûtras, must be convincing to all except those who are pronounced in their ‘nirvîśeshavâdina.’

—Indian Review for November, 1918.

It is scholarly and shows marks of deep study and thinking.

—Dr. S. K. Belvalkar, M.A., Ph. D.,
Prof. of Sanskrit, Deccan College, Poona.

I have found it very interesting reading, and you have well developed the points on which you rely as showing the differences between Sankara and Bâdarâyana. The discussion has brought to my mind a question to which I have elsewhere alluded, namely whether it is not better to hold to two apparently contradictory affirmations, leaving spiritual experience to realise rather than to neglect one at the cost of other.

—Sir John Woodroffe—Judge, Calcutta High Court.

श्रीमद्ब्रह्मभाचार्याखण्डशुद्धाद्वैतब्रह्मवादीपयुक्तेषु संस्कृतमुद्रितपुस्तकेषु
केषाञ्चिन्नामानि मूल्यं मार्गव्ययरहितम् ।

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पाठशाला केथिडलस्ट्रीट भूलेश्वर

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